Re: The Analysis of Knowledge
※ 引述《popandy (pop)》之銘言：
: ※ 引述《aletheia (HERESY)》之銘言：
: In my understanding, Goldman's causal theory of knowing seems to provide
: a causality condition besides the traditional three. Although the extent of
: knowledge in his causal theory slightly differs the traditional extent of
: knowledge, basicly, his causal theory contains the truth, belief and
: justification condition. Furthermore, the causality condition actually
: confirms the legitimacy of the three conditions above.
: In "A Causal Theory of Knowing", Goldman surely argues from a focus
: on 'causality'. He begins his analysis of knowledge with the discussion of
: four major kinds of knowledge: knowledge by perception, knowledge by memory,
: knowledge by inference and knowledge by testimony. Then he proposes a causal
: theory to specify the conditions for one to know something. However, his main
: concern for 'causal connection' does not remove the traditional conditions
: from his theory of knowledge.
: Goldman formulates his analysis of knowing as follows:
: S knows that P if and only if the fact P is causally connected in an
: 'appropriate' way with S's believing P.
: We can see the sufficient and necessary conditions of knowledge, for Goldman,
: is 'the fact P is causally connected in an 'appropriate' way with S's
: believing P', in which 'appropriate' means warranted ways by perception,
: memory, or reconstruction of a causal chain, as the major cases of knowledge
: mentioned above. Here reconstruction of a causal chain leave room for other
: possible causally perceived experiences, say ESP (extrasensory perception).
: In short, he sets out from 'causality' but at last comes to 'truth',
: 'belief', and 'justification.' Thus, 'causality' is certainly the forth
: condition on the basis of the traditional analysis.
: Perhaps I do not grasp your meaning of "以別的方式來進行",
: your further comments are welcomed.
喔喔 我手邊沒有這篇
看過後不知道丟哪去了
我憑一些印象回答 有錯的話先包含一下吧
在傳統的三條件中，證成往往被視為要求S能夠知道自己的證成，有股內在論的味道。
這點是連外在論也承認的，我想在常識中應該也沒什麼問題。
畢竟當一個人說他知道時，我們總希望他要負起在當下說明的責任。
Goldman的casual theory 是外在論的方式，
產生信念的過程有因果連結就是證成，就算是S不知道這個連結
都沒關係。傳統所說的證成和信念的產生沒有必然關係，
只要你能說明你的知識就好，誰管他從哪裡來。而Gettier問題的起因就在於
傳統談的證成根本不對，必須要談「恰當的產生」：知識的可靠性出於他的來源。
用他裡頭火山爆發的例子我想應該可以知道一二，
後來跑來的那個人不能說他知道火山爆發，其原因在於他
產生的p沒有適當的因果連結，這樣的知識不可靠。
我是有點想說Goldman以因果連結取代了傳統上的第三-證成條件，
不過沒有看到原文有點心虛，但意思應該是這樣沒錯。
回到你剛上面寫的，你也很清楚的寫了他的定義 'appropriate way'
不就是證成嗎？ 至少在我的印象中除了這個'appropriate way'之外，
Goldman也沒有提到關於要如何證成知識的咚咚。
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◆ From: 210.85.6.135
※ 編輯: aletheia 來自: 210.85.6.135 (11/04 00:38)
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