Re: The Analysis of Knowledge
※ 引述《popandy (pop)》之銘言：
: 標題: Re: The Analysis of Knowledge
: 時間: Thu Oct 30 10:12:27 2003
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: ※ 引述《kinddog (為自己加加油)》之銘言：
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:
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: : : Gettier's Problem
: : : In his short 1963 paper, "Is justified true belief knowledge?",
: : : Edmund L. Gettier proposed two counterexamples to the traditional
: : : analysis. In this article, Gettier intends to argue that the three
: : : sufficient and necessary conditions of knowledge, in the past firmly
: : : asserted by many, are indeed not sufficient for knowledge. That is to say,
: : : the three conditions for a proposition P do not logically make it knowledge.
: : : Gettier demonstrated that to us in the opposite way, that is, 'S knows that P'
: : : is not the necessary condition for the three statements. (That A is
: : : the sufficient condition for B is identical with that B is the necessary
: : : condition for A.) Even though the conditions above are true, S still does
: : : not know that P. thus, P is exclude from knowledge. He described two cases,
: : : in which (1), (2) and (3) are true but 'S knows that P' is false, that is,
: : : S do not know that P.
: : : In case one, Smith believes and is justified in believing that
: : : 'The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket', for the president
: : : assured him that Jones would get the job and he had just counted the coins
: : : in Jones's pocket. At last, Smith got the job and, unknown to him, he
: : : happened to have ten coins in his pocket. So what Smith believes is true,
: : : but Smith doesn't know it. In case two, the similar situation offers
: : : the counterexample to argue that 'S knows that P' is false when the
: : : alleged sufficient conditions is true.
: : case2跟case1有何不同呢?
: : 看不出來ㄟ
: Here I do not depict the case 2, for it is similar to the case 1
: in the point that the justified belief turned out to be true
: out of luck. So, the case 2, in my opinion, is the same as the case 1
: , offering a counterexample to deny the traditionally alledged
: sufficient conditions for knowledge.
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: : : An Alternative Approach
: : : Above, we noted that the role of the justification condition is to ensure
: : : that the analysis does identify as knowledge a belief that is true out of
: : ^^^^
: : 我覺得這裡應該是"does not"
: : 降子跟下一句話比較接的起來
: I am sure that it is 'does'. In priciple, the justification condition is to
: guarantee the accuracy of the traditional analysis in identifying knowledge.
: As a matter of fact, it fails to serve the purpose of guaratee. Therefore,
: in the next sentence, I wrote that "the justification condition by itself
: cannot ensure this."
:
: Thank you for your comments.
這段的第一句話意思是the justification condition is to guarantee 傳統的分析把一
個出於幸運而為真的信念當成知識.(如果是用"does")
Is this what you mean ?
: : luck.
: : : The lesson to be learned from the Gettier problem is that the justification
: : : condition by itself cannot ensure this. Even a justified belief, understood
: : : as a belief based on good evidence, can be true out of luck. Thus if the
: : : traditional analysis of knowledge is to exclude all cases in relation
: : : to luck, it must be amended with a suitable fourth condition, a condition
: : : that succeeds in the qualification of knowledge.
還有你寫的英文很簡潔
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※ 編輯: kinddog 來自: 218.34.21.61 (10/30 18:48)
※ 編輯: kinddog 來自: 218.34.21.61 (10/30 18:49)
※ 編輯: kinddog 來自: 218.34.21.61 (10/30 20:47)
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