Re: The Analysis of Knowledge

看板W-Philosophy作者popandy (pop)時間20年前 (2003/11/03 19:50)推噓8(8推 0噓 0→)

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※ 引述《aletheia (HERESY)》之銘言： : ※ 引述《popandy (pop)》之銘言： : : An Alternative Approach : : Above, we noted that the role of the justification condition is to : : ensure that the analysis does identify as knowledge a belief that is true : : out of luck. The lesson to be learned from the Gettier problem is that the : : justification condition by itself cannot ensure this. Even a justified : : belief, understood as a belief based on good evidence, can be true : : out of luck. Thus if the traditional analysis of knowledge is to exclude : : all cases in relation to luck, it must be amended with a suitable fourth : : condition, a condition that succeeds in the qualification of knowledge. : 版主寫的嗎？ : 還不錯咧，你英文蠻在行的。 : 不過我對這段有點想法 : 「必定要追尋第四個條件」有點太武斷，這第四條件有時第五第六都出來了。 : 或許可作些修改？ : 像Alvin Goldman就是以別的方式來進行，詳見 A causal theory of knowing : 試圖解答Gettier's problem In my understanding, Goldman's causal theory of knowing seems to provide a causality condition besides the traditional three. Although the extent of knowledge in his causal theory slightly differs the traditional extent of knowledge, basicly, his causal theory contains the truth, belief and justification condition. Furthermore, the causality condition actually confirms the legitimacy of the three conditions above. In "A Causal Theory of Knowing", Goldman surely argues from a focus on 'causality'. He begins his analysis of knowledge with the discussion of four major kinds of knowledge: knowledge by perception, knowledge by memory, knowledge by inference and knowledge by testimony. Then he proposes a causal theory to specify the conditions for one to know something. However, his main concern for 'causal connection' does not remove the traditional conditions from his theory of knowledge. Goldman formulates his analysis of knowing as follows: S knows that P if and only if the fact P is causally connected in an 'appropriate' way with S's believing P. We can see the sufficient and necessary conditions of knowledge, for Goldman, is 'the fact P is causally connected in an 'appropriate' way with S's believing P', in which 'appropriate' means warranted ways by perception, memory, or reconstruction of a causal chain, as the major cases of knowledge mentioned above. Here reconstruction of a causal chain leave room for other possible causally perceived experiences, say ESP (extrasensory perception). In short, he sets out from 'causality' but at last comes to 'truth', 'belief', and 'justification.' Thus, 'causality' is certainly the forth condition on the basis of the traditional analysis. Perhaps I do not grasp your meaning of "以別的方式來進行", your further comments are welcomed. -- ※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 140.112.248.231

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