Re: The Analysis of Knowledge

看板W-Philosophy作者 (為自己加加油)時間20年前 (2003/10/30 00:53), 編輯推噓0(000)
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※ 引述《popandy (pop)》之銘言: : Introduction : Epistemology has been a major branch in western philosophy since : Descartes established his philosophical system. A significant problem : in epistemology, a study for knowledge, is what are the conditions : for one to possess knowledge. In Anglo-American philosophy, it is : a prominent topic that impressed a number of researcher, as well as me. : In the following section, I shall sketch out the analysis of knowledge : in the present day. : The Analysis of Knowledge : The objective of the analysis of knowledge is to specify the conditions : that are separately necessary and jointly sufficient for propositional : knowledge: knowledge that such-and-such is the case. Propositional knowledge : is distinctive from two other kinds of knowledge outside the scope of : the analysis here: knowing a place or a person, and knowing how to do : something. The concept of knowledge is analyzed commonly in virtue of : the schema "S knows that p", where "S" refers to the knowing subject, : and "p" to the known proposition. An analysis is presented in the following : form: S knows that p if and only if X. X refers to a list of conditions : that are separately necessary and jointly sufficient. To test whether : a proposed analysis is correct, we must examine (a) whether every : possible case in which the conditions are met is a case in which S knows : that p, and (b) whether every possible case in which S knows that p is : a case in which each of these conditions is met. : The traditional analysis, which was once take for a sound one, : goes as follows: : S knows that P if and only if (1) P is true, : (2) S believes that P, and : (3) S is justified in believing that P. : Condition (1), the truth condition, receives nearly universal assent. : It is overwhelmingly clear that what is false cannot be known. : Condition (2) and (3), though has generated some degree of discussion, : in principle are accepted. : Gettier's Problem : In his short 1963 paper, "Is justified true belief knowledge?", : Edmund L. Gettier proposed two counterexamples to the traditional : analysis. In this article, Gettier intends to argue that the three : sufficient and necessary conditions of knowledge, in the past firmly : asserted by many, are indeed not sufficient for knowledge. That is to say, : the three conditions for a proposition P do not logically make it knowledge. : Gettier demonstrated that to us in the opposite way, that is, 'S knows that P' : is not the necessary condition for the three statements. (That A is : the sufficient condition for B is identical with that B is the necessary : condition for A.) Even though the conditions above are true, S still does : not know that P. thus, P is exclude from knowledge. He described two cases, : in which (1), (2) and (3) are true but 'S knows that P' is false, that is, : S do not know that P. : In case one, Smith believes and is justified in believing that : 'The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket', for the president : assured him that Jones would get the job and he had just counted the coins : in Jones's pocket. At last, Smith got the job and, unknown to him, he : happened to have ten coins in his pocket. So what Smith believes is true, : but Smith doesn't know it. In case two, the similar situation offers : the counterexample to argue that 'S knows that P' is false when the : alleged sufficient conditions is true. case2跟case1有何不同呢? 看不出來ㄟ : An Alternative Approach : Above, we noted that the role of the justification condition is to ensure : that the analysis does identify as knowledge a belief that is true out of ^^^^ 我覺得這裡應該是"does not" 降子跟下一句話比較接的起來 luck. : The lesson to be learned from the Gettier problem is that the justification : condition by itself cannot ensure this. Even a justified belief, understood : as a belief based on good evidence, can be true out of luck. Thus if the : traditional analysis of knowledge is to exclude all cases in relation : to luck, it must be amended with a suitable fourth condition, a condition : that succeeds in the qualification of knowledge. -- ※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 218.34.21.61 ※ 編輯: kinddog 來自: 218.34.21.61 (10/30 01:17)
文章代碼(AID): #_d_2Hjn (W-Philosophy)
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文章代碼(AID): #_d_2Hjn (W-Philosophy)