Re: [閒聊] 老共的新戰機

看板Military作者ryannieh (new)時間13年前 (2011/01/13 02:54)推噓9(9推 0噓 22→)

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http://tinyurl.com/4bm4zu7 J-20 - The Dragon Gets Airborne Posted by Bill Sweetman at 1/11/2011 7:27 AM CST A lot of people have weighed in so far on what the appearance of the J-20 prototype (or prototypes, as some pictures suggest) means for Chinese and US strategy. （很多人在討論J20原型機對中美戰略的影響） What's fascinating is that, faced with the same kind of information gap that we dealt with in the Cold War, the debate has fallen into the same mold, pitting the hawks against the skeptics. This time around, however, a lot of the people arguing that the J-20 is a propaganda exercise, a preliminary prototype at best, are on the inside of the Pentagon. （令人訝異的是我們面臨了和冷戰時期一樣的資訊鴻溝：討論陷入了鷹派和懷疑論者的論戰。但這一次，很多懷疑論者是在五角大廈這一邊：他們懷疑J20只是宣傳的幌子） If you wanted to be really, really cynical about this, you would note that a certain white-haired gentleman in the Pentagon is on record as saying that China won't have an operational stealth aircraft before 2020, and that public disagreement with said gentleman has (on occasion) turned out to be sub-optimal from a career-development standpoint. （如果你很機車的話，蓋茲可以算上一個這樣的。他說2020年前中國不會有投入服役的的匿蹤機。這對他的官運有傷啊！） However, belief that the J-20 is a long way off is also based on comparison with recent US program performance - and although this may produce the right answer, it will do so for the wrong reasons. （但是，認為中國在這方面還有很長的路要走的想法，雖然不一定是錯的，卻可能是基於錯誤的理由：拿美國近來相關計畫的時間來推論中國也要那麼多時間。） When it comes to timing, the right answer for now starts with admitting that we don't know the answer. We have no good track record for the pace of development in China because it is not that long since China's economy started to take off, and not that long since the Maoist doctrine of the PLA - favoring numbers and politics over technology - gave way to a major program of modernization. One generation of Chinese development - represented by the J-10/10B, JF-17 and J-11B doth not a trend make. （要知道正確的答案，我們得先承認我們不知道答案。中國經濟才起飛沒多少年，整個制度現代化的歷程沒有多入。一世代的發展很難讓人對趨勢做出結論。） The key pointers to the timing at this point are mostly out of sight from the West, because they are items that can be simulated or tested on the ground. They include progress with active electronically scanned array radar, passive electronic surveillance systems and (as often mentioned) propulsion. Blog photos do not tell us very much about that kind of hardware. （網上的照片很難告訴我們實際的情況，尤其是關於AESA或電子偵查或推進系統之類可以在地面實驗或模擬的科技） Still less do they say much about the other essential element of a stealth aircraft, the complex sensor fusion and threat avoidance software that allows it to track targets with minimal transmissions while flying a precise path around planned and pop-up threats. （同樣難以知道的還包括資料融合以及能同時進行電磁訊號管理和精確飛行計畫的任務管理軟體） It is probably a safe assessment that the J-20 is the first Chinese stealth aircraft (unless it has been preceded by another, covert demonstrator), so it will be a learning tool as well as a prototype in its own right. Almost regardless of the date at which it first enters service, its capabilities will evolve as the threat does. （可以很安全地說，J20是中國首種匿蹤機（除非還有別的外面不知道的實驗機存在），它會是個原型機和了解相關科技的平台。無論它何時投入服役，最後它的威脅會和它的能力一同增加） And do not forget the other X-factor: China's unprecedented access to foreign technical data via cyberespionage, data that can be widely disseminated without putting the intelligence system itself at risk. （更不用提中國還有一項利器：中國的網路竊秘行動） As for the aircraft itself: start with the size. Capability has been favored over low unit cost. And even with the in-development 33,000-pound-thrust WS-15 it may have a lower thrust-to-weight ratio than many of its contemporaries. Relative to Typhoon or Rafale, the wing appears more highly loaded and more sharply swept, favoring speed rather than ultimate agility. （關於這飛機，先從它的尺寸談起。即使用上了發展中的， 33000磅(?)推力的WS15，推重比仍相對於颱風和飆風不足。其翼型顯示高翼負荷，較有利於速度而非敏捷性） In LO terms, if this is truly a case of WYSIWYG, we are looking at a modified version of the F-22/F-35 "bowtie" signature pattern - actually a sort of Wild Bill Hickock "string tie" with the dangling strings being the rear sector. （關於低可視度，如果真的看到什麼就是什麼，那麼它的訊號圖譜是一個類似於F22/35的「蝴蝶結」形──事實上是拖著一堆尾巴的蝴蝶結形） What is interesting about this is the ATF history, where the stealth requirement started along those lines. But Lockheed and Northrop promised the full bowtie with very low rear signatures, with no performance or cost penalty, and the requirement was changed. Whether that was really a smart idea, I don't know. （在ATF發展的歷史中，類似的設計也出現過。但LM和諾斯若普提出完全的、不需成本或性能犧牲的蝴蝶結設計，最後設計需求也提高至該水平。J20的設計是不是一個聰明的決定呢？我不知道。） What this suggests is that the Chinese expect to use this aircraft in circumstances where it can disengage, turn and run - maintaining engagement control, in short. （這樣的設計暗示了J20設計的作戰環境是可以脫離戰鬥並轉身離開的情況） This isn't surprising. While the J-20's proportions may be reminiscent of the F-111, it is unlikely to have the same mission (penetrating strike). The PLA, from the antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) through air-launched cruise missiles on the 1950s-technology H-6 bomber to its Type 022 missile boats, seems happy to leave the last run to the target to the missile. Also, for the time being, the PLA is not looking at having to fight through an integrated air defense system and fight its way out again. （這並不讓人意外。J20的尺吋或許像F111，但它不太可能被拿來執行同樣的穿透打擊任務。眾多的歷史經驗顯示PLA不介意讓飛彈來跑最後一程。並且，目前PLA並沒有要穿透IADS 再殺出血路來的需求） What the J-20 should do best is go fast, at high altitude, over a decent range - which leads to my guess is that this aircraft is primarily air-to-air, designed to cause the US really big problems with non-survivable air assets – tankers and ISR. Defending them against a rapidly developing attack by aircraft with a reduced frontal RCS would not be easy. （J20應該最適合高空大速長程的作戰任務。我猜測其主要為攻擊加油機或電戰／預警機的空對空任務。要防衛這樣的攻擊很困難） Range, relative positioning and initiative are the key. With a long unrefueled range and useful sustained supersonic flight (just how good it will be depends on engine data we don't have), the J-20 could hold high-value air assets too far from China to be of much use. It doesn't have to be able to mix it one-for-one with the F-22: there are not enough F-22s to defend everything at Pacific distances. （航程、相對位置及計劃為這樣任務的作戰關鍵。以其長航程和超巡能力，J20可以迫使高價值空中目標遠離中國而無法發揮作用。中國甚至不需要太多這樣的飛機，因為並沒有足夠的 F22來保衛整個太平洋戰區。） The long-range P-38 Lightning could not close-combat a Zero, but then it didn't have to - and its pilots also learned very quickly that its level and climb speed advantage permitted them to control the engagement. （這就像P38對抗零式的策略：P38沒辦法和零式近戰，但它可以用它的速度和爬升率優勢來控制交戰的時機。） Another longer-term possibility for the J-20 is a "baby Backfire" to threaten Aegis ships, another vital and limited asset, with an air launched, supersonic sea-skimmer missile - and you don't have to sink them, just use dispersed kinetic weapons or an EMP warhead to put the antennas out of service. （另一個較長期才會實現的可能性是把J20當迷你逆火來對抗神盾艦。它可以發射超音速掠海反艦飛彈，而且用不著非要擊沉神盾艦──用散佈的動能或EMP彈頭來癱瘓其雷達天線就行。） Both these missions fit with the anti-access/area denial (A2AD) theme that runs through a lot of PLA planning, including medium-range missile development. US freedom of operation inside the "second island chain" around China - running from Japan south to Guam and West Papua and encompassing the Philippine and China seas - depends on bases such as Andersen in Guam and Kadena in Japan, on tankers, airborne ISR and on carrier air power, and those assets increasingly support one another. （這兩種任務都符合解放軍一貫的反進入／區域拒止戰略。美國的軍事行動自由依賴第二島鏈上的基地、加油機、電戰／預警機和航艦兵力。它們彼此愈來愈相互依賴。 That's where an operational J-20 - whenever it appears – will generate options for the PLA and problems for its adversaries, and that is the figure of merit for any deterrent system. （這是當J20投入服役，無論何時，PLA所會增加的作戰選擇和它的對手所要面對的問題。這無疑地造成了威懾。） -- ※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 96.238.154.155

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