Re: [分享] 學者Mearsheimer烏克蘭不應該放棄核武已刪文
上一篇不少推文說Mearsheimer是以大國的角度來看
看完這篇1993年的文，不知道還是不是一樣
文中寫道1991年烏俄的關係是不錯的
Mearsheimer能在二三十年烏俄關係不錯的背景
先預見現在歐美的態度，烏克蘭放棄核武的錯誤，俄國出兵理由
還是覺得很神
The case for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent
烏克蘭的核武議題
https://reurl.cc/VjQxQR
Abstract
Conventional wisdom argues that Ukraine should be forced to give up its
nuclear weapons to ensure peace and stability in Europe. This is quite wrong.
As soon as Ukraine declared its independence, Washington should have
encouraged Kiev to fashion its own secure nuclear deterrent. The dangers of
Russian-Ukrainian rivalry bode poorly for peace. If Ukraine is forced to
maintain a large conventional army to deter potential Russian expansion, the
danger of war is much greater than if it maintains a nuclear capability. US
policy should recognize that Ukraine, come what may, will keep its nuclear
weapons.
大綱
有些論點認為烏克蘭該放棄核武來確保在歐洲穩定與和平的發展，這個想法錯得離譜。作
者認為烏克蘭獨立，美國應該要鼓勵烏克蘭建立他們的核武威攝能力，如果烏克蘭是以維
持一個大型的傳統武裝部隊來防堵俄羅斯的擴張，風險會遠高於烏克蘭擁有核武的風險，
美國應要讓烏克蘭保有自己的核武能力。
看得很快，如果有時態文義錯誤的地方還請見諒，僅節錄部分翻譯
WHO CONTROLS THE WEAPONS?
The breakup of the Soviet Union left Ukraine with almost 4,000
nuclear weapons on its territory. Ukrainian leaders emphasized
before and immediately after Ukraine declared its independence on
December 1, 1991, that Ukraine would transfer all of its nuclear
weapons to Russia by the end of 1994, sign the Nonproliferation
Treaty (npt) and live the life of a nonnuclear state.
蘇聯解體後，有約4000枚核武留在烏克蘭境內
(註: 其他網站資料顯示烏克蘭核武量曾經世界前3大，僅次美、蘇)
烏克蘭的領導人聲明在烏克蘭獨立之後烏克蘭會依據核武禁擴條約
把這些核武轉移到俄羅斯
WHO CONTROLS THE WEAPONS?
True to its word, Ukraine moved all of its tactical nuclear weapons
to Russia between January and May 1992. However, none of
Ukraine's 1,656 strategic nuclear weapons have been transferred to
Russia. That force, which is aimed at the United States but could be
programmed to strike Russia, includes 130 SS-19S (6 warheads each),
46 SS-24S (10 warheads each), and 30 Bear-H and Blackjack bombers
(together carrying 416 bombs), making a total of 1,656 nuclear
weapons.
在1992的1月到5月之間，烏克蘭把所有的戰「術」型核武(tactical nuclear weapon)轉
移到俄羅斯。但是，烏克蘭所有的1656枚戰「略」型核武(strategic nuclear weapon)，
卻沒有一個移轉到到俄羅斯。這些核武，是用來針對美國的，但也可以用來打擊俄國。
後面都是在辯證烏克蘭跟俄到底誰才能真正掌握這些核武的國家我就不貼上來了
總之作者認為，證據顯示烏克蘭才是實際掌控這些核武的國家
WHY RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN PEACE IS IMPORTANT
A war between Russia and Ukraine would be a disaster. Great power wars are
very costly and dangerous, causing massive loss of life and worldwide
turmoil, and possibly spreading to involve other countries. The likely result
of that war-Russia's reconquest of Ukraine -would injure prospects for peace
throughout Europe. It would increase the danger of a Russian-German
collision, and sharply intensify the security competition across the
continent.
烏克蘭跟俄羅斯的戰爭會是場災難，大國間的戰爭將造成許多生命的消逝還有世界的動盪
，甚至把戰爭的影響擴散到其他國家，既危險且成本高昂。
可能的結果是俄羅斯將再次奪回烏克蘭，破壞整個歐洲的和平前景，這將增加俄德衝突的
危險，並加劇歐洲大陸的軍事競爭。
A conventional war between Russia and Ukraine would entail vast military
casualties and the possible murder of many thousands of civilians. Russians
and Ukrainians have a history of mutual enmity; this hostility, combined with
the intermixing of their populations, raises the possibility that war between
them could entail Bosnian style ethnic cleansing and mass murder. This war
could produce millions of refugees clamoring at the borders of Western
Europe.
俄羅斯和烏克蘭之間的傳統戰爭將導致大量軍事人員的傷亡，導致數千名平民遭受殺害。
烏克蘭和俄羅斯人一直以來對彼此互有敵意，這些敵意加上種族混合的人口，可能會導致
波士尼亞式的種族清洗與大規模屠殺。這場戰爭還可能導致西歐邊界出現數百萬的難民。
In addition, there are 14 operational nuclear reactors in Ukraine that might
produce new Chernobyls if left unattended or attacked during a conventional
war. The consequences of such a war would dwarf the death and suffering in
the Balkans, where more than 50,000 people have died since the summer of
1991. Needless to say, if nuclear weapons were used the costs would be
immeasurable.
更甚者，烏克蘭境內有14座核反應爐，如果無人看管或遭受攻擊，可能會出現新的車諾比
事件，如果真的發生上述的悲劇，巴爾幹半島在1991年的內戰衝突來對比烏俄衝突的災難
，可能就不算什麼了。更不用說，如果烏俄衝突使用上了核武，這些代價更難以估計。
There is also the threat of escalation beyond the borders of Russia and
Ukraine. For example, the Russians might decide to reconquer other parts of
the former Soviet Union in the midst of a war, or might try to take back some
of Eastern Europe. Poland and Belarus might join forces with Russia against
Ukraine or gang up with Ukraine to prevent a Russian resurgence. The Germans,
Americans or Chinese could get pulled in by their fear of a Russian victory.
(Doubters should remember that the United States had no intention of fighting
in Europe when war broke out in 1914 and again in 1939.) Finally, nuclear
weapons might be used accidentally or purposefully against a third state.
除此之外，烏俄邊界以外還有其他可能的威脅，舉例來說俄羅斯可能會意淫並想要再次對
部分東歐壞壞，波蘭跟白俄羅斯可能會加入俄羅斯的行列或者聯合烏克蘭一起抵禦俄羅斯
。德、美、中可能會因為對俄羅斯勝利的恐懼而捲入戰局(懷疑者應該要回想美國”宣布
中立”在1914、1939年戰爭爆發一開始是沒有意願在歐洲作戰的，最後還不是乖乖來了)
，最終，核子武器可能會有意或無意地用在第三國。
註:美國最近在北約增派人手了
The security environment in Europe would certainly become heated and
competitive in the wake of a Russian war with Ukraine. Other great powers
would move quickly and sharply to contain further Russian expansion. The
Russians would then think seriously- for security reasons-about controlling
their many smaller neighbors. Other great powers would move to check them.
在烏俄戰爭之後，歐洲的環境將會產生激烈的變化。其他的大國將會採取措施來防堵俄羅
斯的擴張，屆時俄羅斯會認真思考來控制其他鄰居小國，其他的國家也會採取因應措施。
One might expect the burden of deterring a resurgent Russia to fall to an
American-dominated nato, in effect, bringing back the Cold War order that
kept Europe at peace for 45 years. That outcome is not likely, however, for a
number of reasons. The United States is reducing force levels in Europe
significantly, which will cause it to lose much of its leverage on the
continent. Even if Russia behaves aggressively, U.S. troops are not likely to
return to Europe in large numbers, mainly because the Germans are capable of
bearing most of the burden of checking the Russians. The Germans are
well-located geographically to counter Russian expansion, and they are strong
enough to do so. Germany not only has a powerful economy, but its population
has just increased by almost 20 million. Russia, even with the conquest of
Ukraine, would probably be markedly less powerful than the former Soviet
Union.
可能會有人認為以美國為首的北約組織會負責遏止俄羅斯的工作，實際上並不是這樣，因
為許多原因，美國正大幅從歐洲減少軍事部屬，這將會削減美國在歐洲的影響力。即使俄
國的行為極具侵略性，美國的軍事佈署也沒有要重返歐洲的跡象，主要的原因是德國具有
能力承擔主防俄羅斯的工作。德國好山好水(戰略位置)，國力也足夠強能讓它們對抗俄國
。德國不只擁有強勁的經濟體系，人口也剛達到2000萬人。俄羅斯即便征服了烏克蘭，可
能也不如之前的蘇聯強大。
A multipolar Europe with a German-Russian security competition at its core
might be inevitable, regardless of Ukraine's fate. Germany and Russia will
probably be the two most powerful states in post-Cold War Europe.
Nevertheless, an independent Ukraine dampens that competition because it is a
formidable barrier between Russia and Germany. Remove that key buffer,
however, and the borders of the two most powerful states on the continent
would be much closer to each other, with the territory in between occupied by
weak states. An intense political rivalry focused on this new buffer zone
would probably result.
若無視烏克蘭的命運，德俄的軍事競爭將很難避免。德俄將可能分別是冷戰後最強大的歐
洲國家。獨立的烏克蘭有助於穩定歐洲大陸的情勢，因為烏克蘭成為強大的屏障，阻隔了
俄國與德國。如果消除了這個關鍵的緩衝，其他弱國的領土會被吞食，這兩個強大的國家
會更近距離的接觸，在新的緩衝區更為激烈的政治衝突就可能發生。
WHY THE ALTERNATIVES WILL NOT WORK
To deter Russian aggression in a future crisis, Ukraine might consider
developing a conventional deterrent, or asking the West to extend it a
security guarantee. These alternatives, however, are not feasible.
為防堵未來俄羅斯可能的侵略，烏克蘭可能會考慮發展傳統武力，或者要求西方為其提供
安全保障，但是這些方案都是不可行的。
A Ukrainian conventional deterrent is not a viable option because Ukraine
cannot build an army powerful enough to stop a Russian attack. Ukraine's army
might put up dogged resistance, but it would eventually be defeated. Russia
is simply too powerful. The best indicators of latent military
power-population, gross national product, industrial output-show Russia to be
about three times more powerful than Ukraine. Even if Ukraine had a stalwart
conventional deterrent, a nuclear-free Ukraine would still be vulnerable to
Russian nuclear blackmail.
烏克蘭的軍事武力不是一個可行的選項，因為烏克蘭沒有辦法打造一支足以抵禦俄羅斯攻
擊的軍隊，就算烏克蘭的軍隊會頑強的抵抗，但是最終還是會被俄羅斯擊敗，原因無他，
因為俄羅斯的軍事實力實在太強了。即使烏克蘭擁有強大的傳統軍事力量，沒有核威攝能
力的烏克蘭仍容易受到俄羅斯的核武威脅。
Finally, Ukraine would have to ruthlessly extract resources from its society
if it tried to compete with its bigger neighbor at the conventional level.
Conventional military power is significantly more expensive than nuclear
military power and requires a larger military; hence it requires far more
popular mobilization. Reliance on conventional forces would therefore tempt
Ukrainian leaders to portray the Russian threat in the worst possible light
and fan the flames of nationalism, which could heighten friction between
Ukrainians and the large Russian population living in Ukraine. This
development would upset the Russians and push them to consider military
intervention to protect their fellow Russians.
如果烏克蘭想要跟他旁邊的大鄰居競爭，烏克蘭更要從底層社會無情的搾取資源。尤其傳
統的軍事武力發展，成本遠高於核武，亦需要更大規模的部隊，因此烏克蘭也需要更多的
人口動員。另外，對傳統武力的依賴會使烏克蘭領導人試圖煽動民族主義的火焰，以最糟
糕的方式來描述俄羅斯的威脅，這可能會加劇烏克蘭人和居住在烏克蘭境內俄羅斯人之間
的摩擦。這樣的發展將使俄羅斯人感到不安，並促使他們考慮進行軍事干預以保護他們的
同胞。
A security guarantee from the West is theoretically possible but not a
practical strategy for maintaining Ukrainian sovereignty. Extending
deterrence to Germany during the Cold War was a demanding and expensive job;
extending deterrence further east to Ukraine would be even more difficult.
Neither America nor its European allies are eager to take on an expensive new
commitment; on the contrary, natos power is shrinking rapidly. Political will
aside, extending nato's security umbrella into the heart of the old Soviet
Union is not wise. It is sure to enrage the Russians and cause them to act
belligerently.
來自西方的安全保證僅是一個可能的理論，但對於保護烏克蘭主權則不是務實的策略。將
北約的保護傘延伸到舊蘇聯的心臟是不明智的，肯定會激怒俄羅斯人，最終導致他們以戰
爭行動來解決。
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE THE ANSWER
Vilifying nuclear weapons is a fashionable sport in the West. Many believe
they are a major source of tension between states and that their deterrent
value is quite limited. Given these beliefs and the horrible consequences of
nuclear war, it is hardly surprising that many people want to rid the world
of these weapons.
批評核子武器在西方是一種政治時尚，他們認為核武是國與國之間主要的緊張來源，但是
威攝效果卻是有限的(我猜是因為不能動不動拿核武出來談判)，根據這些想法以及核武可
能帶來的可怕後果，多數人們想要讓世界擺脫核武這樣的武器也就不太讓人意外了。
This view of nuclear weapons is simplistic and flies in the face of the
inherent logic of nuclear deterrence, as well as the history of the Cold War.
In fact, nuclear weapons often diminish international violence, and Ukrainian
nuclear weapons would be an effective deterrent against a Russian
conventional attack or nuclear blackmail.
上面對於核武的觀點過於簡單，而且與核威攝的內涵及冷戰的歷史殷鑑背道而馳。***(接
下來這段話在衛道人士眼裡可能會有些離經叛道)***核武可消除國際一些暴力衝突，而烏
克蘭的核武可以有效的威攝俄羅斯傳統軍事武力或者核武的威脅。
註:因為作者信奉的是國際現實主義，下面會作者意圖實證在沒有至高無上的國際強權出
現之前的戰爭與殺戮，反致生靈塗炭；核武出現之後，有相對(兩極或多極)的國際強權
，形成恐怖平衡，讓局勢逐漸穩定，世界步入和平。
In the pre-nuclear world of industrialized great powers, there were two world
wars between 1900 and 1945 in which some 50 million Europeans died. In the
nuclear age, the story is very different. Only some 15,000 Europeans were
killed in minor wars between 1945 and 1990, and there was a stable peace
between the superpowers that became increasingly robust over time. A
principal cause of this "long peace" was nuclear weapons.
在核武還沒有出現的世界前，在1900-1945年之間有兩次世界大戰，造成約5000萬歐洲人
死亡。
核武元年以後，這個世界變得更美好了XD，在1945年-1990年之間，歐洲只有零星的戰爭，
比起過去，現在僅約15000歐洲人死亡。
Nuclear weapons are a powerful force for peace because they are weapons of
mass destruction. They create the possibility that in a war both sides will
cease to exist as functioning societies. This catastrophic threat will
foreclose any Russian thoughts of aggression against Ukraine, since a
defeated Ukraine could well use its nuclear weapons against Russia before
going under. Defeat for Ukraine at the hands of the Russians would mean loss
of sovereignty, and history makes clear that states will pay very high costs
to maintain it. Hence an aggressive Russia could not dismiss the Ukrainian
nuclear threat. Moreover, there is always the possibility that nuclear
weapons might be used inadvertently or accidentally in the course of a
conventional war, which provides further incentives for caution.
核武對於和平有重要的力量是因為核武是大規模毀滅性武器，如果雙方使用核武開戰，雙
方都有可能無法再正常運作。因為核武足夠災難，所以可以使俄羅斯屏除一切對烏克蘭壞
壞的想法。尤其如果假設烏俄開戰，烏克蘭被打矇了，烏克蘭還是可以使用核武來對抗俄
羅斯。也因此，俄國不能忽略烏克蘭的核武威脅，尤其核武可能會有意或無意的在傳統戰
爭中出現，那使得兩個少年哥要衝突更需要謹慎小心。
There is a second reason to favor a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent: it is
inevitable. Ukraine is likely to keep its nuclear weapons, regardless of what
other states say and do. American opposition would raise the risk of war
between Russia and Ukraine.
第二個支持烏克蘭繼續持有核武威脅的理由是: 不可避免的，如果烏克蘭未持有核武威脅
，將會增加烏俄開戰的風險。
Ukraine has suffered greatly at the hands of outside occupiers. After
Stalin's murder of 12 million in the 1930s, the Germans killed another 7
million Ukrainians during World War II. This dark history, plus a Russian
threat next door and the absence of outsiders willing to deter that threat,
makes it unlikely that Ukraine would give up its nuclear weapons. Reflecting
this reality, pronuclear sentiment is already growing rapidly in Ukraine.
America and its allies may complain about Ukraine's new posture, but they
would not have to live with the consequences of a Russian attack if
deterrence fails.
有鑑於烏克蘭慘痛、被蹂躪的歷史(1930年代，史達林殺了1200萬人；二戰，德國殺了700
萬人)，以及現實生活中，住在旁邊的壞鄰居鵝國，烏克蘭境內對持有核武議題的情緒會
迅速增長。換言之，如果烏克蘭能持有核武，歐美雖然可能會不適應(擔心演變成親俄、獨
裁之類的走向)烏克蘭的新角色，但是歐美的好處是不用直接面對鵝國人。
Once the Russians learn that Ukraine is keeping its nuclear arsenal, they
will doubtless consider launching a preventive war to eliminate it before it
becomes fully operational. But this is an unattractive military option. It
would be a difficult task with conventional means, since Ukraine inherited
substantial conventional forces from the Soviet military, which would enable
it to put up formidable resistance. The Russians might launch a nuclear
strike against the Ukrainian arsenal. The probability of Ukrainian nuclear
retaliation would be small, but the Russians could never be sure that Ukraine
would not launch some nuclear weapons back at them, causing cataclysmic
damage, even if the retaliation was ragged. Also, radioactive fallout from an
attack on Ukraine would contaminate Russia as well.
這邊簡單來說就是假設烏克蘭續擁核後，俄羅斯跟美歐各自可能的棋弈，沒什麼就不寫了
。
Thus military calculations alone should suffice to deter the Russians from
launching a preventive war. Nevertheless, it is important that every element
in the deterrent equation work to prevent war from breaking out. Strong
American and European resistance to Ukraine's decision to be a nuclear state
is likely to isolate Ukraine diplomatically and weaken deterrence.
要達成均衡的威攝，每個因素都很重要，才能預防戰爭的發生。如果烏克蘭決定擁核，強
悍的歐美可能會決定孤立烏克蘭並削減烏克蘭的威攝能力。
IT IS STILL NOT TOO LATE
The United States should have begun working immediately after the Soviet
Union collapsed to quickly and smoothly make Ukraine a nuclear power. In fact
Washington rejected this approach and adopted the opposite policy, which
remains firmly in place. Nevertheless, it is wrongheaded, and despite the
sunk costs and the difficulty of reversing field in the policy world, the
Clinton administration should make a gradual but unmistakable about-face.
在蘇聯垮台後，美國應該協助烏克蘭成為核武國，但是白宮拒絕了這樣的做法，並且採取
了相反的措施，而且還很堅定要把烏克蘭去核武化。儘管政治決策逆轉是非常困難以及沉
默成本等現實，柯林頓政府還是應該要迷途知返。
--
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03/06 13:37, 9F
推
03/06 13:37,
2年前
, 10F
03/06 13:37, 10F
→
03/06 13:37,
2年前
, 11F
03/06 13:37, 11F
推
03/06 13:38,
2年前
, 12F
03/06 13:38, 12F
推
03/06 13:38,
2年前
, 13F
03/06 13:38, 13F
推
03/06 13:39,
2年前
, 14F
03/06 13:39, 14F
推
03/06 13:39,
2年前
, 15F
03/06 13:39, 15F
→
03/06 13:39,
2年前
, 16F
03/06 13:39, 16F
推
03/06 13:39,
2年前
, 17F
03/06 13:39, 17F
推
03/06 13:39,
2年前
, 18F
03/06 13:39, 18F
→
03/06 13:40,
2年前
, 19F
03/06 13:40, 19F
推
03/06 13:40,
2年前
, 20F
03/06 13:40, 20F
推
03/06 13:40,
2年前
, 21F
03/06 13:40, 21F
推
03/06 13:40,
2年前
, 22F
03/06 13:40, 22F
→
03/06 13:40,
2年前
, 23F
03/06 13:40, 23F
推
03/06 13:40,
2年前
, 24F
03/06 13:40, 24F
推
03/06 13:40,
2年前
, 25F
03/06 13:40, 25F
推
03/06 13:41,
2年前
, 26F
03/06 13:41, 26F
推
03/06 13:42,
2年前
, 27F
03/06 13:42, 27F
→
03/06 13:42,
2年前
, 28F
03/06 13:42, 28F
→
03/06 13:42,
2年前
, 29F
03/06 13:42, 29F
推
03/06 13:42,
2年前
, 30F
03/06 13:42, 30F
推
03/06 13:42,
2年前
, 31F
03/06 13:42, 31F
→
03/06 13:43,
2年前
, 32F
03/06 13:43, 32F
→
03/06 13:43,
2年前
, 33F
03/06 13:43, 33F
推
03/06 13:43,
2年前
, 34F
03/06 13:43, 34F
推
03/06 13:44,
2年前
, 35F
03/06 13:44, 35F
→
03/06 13:44,
2年前
, 36F
03/06 13:44, 36F
還有 32 則推文
還有 3 段內文
→
03/06 13:57,
2年前
, 69F
03/06 13:57, 69F
推
03/06 13:57,
2年前
, 70F
03/06 13:57, 70F
→
03/06 13:57,
2年前
, 71F
03/06 13:57, 71F
推
03/06 13:57,
2年前
, 72F
03/06 13:57, 72F
推
03/06 13:57,
2年前
, 73F
03/06 13:57, 73F
推
03/06 13:58,
2年前
, 74F
03/06 13:58, 74F
推
03/06 13:58,
2年前
, 75F
03/06 13:58, 75F
→
03/06 13:58,
2年前
, 76F
03/06 13:58, 76F
→
03/06 13:58,
2年前
, 77F
03/06 13:58, 77F
推
03/06 13:59,
2年前
, 78F
03/06 13:59, 78F
→
03/06 13:59,
2年前
, 79F
03/06 13:59, 79F
推
03/06 13:59,
2年前
, 80F
03/06 13:59, 80F
推
03/06 14:00,
2年前
, 81F
03/06 14:00, 81F
推
03/06 14:01,
2年前
, 82F
03/06 14:01, 82F
推
03/06 14:01,
2年前
, 83F
03/06 14:01, 83F
→
03/06 14:01,
2年前
, 84F
03/06 14:01, 84F
推
03/06 14:01,
2年前
, 85F
03/06 14:01, 85F
推
03/06 14:02,
2年前
, 86F
03/06 14:02, 86F
推
03/06 14:02,
2年前
, 87F
03/06 14:02, 87F
推
03/06 14:03,
2年前
, 88F
03/06 14:03, 88F
推
03/06 14:03,
2年前
, 89F
03/06 14:03, 89F
→
03/06 14:04,
2年前
, 90F
03/06 14:04, 90F
→
03/06 14:04,
2年前
, 91F
03/06 14:04, 91F
推
03/06 14:05,
2年前
, 92F
03/06 14:05, 92F
推
03/06 14:05,
2年前
, 93F
03/06 14:05, 93F
→
03/06 14:05,
2年前
, 94F
03/06 14:05, 94F
推
03/06 14:06,
2年前
, 95F
03/06 14:06, 95F
→
03/06 14:06,
2年前
, 96F
03/06 14:06, 96F
推
03/06 14:07,
2年前
, 97F
03/06 14:07, 97F
推
03/06 14:08,
2年前
, 98F
03/06 14:08, 98F
推
03/06 14:09,
2年前
, 99F
03/06 14:09, 99F
推
03/06 14:11,
2年前
, 100F
03/06 14:11, 100F
→
03/06 14:11,
2年前
, 101F
03/06 14:11, 101F
推
03/06 14:12,
2年前
, 102F
03/06 14:12, 102F
推
03/06 14:12,
2年前
, 103F
03/06 14:12, 103F
→
03/06 14:12,
2年前
, 104F
03/06 14:12, 104F
推
03/06 14:15,
2年前
, 105F
03/06 14:15, 105F
推
03/06 14:17,
2年前
, 106F
03/06 14:17, 106F
推
03/06 14:17,
2年前
, 107F
03/06 14:17, 107F
→
03/06 14:19,
2年前
, 108F
03/06 14:19, 108F