Re: [閒聊] rigid designator與definite description
其實I兄潑這段對討論也蠻有幫助滴
你後來滴解釋 我覺得看起來也都蠻合理滴
a兄質疑滴 大概是你之前滴解釋吧?
※ 引述《IsaacStein (My Name)》之銘言：
: In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names
: are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not have
: been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been
: Nixon (though he might not have been called 'Nixon'). Those who
: have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator,
: we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity'
: have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can
: refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what
: might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that
: 'transworld identifications' are unproblematic in such cases.
嗯 這就是我之前瞭解I所說滴
Kripke預料到有人會用transworld identity去質疑proper name做為rigid designator
而做出回應
有人會質疑proper name在所有可能世界所指涉的對象 為何是同一個呢?(為何不是多呢?)
哪些properties是這個對象的essential properties 以致於它在所有可能
世界都保持同一
kripke認為這種質疑有點本末倒置..我們已經先規定好了 我們是在談論某個
特定的對象 transworld identification才不是個問題
當然 在這裡有點puzzling 為啥kripke會認為 如此transworld identification才
不是個問題...我的解讀是: 如果proper name不是指涉到某個特定對象的話 那transworld
identification就會是個問題 從此條件句的前件推到後件 這是顯而易見的
畢竟 若不是指涉某個特定對象的話 就可能是許多不同的對象 這時候就有了transworld
identity的問題..
以下有空再潑..
: The tendency to demand purely qualitative descriptions of couter-
: factual situations has many sources. One, perhaps, is the confusion
: of the epistemological and the metaphysical, between a prioricity
: and necessity. If someone identifies necessity with a prioricity,
: and thinks that objects are named by means of uniquely identifying
: properties, he may think that it is the properties used to identify
: the object which, being known about it a priori, must be used to
: identify it in all possible worlds, to find out which object is Nixon.
: As against this, I repeat: (1) Generally, things aren't 'found out'
: about a counterfactual situation, they are stipulated; (2) possible
: worlds need not be given purely qualitatively, as if we were looking
: at them through a telescope. And we will see shortly that the prop-
: erties an object has in every counterfactual world have nothing to do
: with properties used to identify it in the actual world.
: 以上節錄自Saul A. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity" Lecture I, pp. 49-50
: 是他本人的論證，但原先的敘述不排除我個人的主觀認知和詮釋。
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