[新聞] 美：該討論台灣問題了
簡單翻譯
It’s Time to Talk About Taiwan
https://reurl.cc/nVWWzd
DEFENSE ONE 美國 Michael Hunzeker MARK CHRISTOPHER 2020/02/25
Washington’s longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity is increasingly
likely to inflame the kind of crisis it was meant to deter.
In an interview with 60 Minutes on Sunday night, Democratic front-runner
Bernie Sanders suggested that he might take military action to defend Taiwan
if China attacks it. The implication is that a Sanders Administration would
fundamentally transform America’s security policy toward Taiwan—a move that
would surely cause hand-wringing in foreign policy circles from Washington to
Beijing.
禮拜天對於民主黨總統候選人桑德斯的60 MINUITE節目訪談，桑德斯表示如果中國發動對台灣武力
進攻則美國應當協助保防。桑德斯意思將改變美國現有安全政策，並將引發北京的不滿。
At least in this instance, Sanders is right to shake things up. Washington’s
longstanding policy of “strategic ambiguity” is increasingly likely to
inflame the very kind of crisis that it was intended to deter. It’s time for
Washington to re-evaluate, redefine and clarify its commitment to Taiwan.
至少在現在這種情況，桑德斯是正確的，華盛頓長期的模糊政策，事實上只會激起原本要
阻止的危機。
Since the 1979 passage of the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States has had
a legal obligation to sell Taiwan the arms it needs for self-defense. Yet the
United States remained deliberately vague as to whether it might come to
Taiwan’s aid in a cross-Strait conflict. The logic behind this one-foot-in,
one-foot-out policy is that as long as the United States kept both sides
guessing about the conditions under which it might intervene, it could deter
both Taiwan from declaring independence and China from invading.
從1979年通過台灣關係法以來，美國附有法律義務銷售台灣防衛性武器，但是對於是否
協助台灣於發生海峽戰爭的時候參與戰爭，仍保持著模糊的說詞
美國保持這種模糊觀點的優點是可以讓雙方臆測，使台灣猜測美國而不敢獨立，
中國猜測美國是否介入而不敢武力犯台。
Strategic ambiguity gave the United States flexibility, which made sense
while the trajectory of China-Taiwan relations remained deeply uncertain. For
generations, Taiwan’s ruling party—the KMT—aspired to unify Taiwan with
China (albeit under KMT rule). Even after Taiwan’s transition to democracy,
the KMT continued to favor pro-unification policies. As a result China, which
long lacked the military power to take Taiwan by force, had reason to remain
patient.
運用上述的模糊戰略讓美國對於台海局勢保持靈活。
長期執政的國民黨對於中台關係傾向統一，在政權移轉後仍傾向統一。
而中國政府因長期軍事仍無法武力攻台，至今仍保持著高度耐心。
Recently though, uncertainty has given way to clarity on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait. In China, clarity comes in the form of Xi Jinping.
最近台海局勢隨著習近平提出主張而明確化。
Annexing Taiwan has been among China’s top priorities since Mao. But Xi
Jinping, China’s strongest leader in generations, has gone a step further by
pinning his own legitimacy to the issue. Xi has also overseen a major
modernization of China’s military, swinging the military balance on the
Taiwan question clearly in China’s favor. Nor is he proving particularly
patient, as he repeatedly warns audiences at home and abroad that the Taiwan
problem “should not be passed down generation after generation.”
併吞台灣的問題是從毛澤東以來中國政府心裡的痛，最強領導人習近平上任後不斷的
對著台灣人警告台灣問題不應當世代相傳。
In Taiwan, clarity comes from a growing sense of national identity. Public
opinion polling suggests that more than half of the island’s population now
identifies as exclusively Taiwanese. Identity tends to solidify with time,
making it hard to believe that Taiwan will voluntarily submit to Chinese rule
anytime soon.
但是台灣主流民意已經把自己當成"台灣人"，隨著時間身分認同更加固定。
讓中國統一台灣問題越來越困難，台灣人很難自願的認為自己是中國人。
This trend helps explain why Taiwanese voters handed independence-leaning
President Tsai Ing-wen and her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) a landslide
victory last month. In doing so they sent China an unambiguous signal. Taiwan
will no longer accept Beijing’s long preferred “one country, two systems”
solution to the 71-year old standoff over the island’s status.
以上可以合理解釋為什麼傾向獨立的蔡英文及民進黨政府於上個月的選舉獲得壓倒性
勝利。
而後蔡英文政府明確向北京發出不接受一國兩制的訊號。
It makes sense that Taiwanese voters don’t trust Chinese promises and
assurances. They are all too aware that Xi has reinforced the Communist Party
’s role at the center of Chinese economic and political life, pulled back
from market-based reforms, and ruthlessly crushed any perceived challenges to
China’s territorial integrity. They have also watched the CCP round up
millions of Uyghurs in Xinjiang and put them in reeducation camps, stonewall
pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, and respond to the coronavirus outbreak
with draconian quarantines and Orwellian propaganda. The recent election
results, in which Tsai received more votes than any president in Taiwanese
history, were a resounding rebuke of Beijing’s agenda.
台灣人民不信任中國政府是有道理可循，北京歷年來對於新疆維吾爾、香港反送中等議題
處理，並且採用歐威爾式自我宣傳。
(指現代專制政權藉由嚴厲執行政治宣傳、監視、故意提供虛假資料、否認事實（雙重思想
）和操縱過去（包括製造「非人」，意指把一個人過去的存在從公共記錄和記憶中消除）
的政策以控制社會。) https://reurl.cc/VayyOR
都讓蔡政府創下選票歷史新高的原因。
Meanwhile, even as views in China and Taiwan harden, circumstances in the
United States are causing both sides to wonder if strategic ambiguity is
starting to mask empty bluster. Voters across the U.S. political spectrum are
dissatisfied with America’s role in the world. Politicians as dissimilar as
Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders have keyed in on Americans’ desire to fix
problems at home before focusing on challenges abroad. And nearly two decades
of high-tempo military operations has yielded a relative decline in American
military dominance along with a sense of fatigue and strategic distraction.
在台海局勢逐漸僵化的情況下，美國的台海政策似乎讓中台覺得是減弱的。
這些年美軍在世界各地戰爭造成美軍疲乏。
Collectively, these trend lines suggest that strategic ambiguity’s costs and
risks now outweigh its benefits. Perhaps ambiguity still deters Taipei from
pursuing independence. But Chinese military power alone is already sufficient
to impose restraint on Taiwan. It is also true that strategic ambiguity
affords the United States options in a crisis. Yet the logic of deterrence
tells us that keeping one foot out the door does not deter your adversaries—
it emboldens them.
美國模糊的政策也許可以阻止台灣獨立。也不可否認中國軍力是可以克制台灣的。
It could get worse. U.S. ambiguity already seems to be encouraging Chinese
assertiveness and aggression toward Taiwan. Failing to clarify the true depth
of Washington’s commitment—or lack thereof—increases the risk of a war
that both sides could have avoided had one side (the United States) not
misrepresented its true resolve.
美國模糊的政策也讓中國對於武力攻台產生自信。
It is therefore time to move from ambiguity to clarity. Options for a more
explicit policy run the gamut from unequivocal security guarantees to
abandoning Taiwan entirely, and although we have our preferences, a decision
of this magnitude requires serious deliberation at the highest levels of
elected power. Our point is simply that America’s status quo policy is fast
losing its ability to maintain the cross-Strait status quo.
美國應該明確表態，是要模糊的安全保證或是完全放棄台灣，我們是有偏好的。但最後
選擇應當要認真審視考慮。
目前我們的觀點是這種模糊的雙邊政策造成美國失去對台海的控制能力。
Reviewing—let alone changing—a policy this important entails risks. Teeth
will gnash and sabers will rattle throughout Asia. People fear change,
especially in a national security community that prizes “stability” above
all. But a policy designed to keep the peace must evolve alongside facts on
the ground.
And the facts are unambiguous. American credibility is in doubt. Washington
is not in the driver’s seat, because it no longer has the power to dictate
how the cross-Strait relationship will unfold. And Beijing is as clear-eyed
about its intentions towards Taiwan as Taiwanese voters are steadfast in
their willingness to reject Beijing’s vision.
In the Analects, Confucius demands that words speak clearly and reflect
reality: “If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the
truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things,
affairs cannot be carried on to success.” For three decades, Taiwan’s
uncertain aims and China’s uncertain response characterized the Taiwan
question, and strategic ambiguity was the right answer. Today, the
uncertainty is gone and the question has changed. America’s answer must
change as well.
不明確已逝，所以答案必須變更，美國對台海的答案勢必得改變了。
--
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※ 文章網址: https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/Gossiping/M.1582612703.A.841.html
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※ 編輯: iPenis (1.171.56.247 臺灣), 02/25/2020 14:52:27
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