Re: [閒聊] rigid designator與definite description
※ 引述《IsaacStein (My Name)》之銘言：
: : --
: : ◆ From: 218.160.180.124
: : → aletheia:這是Kripke本人的論證嗎? 10/15 02:05
: : 推 realove:我其實跟一樓滴a兄有同樣滴疑問.. 10/15 08:47
: : 推 realove:有可能是I對K的詮釋?我是對pw是本體論上滴還是知識論上滴 10/15 09:58
: : → realove:那一段不太清楚囉... 10/15 10:00
: In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names
: are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not have
: been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been
: Nixon (though he might not have been called 'Nixon'). Those who
: have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator,
: we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity'
: have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can
: refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what
: might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that
: 'transworld identifications' are unproblematic in such cases.
: The tendency to demand purely qualitative descriptions of couter-
: factual situations has many sources. One, perhaps, is the confusion
: of the epistemological and the metaphysical, between a prioricity
: and necessity. If someone identifies necessity with a prioricity,
: and thinks that objects are named by means of uniquely identifying
: properties, he may think that it is the properties used to identify
: the object which, being known about it a priori, must be used to
: identify it in all possible worlds, to find out which object is Nixon.
: As against this, I repeat: (1) Generally, things aren't 'found out'
: about a counterfactual situation, they are stipulated; (2) possible
: worlds need not be given purely qualitatively, as if we were looking
: at them through a telescope. And we will see shortly that the prop-
: erties an object has in every counterfactual world have nothing to do
: with properties used to identify it in the actual world.
: 以上節錄自Saul A. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity" Lecture I, pp. 49-50
: 是他本人的論證，但原先的敘述不排除我個人的主觀認知和詮釋。
可是看來你寫的和他寫的不太一樣
我看不太懂你寫的 引的這段Kripke倒是有看懂
他文中提到的只是依他的語意學來看
criteria of transworld identity這問題不存在
因為早先我們已經設定不同世界中的P都是同一個
Kripke一直有個重點 便是使用他的可能世界語意學
或著叫Kripke semantics
什麼叫可能世界或可能狀態?
對Kripke來說 w1 access to w2
這叫w2是w1的可能世界
如果access不好懂
換種說法 w1 can see w2
如同他講用望遠鏡看一樣
如果按照這樣來理解可能世界 那不用牽扯到知識論和形上學
或許可以說現實世界和可能世界的區分
現實世界是形上學上存在的 而可能世界則否
但區分現實和可能世界對界定什麼叫可能世界並沒有太大的幫助
另外你多次提到"可能世界狀態"
像是:
具有存有學意義的世界只有一個，就是我們所身處的
現實世界，而我們在言談中所使用的模態概念（例如可能、必然）所
衍生出來的可能世界，其實只是眾多的可能世界「狀態」
還有
「在某個可能世界中，亞里斯多德不是亞歷山大帝的
老師」時，我們並不是在說，存在著某一個可能世界W1，在該世界中
有某個人不是亞歷山大帝的老師，但是他與在現實世界中亞歷山大帝
的老師（同時是柏拉圖的學生、邏輯的創始人、寫了《形上學》一書
的偉大哲學家）是「同一個人」。對Kripke而言，這樣一句話其實只
是表達了以下意思：「現實世界有一個可能的世界狀態是，在其中亞
里斯多德不是亞歷山大帝的老師」。
看來你說的可能世界狀態和可能世界不一樣
可以稍微說一下嗎? 什麼叫做"可能世界狀態"
--
※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc)
◆ From: 59.117.242.142
※ 編輯: aletheia 來自: 59.117.242.142 (10/16 01:48)
討論串 (同標題文章)