[新聞] 希臘危機導覽-你所需要知道的一切

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1.原文連結(必須檢附)： 2.原文內容： A Primer on the Greek Crisis: the things you need to know from the start until now Anil Kashyap University of Chicago, Booth School of Business June 29th, 2015 1) How did Greece get into such trouble? Greece from the mid-1990s until last year was constantly spending more than it was collecting in tax revenues. For most of this time, the country's initially reported numbers showed small differences that were subsequently found to have been much larger. The revisions tended to be most substantial right after elections when a new government would find that its predecessor was much more profligate than had been reported. Because of these deficits, the country borrowed to cover the shortfalls and its debt burden was steadily rising. In the fall of 2009, a then newly elected government reported that the deficit for that year was going to be 13.6 percent of economic output and that the deficits in 2007 and 2006 were also larger than had been reported. From that point onward, the world began to wonder if Greece really could pay the debt that it had issued or needed to default. Its borrowing costs rose sharply and the country began looking for ways to reduce its required debt payments and end its borrowing addiction. 1）希臘是如何深陷泥潭的？自1990年代中期一直到去年，希臘每年都處於入不敷出狀態，即花出去的錢超過其稅收收入。大多數時候，希臘最開始公佈的赤字金額都很小，但隨後卻被證實很大。每屆新政府上臺後，都會指責前一任政府的"鋪張浪費"，戳穿他們的"謊言"，大幅上調赤字。由於赤字缺口越來越大，希臘不得不通過舉債度日，債務壓力也就越來越大。 2009年秋天，希臘新政府宣佈，當年的財政赤字和公共債務將高達GDP的12.7%和113%，遠超歐盟《穩定與增長公約》規定的3%和60%的上限。自那時起，國際社會開始擔心希臘是否有能力償還債務，是否有違約風險。該國的融資成本（國債收益率）也開始飆升。 2) Wasn't Greece already bailed out in 2010? By the spring of 2010 the excessive debt problem became unbearable and there was open speculation that Greece would default. The country had done this on four occasions previously since 1800. Much of the government debt was owed to banks outside of Greece, with the largest amounts in France and Germany. So if Greece had stopped paying, the French and German banks would have suffered substantial losses. Greece was lent new money in 2010, but as Karl Otto Pohl former head of the German central bank observed at the time much of that money was used to repay the obligations owned by the French and German banks. The new lending was advertised by the politicians across Europe as a rescue for Greece. But it was at least as much a deal to buy time for the banks and other owners of Greek debt to avoid a default. Greece did avoid default, but the support came with requirements designed to make sure that the country end its chronic deficit spending. 2）希臘2010年不是獲得過援助了麼？事情發展到2010年春，希臘的債務問題已經一發不可收拾，市場已經開始公開押注希臘違約。事實上，自1800年以來，這個國家已經違約過四次。這一次，希臘政府主要是欠國外銀行的錢，其中對法國、德國銀行的欠款尤其巨大。所以，如果希臘選擇賴帳，法、德的銀行將會承受巨額損失。 2010年5月，希臘獲得第一輪援助。希臘成功避免了違約，但援助不是無條件的，希臘必須滿足國際援助者一系列條件，以確保將來能夠還得起錢。據前德國央行行長、歐元區奠基人之一卡爾·奧托觀察，希臘大多數錢都用來償還了法國和德國銀行欠款。 3) Why did that rescue fail? To justify the new lending, the lenders had to be assured that the deficits would end and that the country would grow enough to be able to service its debt. In May of 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), led at the time by Dominique Strauss Kahn, who had ambitions of running for the presidency of France, conducted an analysis to see if such a scenario was realistic. The report at the time concluded that if Greece undertook drastic reforms it could close its deficits and begin growing so that over time the debt (including the new lending that was being provided) would be manageable. This analysis was later shown to be deeply flawed by the IMF itself. The Greeks did actually cut their deficits substantially, but many of the reforms that were supposed to support growth did not occur and the economy contracted substantially. So the debt, relative to the size of the economy, did not improve. Importantly, no debt was written off in 2010, even though many analysts, including some on the executive Board of the IMF, at the time believed that it was necessary and that the banks and other private sector owners of the debt should have taken some losses. 3）第一輪援助為什麼會失敗？為了確保自己資金安全，出資人需要確信希臘的赤字會不斷縮小，且其經濟增長也足以償還債務。2010年5月，時任IMF總裁的卡恩主持的研究報告認為，這是有可能實現的。報告稱，如果希臘進行了改革，就有可能結束財政赤字，使得債務規模可控。但IMF很快就被打臉了。希臘人確實大幅降低了財政赤字，但許多改革措施並未能如預期那樣推動經濟增長。相反，希臘經濟出現了大幅萎縮。值得一提的是，雖然包括IMF董事會成員在內的不少分析師認為，有必要讓銀行等私人部門承擔部分損失，但2010年的援助並沒有涉及債務減記。 4) What is the troika (or the institutions) and what do they have to do with this? The new lending in 2010 came from two sources, a fund that was raised from European governments and the IMF. The bailout fund was overseen by the finance ministers of these governments. The European Central Bank also provided support to Greece in two ways. First, it allowed banks in Greece (and everywhere else) to borrow from it by posting bonds guaranteed by Greece as the collateral. Second, it bought some Greek government bonds in the open market. So all three of these organizations were now exposed to losses in the event that Greece ever defaulted. As such, they had representatives that met regularly with the Greek government to make sure that the reforms were on track. Initially the three were called the troika. Subsequently, they have also been referred to as "the institutions". 4）三駕馬車和援助有什麼關係？ 2010年的援助來自兩部分，歐元區各國政府和IMF。歐洲央行也在兩個方面對希臘提供支援。第一，它允許歐元區的銀行用希臘債券作抵押向其融資。第二，它在公開市場上買入了一些希臘政府債券。所以，希臘一旦違約，三駕馬車都將承受損失。也正因為如此，他們都派代表定期與希臘政府會面，確保改革按計劃實施。 5) Wasn't Greece also bailed out in 2012? By late 2010 it was already clear that the debt burden might prove to be unsustainable. So discussions began over reducing the debt. The Greek government was supposed to sell some assets to retire some of the debt. That never happened and as the recession continued it was clear that the 2010 plan was not going to be adequate. So in March 2012 a second bailout program with revised terms was undertaken. The IMF lent additional money, but the main conditions that accompanied the funding were largely the same. Once again, the cornerstones of the plan continued to be steps to make tax collection more efficient, to reduce spending promises, and to undertake reforms to encourage hiring and business expansion that would support growth. It was not clear why this plan would be more successful than the first one. The European Central Bank meanwhile became more deeply committed to stabilizing financial markets. ECB President Mario Draghi famously said in July 2012 that "within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough." Draghi's statement immediately led to a drop in borrowing costs for governments across Europe and the pressure on Greece temporarily subsided. By continuing to allow banks everywhere to use Greek debt as collateral, the ECB also created conditions that supported the trading of Greek debt. By this time the French and German banks had shed their exposure to Greece so that they would no longer be directly harmed if there was a default. So the stealth rescue of the non-Greek banks was completed with little public attention and the narrative that all the problems were self-inflicted by the Greeks became more pronounced. 5）希臘2012年不是又一次接受過援助嗎？ 2010年底，希臘債務不可持續的事實已經非常明顯。所以希臘再次被推上風口浪尖，有人認為希臘政府應該出售資產來還債，但希臘從來沒有這麼做過。隨著希臘局勢的不斷惡化，人們意識到2010年的援助還遠遠不夠。於是，2012年3月債權人又對希臘進行了第二輪救援。 IMF在提供更多資金的同時，並沒有對援助條款做太多修訂。希臘所要做的依然是提高徵稅效率，削減開支，推動改革，發展經濟等等。沒人說得清，為什麼這樣的援助協議就會比第一次更有效。市場似乎並不買帳。因為擔心希臘違約，包括希臘在內的歐豬五國債券收益率飆漲，歐元一瀉千里，歐債危機進入高潮。歐洲央行不得不挺身而出。2012 年7月，歐洲央行主席德拉吉發表講話："歐洲央行將在自己的使命範圍內，不惜一切代價保衛歐元區穩定。"他的講話被市場理解為歐洲央行將對市場托底的承諾，很快平息了市場的恐慌，希臘問題也暫時緩解。同時，歐洲央行繼續允許銀行業使用希臘國債作抵押，為希臘國債提供了良好的流動性支撐。 6) Why is Greece in trouble again now? In the time since Draghi's statement three important things happened in Greece. First, Greece made further substantial progress on closing its deficits. By late 2014, Greece was finally spending less than it was collecting, although the interest payments on debt meant there was still an overall deficit. So for the first time since Greece adopted the euro it had budget position that was solid. Second, the economy contracted for two more years as the reforms failed to deliver higher growth. Certainly the higher tax collections and reduced government spending contributed to the weak performance, but the degree to which the planned reforms, if fully implemented, could have offset that remains controversial. It is important to also recognize the massive collapse was preceded by a very large debt-fueled boom. Austerity notwithstanding, the economy seemed to have reached bottom and was finally beginning to recover in late 2014. A very interesting counterfactual scenario is to contemplate what would have happened if the political situation had allowed this progress to continue. The third major development, however, was that the public lost confidence in the incumbent government and its lenders. Unemployment in Greece has remained above 25% for years and was much higher for young people. So the citizens were fed up. Hence, in 2015 the public voted for a new government that insisted on deviating from the past playbook. The major party in the new coalition, Syriza, is often referred to a coalition of the radical left. In January 2015, newly elected Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras sought to reopen negotiations with Greece's creditors. 6）如今希臘為什麼又陷入危機了？自從德拉吉的講話之後，希臘的狀況發生了三個比較重大的變化。第一，希臘政府在控制赤字上取得了很大進展。到了2014年末，希臘終於實現了收支平衡（當然，如果算上債務利息希臘依然是入不敷出）。第二，希臘經濟繼續萎縮了兩年，改革未能帶來增長。顯然，高稅收和低開支的政策導致了經濟的疲軟表現。第三，公眾對政府和債權人喪失了信心。希臘失業率已經連續多年高於25%，年輕人的失業率更是高的嚇人。不堪忍受的希臘人終於將極左聯盟Syriza選上臺，希望新政府能將一切束縛推倒重來。於是就有了齊普拉斯政府上臺之後重開談判的一幕。 7) What is the Greek government asking for? The Tsipras government wanted three types of changes. First, it wanted to restore some of the spending cuts that had been enacted. Second, it wanted to reverse some of the revenue hikes that the past governments had instituted. These first two requests would have widened the deficit and also reorganized priorities within the budget. (In fact, once it became clear that Syriza was going to win the election, tax revenues began shrinking as the public stopped paying some unpopular taxes). Finally, it wanted outright forgiveness of some of the debt that had accumulated.Since taking office, Tsipras has been negotiating with the creditors over for a new set of agreements. The creditors have made some modest concessions but are largely insisting on a continuation of similar plans. When he failed to secure these changes, Tsipras announced that he would have the Greek people vote on a referendum on July 6th over whether Greece would vote yes to accept the creditors latest offer or vote no to reject it. 7）希臘政府想要什麼？大致來說，希臘政府有三大訴求。第一，它希望增加現在已經降得很低的政府開支。第二，它希望降低減稅額度。前兩項要求將會增加政府的財政赤字，並重新分配預算的優先權。（事實上，在Syriza贏得了大選之後，希臘政府的稅收就開始縮水，因為民眾開始自發停止繳納一些不常見的稅種）。最後，希臘政府希望獲得更多債務減記（直白地說就是賴掉一部分債務不還）。自上臺以來，齊普拉斯政府就不斷與債權人討價還價。債權人也做出了適當讓步，但總體依然堅持原有計劃不變。由於未能爭取到更多有利條件，齊普拉斯公開宣佈將於7月5日舉行全民公投，由希臘人民來決定是否接受債權人的要求。 8) Why do the institutions disagree with the government? There are two sources of objections that the creditors have with Tsipras' requests. First, and probably most importantly, countries such as Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland, had all had to undertake similar types of adjustment as in Greece. None of them saw their economies collapse to the extent of Greece, but unemployment especially among the young is also high in all these countries. Hence, if there are substantial concessions to Greece, then these countries will insist upon getting similar treatment. The existing governments in these countries all realize that if electing a radical government in Greece is seen as being rewarded, then voters elsewhere will do the same. The money needed to save Greece could easily be found. Greece is a small economy, so even though their debt is large when judged relative to Greece's economy, it is small relative to the overall capacity in Europe. In contrast, the money needed to forgive debt in the other countries, especially Italy and Spain, is not affordable for Germany (and all the other Northern European countries that would have to foot the bill). Second, even if there was some way that Greece could be helped without setting a precedent, the officials do not trust the Greeks to carry through with any plans. The fact that Prime Minister Tsipras is asking for a public referendum to accept a continuation of prior policies was the straw that broke the camel's back. Tsipras is arguing that the public should reject the plans, but he says that if the public prefers to accept them, then he will go along with that. The institutions doubt that he could reverse his position and suddenly begin taking steps which he has campaigned against for years. They also are infuriated that he believes his mandate to get better terms supersedes the ones that other elected governments had from their citizens that wanted no more bailouts. Another consideration is that IMF, the ECB and the other European leaders believe that unlike before if Greece defaults the spillovers can be managed. 8）債權人為什麼不肯妥協？兩點原因促使債權人不可能同意希臘的要求：首先也是最重要的，義大利、葡萄牙、西班牙等國和希臘一樣接受援助。雖然他們的經濟沒有像希臘那樣崩潰，但失業率高企的情況是一樣的。因此，一旦債權人對希臘做出答覆讓步，那麼這些國家也會跳出來要求同樣的待遇。而且，這些國家的現政府都意識到，如果像希臘一樣選出一個激進的政府就能解決問題，那麼他們的選民也會依葫蘆畫瓢。事實上，錢並不是問題。希臘的經濟總量不大，救助希臘的錢歐洲完全拿得出來。可怕的是縱容希臘可能會引發示範效應。其次，即便不發生示範效應，債權人現在也不再相信希臘的改革能夠真的執行，前兩次的援助失敗就是活生生的教訓。齊普拉斯發起的公投可能成為壓死駱駝的最後一根稻草。齊普拉斯呼籲民眾否決債權人的方案，不過他表示如果人民同意該方案，他也會接受並服從。但債權人卻很懷疑，他是否能夠推動和自己最初施政理念截然相反的政策改革。此外，和前兩次不同的是，IMF、歐洲央行和其他歐洲國家領導人相信，如今歐洲已經能夠控制希臘違約造成的連鎖反應。 9) Why is the IMF loan that is coming due so important? The IMF made loans in 2010 to Greece that no private lender would have been willing to make. It did so with the presumption that it would be first in line to be repaid subsequently. For failing businesses in many countries, there is analogous arrangement where in a bankruptcy situation a judge can decide that a business is worth more if it can continue to operate with some new funding, than if it was closed and sold off immediately. In that case, the new funding gets highest priority for repayment (otherwise no one will lend) and a judge will make sure that is the case. For countries, enforcing this priority is a problem since there is no court or other authority that can compel a country to pay. Greece has now announced that it will not pay the IMF the €1.55 billion that it is owed on Tuesday (June 30); once it has defaulted, Greece becomes an international pariah. To preserve its own ability to operate in future crises, the IMF must insist on being repaid. If it ever accepts the idea that a country can default if things go south, then it will never get repaid in the future. So the IMF will continue to seek repayment, no matter how flawed the analysis that led to the lending in the first place. Interestingly, Greece did make a small payment to the European bailout fund, so it will not be in default to that lender even if it does fall behind with the IMF. 9）為什麼償還6月30日IMF的貸款非常重要？如果一個公司破產了，那麼法院可以強制將其資產出售，債權人獲得優先賠償權。但如果一個國家破產，沒有機構能迫使其這麼做。 2010年，IMF之所以願意在危難之際為希臘貸款，就是基於希臘會按時還款的假設。如果希臘違約，那麼它就變成了一個國際"無賴"。為了保證其可持續發展，IMF必須要求還錢。否則，如果一個國家一旦處境困難就可以違約，那麼IMF今後永遠也不要指望能收回貸款了。所以，即便最開始的判斷有誤，IMF依然會鍥而不捨地追款。 10) What did the ECB decide this weekend and why is Greece closing its banks? The ECB decided it could no longer keep accepting additional collateral from the Greek banks that was guaranteed by the Greek government. This means no more extraordinary lending will be extended. The ECB was worried that Greece might not honor the obligations and hence it could be left with collateral that would be insufficient to cover the loans it extended already. This is in keeping with Draghi's promise of staying within the ECB mandate; lending when losses are expected would be clearly illegal. However, the ECB has not completely cut off its support to Greece. The ECB could have recalled all of its loans, or demanded even more collateral for the existing loans. But for the Greek banks this removed the only viable option for obtaining more cash. They do not have assets that they can sell to come up with more cash. So without the ECB's full support, they are in serious trouble. Greece has closed the banks so that depositors cannot take out all of their money. There are now limits on how much depositors can get from ATMs and limits on wire transfers. So depositors are nervous and scared about what is going to happen. 10）歐洲央行本周做了什麼，希臘銀行為什麼要關門？歐洲央行決定，不再接受額外的希臘國債作為抵押品，這意味著其不會再增加對希臘銀行的流動性。不過，央行並沒有完全切斷對希臘的支持，它本可以要求希臘償還所有債務，甚至要求增加現有債務的抵押。但對希臘銀行來說，央行此舉無疑關上了他們最後的融資大門。他們如今已經無力籌措到更多資金。所以，失去流動性的銀行只能關門大吉。這樣儲戶就無法取出他們所有的錢。如今，希臘人每人每天最多只能取60歐元。 11) What can Greece do to save its economy now? Greece must either find a new lender, which seems very unlikely, or survive with very little credit for a while; Russia will not step in to offer support, since doing so would likely wind up with some of the resources transferred to other creditors and Russia has its own big fiscal problems. If there is a no vote, Greece will likely stop payments on all debt. Being cut off from credit markets, it will now be forced to match its spending to the revenue it is receiving. To ease the burden, the government will likely distribute IOUs of some form to government employees, vendors and pensioners. It may even have to use IOUs to fund the referendum. These IOUs will likely circulate as a form of money alongside the euro. People will strongly prefer euros to the IOUs, so the IOUs will trade at a discount. Some people and businesses may resort to bartering. 11）希臘人現在要怎麼做才能拯救經濟？希臘要麼找到一個新的債主（看起來可能性極小），要麼暫時在沒有流動性支援的情況下生存下去。俄羅斯不會成為它的救世主，因為普京這麼做只會便宜了其他債權人，而且俄羅斯自己也很缺錢。如果公投最終否決了救助方案，那麼希臘在停止支付所有債務的同時，也失去了所有國際援助。希臘將不得不努力減少開支，做到收支平衡。為了減輕負擔，政府可能會向公務員、發放某種形式的欠條，最後可能連公投的資金也需要用欠條支付。這些欠條可能會像歐元一樣成為某種形式的流通貨幣。當然，人們還是會傾向于使用歐元，所以政府的欠條可能會有所折價。 12) Why not just bring back the drachma? The public will have little confidence in the IOUs that the government issues. Probably even less confidence if Greece opts to officially introduce a new currency. Reintroducing the drachma would be totally illegal under European law and form the basis for a law suit to force Greece out of the European Union (EU). As part of the EU, Greek citizens can travel freely and work anywhere within Europe. Greek goods are also allowed to be sold without being subject to tariffs. Expulsion from the EU would be devastating. Issuing IOUs which are not officially touted as a currency is a better option for Greece for now. 12）希臘會回到德拉克馬嗎？不會。可以預計，公眾對於政府發行的欠條將不會太有信心。如果發行新貨幣，信心大概就更弱了。而重新啟用德拉克馬將完全違背歐元區現有法規，希臘距徹底被逐出歐元區乃至歐盟又近了一步。作為歐盟的成員國，希臘人民可以在歐盟國家自由旅行和工作，希臘的商品也無需擔心關稅的問題。退出歐盟後，這些福利都將失去。希臘人準備好了麼？所以，發行欠條這種非正式貨幣應該是希臘最好的選擇。 13) Will the Greek crisis spread? It depends largely on what citizens make of the impending chaos in Greece. If people believe that their governments also might default on debt, they could also try to get money out of the banks. Likewise, investors could refuse to buy newly issued debt. The ECB is likely to be able to head off both these problems. It is already buying debt and can do more of that. It also can lend against the collateral guaranteed by these governments. The ECB can probably contain the immediate fallout. The political contagion is much harder to assess. Perhaps if Greece emerges in better shape in the medium term, then other countries will follow. Tsipras was betting that this concern would be so powerful that Europe would never take this risk. 13）希臘危機會蔓延嗎？這主要取決於其他國家人民如何看待希臘的危機。如果人們認為他們的政府也可能債務違約，那麼他們也可以去銀行把錢都取出來，投資者也可以拒絕購買該國國債。不過歐洲央行有能力化解這些問題。它現在已經在購買這些國家的債券，今後可以買的更多。它還可以允許這些國家的國債用來抵押融資。政治上的傳染也很難。也許一段時間後，人們發現希臘違約後依然過得很好，那麼其他國家也可能效仿。齊普拉斯正是在豪賭歐元區經不起希臘退歐的風險。 14) What is likely to happen next in Greece? The outcome of the referendum now becomes critical. If the public votes "yes", then perhaps the existing government (likely reorganized) will be able to reopen the banks and conclude a deal. But, if the public sides with Tsipras government, then there will be a very sharp recession over the next few months. Tax collection is likely to collapse. The Tsipras government is unlikely to survive the economic collapse. If the post-Tsipras government opts to proceed with the default, then the next big unknown is how long before the economy stabilizes. At some point Greece will be a very attractive tourist destination, and its goods that are no longer priced in euros will be more competitive, so at some point the economy will begin to turn around. Whether this takes months or quarters will depend on many decisions that are difficult to forecast now. 14）希臘危機下一步可能怎麼發展？如今，公投結果變得非常關鍵。如果希臘人民投下贊成票，那麼希臘政府（可能會重組）就會接受債權人的援助協議，銀行業就可以恢復正常。但如果希臘人民投反對票，與齊普拉斯政府站在一邊，那麼希臘未來幾個月勢必迎來劇烈的衰退。政府稅收可能會崩潰，齊普拉斯政府難以倖存。如果齊普拉斯之後的新政府繼續選擇違約，那麼沒有人知道希臘經濟再過多久才能穩定。屆時，希臘的旅遊業將會很有吸引力，因為其很多商品不再使用歐元定價，所以，在之後的某個時點，希臘經濟會開始復蘇。至於這個過程要經歷幾個月還是幾個季度，中間未知因素太多，我們很難作出預測。 15) What happens to the IMF if its loan is not repaid? It will continue to pursue its claim against Greece. Greece will not be able to borrow internationally until it makes peace with the IMF. So the IMF will eventually be repaid. This could take years. The IMF is likely to be criticized further for the recommendations it made, particularly in 2010. Perhaps it will be reformed to limit its discretion in lending. Traditionally the head of the IMF has been a European. That is very likely to change since many countries believe that Greece was treated preferentially because it was a European country. 15）如果希臘違約，IMF怎麼辦？ IMF會繼續追討希臘的債務。在其向IMF還錢之前，希臘不可能在國際市場上借到錢。所以，IMF最終會拿到錢，但這可能需要幾年時間。IMF可能會因為2010年最初借錢給希臘的那個決定而備受指責，但它很快會進行改進，未來的借款會更加謹慎。一直以來，IMF的首腦都由歐洲人擔任。未來這一狀況可能會有改變，因為大家會指責IMF 因為希臘是歐洲國家而有所偏袒，從而導致壞賬。 16) What happens to the ECB if Greece defaults? The loans made to Greece are extended by the Greek central bank, which in turn borrows from the ECB. So the ECB will have a large claim against the Greek central bank that is likely to turn into a significant loss. 16）如果希臘違約，歐洲央行怎麼辦？歐洲央行通過金及流動性援助（ELA），借希臘央行之手為希臘銀行業提供了大量的貸款。所以它當然會向希臘央行討債，否則將會遭受巨大損失。 17) Can the ECB survive if Greece defaults? The ECB can definitely continue even if Greece defaults. The ECB has provisions set aside to cover some losses. It also is making lots of profits on the bonds it owns (that it pays for with money that pays no interest). So the Greek losses per se are not a problem. A default by a larger country such as Italy or Spain would be very different. 17）歐洲央行會因此倒閉嗎？歐洲央行當然會繼續運作下去。歐洲央行有專門應對損失的準備金，而且通過買債券賺了很多利潤。所以希臘違約的損失不是問題。但是，如果義大利、西班牙等大國違約，情況就不一樣了。 18) What should have been done to avert this crisis? Greece should have defaulted in 2010. Its debt burden then was unsustainable and nothing since then has changed this. It is true that financial markets were much more jittery at that time, but the money that was raised to pay off the creditors in that bailout could have been diverted to support Greece and other weak countries. Once the bad rescue of 2010 was undertaken, it was inevitable that some form of debt relief was going to be necessary. Imagine how different the political dynamics in Europe would have been if the German and French banks had been explicitly bailed out. 18）如果歷史可以重來，應該怎樣處理這次危機？希臘2010年時就應該違約。那時其債務就已經不可持續，五年來這一狀況沒有任何改變。那時的市場確實比現在更加擔憂，但希臘還給債權人的這筆錢本來可以用來支持國內建設。2010年的援助一旦開始，就不可避免地要對希臘進行債務減免。試想，如果希臘違約，需要救助的不是希臘而是德國和法國的銀行，那麼歐洲各國的重視程度和動員力量該有多麼不同。 3.心得/評論(必需填寫)：寫的真好,又淺顯易懂 (翻譯是26的翻譯我懶自己翻..) -- ※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc), 來自: 36.231.114.51 ※ 文章網址: https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/Stock/M.1435835388.A.5ED.html

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victoryss

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dinotea

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