[情報] How And Why The Graduation Rate For Dr
http://www.baseballamerica.com/draft/how-and-why-the-graduation-rate-for-draft-picks-has-changed/
How And Why The Graduation Rate For Draft Picks Has Changed
July 23, 2013 by Matt Eddy
Baseball America determined that roughly one in six signed picks—17.2
percent, actually—from the 1987-2008 drafts went on to play in the big
leagues. Today, we’ll see how that rate compares with historical marks and
explore the reasons for the change.
Rresearch conducted by BA founder Allan Simpson and published in 2003
indicates that 22.8 percent of signed picks from the top 20 rounds of the
1965 through ’95 drafts played in the major leagues.
The graduation rate for draft picks in today’s game is slightly higher. In
the 22 drafts we studied for this exercise, we found that roughly a quarter
of signed draft picks (25.4 percent) from the top 20 rounds reached the major
leagues for at least one game.
Breaking it down one step further: In the first 10 years of our sample,
1987-96, the graduation rate was 26.3 percent, whereas 24.6 percent of signed
draft picks had reached the big leagues (through the first half of 2013) from
the second decade of the sample, 1997 through ’08. That 24.6 percent rate
will surely rise as players continue to reach the majors from the more-recent
drafts, but an additional 90 players would need to graduate in order to match
the 26.3 percent rate from 1987-96.
Regardless of which graduation rate you reference, roughly one-quarter of
signed draft picks from the top 20 rounds will appear in the majors, though
perhaps the proliferation of international talent in today’s game has muted
the impact of the more-recent draft classes. That trend might signal a
decline in draft-pick graduation rate going forward.
Major league front-office executives offered several hypotheses—many of them
interrelated—as to why more draft picks reach the majors today than they did
25-30 years ago.
‧ Transaction action. Multiple sources indicated that teams today make many
more transactions involving the major league roster than they once did—more
callups, more demotions, more outrights and more waiver claims. This creates
much more major league opportunity for fringe players and low-ceiling
prospects.
“Teams are more aggressive than ever with short-term roster juggling,” said
one executive, “meaning that they’re more likely to use 35-40 players in a
season rather than 25. Even though a lot of those extra stints are the same
guys over and over again, it should still lead to more players getting big
league time—though not more regulars.”
‧ Injuries and investments. “I’d argue we have more injuries now,” said
another exec, “and because of the money involved, teams are more cautious
and will put a player on the disabled list instead of having him ‘rub some
dirt on it.’ With more injuries comes the need for more players to replace
them on the roster.”
Another front-office executive noted that teams have practically nothing to
lose from a financial standpoint by taking a flier on a player from Triple-A.
In the context of the average major league salary ($3.2 million in 2012), the
non-tenured callup receives only the prorated portion of the $490,000 major
league minimum, which works out to about $20,000 in salary for a one-week
trial. This occurred less frequently in the past, when the gap between the
minimum and average salary was smaller.
‧ General pitcher churn. As pitchers face fewer batters per appearance than
they once did, teams face constant demand for new arms to replace the ones
who burn out or lose effectiveness. The average team in 2012 used about 22
pitchers to cover all the innings in the season. In 2002, they used 20. In
1992, they used 17. In 1982, they used 15. In fact, teams averaged between 14
and 15 pitchers a year from the baseball’s first expansion in 1961 until
1985, when the average reached 16 for the first time. The average has not
dipped below that threshold since then. In graphical form, where the thin
black line represents the five-year moving average:
http://www.baseballamerica.com/draft/one-in-six-draft-picks-will-click/attachment/pitchersperseason/
The wonderful Baseball-Reference Play Index generated these pitcher head
counts, but they inevitably include a few position players each season who
took the mound during blowouts. That number ought to be fairly constant from
year to year, however. The gaps in the graph represent strike-shortened
seasons in which less than 162 games were scheduled. We’ll never know
exactly how many pitchers would have been used in those seasons.
The number of unique position players per team has remained much more stable,
ranging from roughly 19 to 22 during the Expansion Era. The average number of
position players per team has trended downward since peaking in 1991 (21.7)
and has averaged 20.8 during the last five full seasons.
‧ Velocity cycle. An emphasis on pitcher velocity in today’s game has
resulted in an historic strikeout rate—one in every five batters—or maybe
it’s the other way around and teams are fighting fire with fire, preferring
power pitchers to combat all-or-nothing hitting approaches. Regardless, teams
clearly favor pitchers who throw hard, and that selection bias may be
contributing to more arm injuries—at the least, more DL stints—thus the
need for fresh hard-throwers.
It’s not just fastball velocity that has climbed to new heights, however.
Sliders and cutters—the latter pitch type among starters, anyway—are thrown
harder and more frequently today than they were even five years ago.
According to Baseball Info Solutions pitch data presented at Fangraphs.com,
the average fastball velocity by a starter in 2012 was 91 mph, compared with
89.8 mph in 2007. Sliders and cutters saw similar gains, increasing from 82.3
to 83.3 mph (sliders) and 85.5 to 87.4 mph (cutters).
The rise in cutter velocity is particularly impressive, given that the pitch's
rate of deployment doubled in that span. Average fastball velocity for
relievers climbed from 91.1 mph in 2007 to 92.5 mph in 2012, while sliders
saw a more modest gain (82.6 to 83 mph).
AVERAGE PITCH DISTRIBUTIONS IN 2012
Because of their inherent platoon splits, fastball/slider pitchers often wind
up in the bullpen, where managers can use them in favorable matchup situations.
Last year, relievers threw either a fastball or a slider nearly four out of
every five pitches. The “Other” category captures cutters, splitters and
the stray knuckleball.
Pitch Starter Reliever
Fastball 56% 60%
Slider 12% 18%
Curveball 11% 8%
Changeup 12% 6%
Other 9% 8%
‧ Matchup morass. With the seven-man bullpen and 12-man pitching staff now
standard, teams freely devote roster spots to matchup relievers with large
platoon splits, and these extra roster spots naturally create more
opportunity for unproven pitchers to get a foot in the door. This applies to
many lefthanded relievers, of course, but many teams today also carry sidearm
righty relievers, many with their own platoon weaknesses. Their ranks include
the likes of Steve Cishek, Cody Eppley, Cody Gearrin, Peter Moylan,
Pat Neshek, Darren O’Day, Joe Smith and Brad Ziegler.
This reliever-heavy roster construction works only if the opposing offense is
unable (or unwilling) to pinch-hit late in games to gain the platoon
advantage, and with a typical big league bench consisting of three or four
non-catcher position players, this has become the case. For perspective, the
average American League team in 2012 pinch-hit 43 times, compared with 77
times in 1982. The gap would be even wider if one discards pinch-hitters for
the pitcher in interleague games.
Offenses today often cede the platoon advantage to the defense, resulting in
more right-on-right and left-on-left confrontations in late innings,
situations rife for fastballs and sliders. As the table at right illustrates,
relievers in 2012 threw either a fastball or a slider 78 percent of the time
—nearly four out of every five pitches—while starters relied on offspeed
pitches in equal measures to combat batters from both sides of the plate.
‧ Greater scrutiny. Technological advances—particularly MLB.TV and the MLB
Network—have changed the way fans consume baseball. If a hot prospect goes
into a 1-for-30 tailspin, then even casual fans will know about it. That
negative reinforcement may be damaging for the player, and that factor may be
contributing to teams keeping a shorter leash on young players.
‧ Higher stakes. In today’s game, where one-third of teams qualify for a
playoff spot, too many underperforming players can make the difference
between winning the second wild card and staying home. Thus teams require
instant results and cannot always afford to be patient with struggling
youngsters.
‧ More information. The draft and other means of player procurement proceed
in a more orderly fashion today because organizations have access to more
sophisticated ways of gathering, processing and disseminating information.
This contributes to a larger percentage of signed draft picks reaching the
majors as scouting departments do a better job of identifying amateurs with
pro potential (as well as those who are signable in the first place) and
player-development staffs do a better job of cultivating raw tools into
skills.
“The whole process is more efficient,” said the first executive. “NDFAs
and players drafted after the 20th round used to be a larger portion of the
big leagues because teams now have gotten better at lining the talent up
properly. In the past, you could find big leaguers more easily in those
areas.”
Our research backs up the exec’s claim. Dividing the first 20 years of the
sample into “old” (1987-96) and “new” (1997-08) groups reveals that more
players selected in the second through fifth rounds in the “new” sample
reached the majors at a higher rate, 39.1 to 37.9 percent, and provided more
three-year players, 13 to 12.6 percent. The opposite is true for players
drafted after the 20th round, where teams found a higher percentage of big
leaguers, 7.7 to 6.1 percent, and regulars, 2.3 to 1.2 percent, in the
“old” sample.
‧ More jobs. Two waves of expansion in the ’90s created 100 additional
major league jobs with the Diamondbacks, Marlins, Rays and Rockies. In the
bigger picture, baseball has increased its ranks by 50 percent since the
first draft in 1965, expanding from 20 teams to 30. The existence of more
teams necessarily results in the existence of more second-division teams, and
second-division teams facing nonexistent playoff odds have nothing to lose
by auditioning as many unproven players as they can cram on a 40-man roster.
‧ Accessibility. Half of the 30 big league teams have Triple-A affiliates
within 250 miles of their home city, making travel between destinations both
easy and relatively affordable. In fact, nine organizations have access to
Triple-A players within a tempting 100 miles of their home base. They are the
Athletics (Sacramento), Blue Jays (Buffalo), Braves (Gwinnett), Mariners
(Tacoma), Phillies (Lehigh Valley), Red Sox (Pawtucket), Reds (Louisville),
Rockies (Colorado Springs) and Tigers (Toledo).
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