[討論] A defense of the beliefs of sensation
請參考 Keith Lehrer, "Why Not Skepticism?" 第62頁 IV部分 :)
Lehrer指出我們有可能弄錯自己的感覺及意識狀態，
而我持反對意見，至少有某些感覺經驗是不會錯的。
There are some beliefs about one's mental state must be true,
while still others may be mistaken. To illustrate a false belief
about one's mental state, we can image a dead drunk person who
firmly believes that he is well conscious. However, consider a
person who claims an intense pain. Tortured with the unendurable
pain, he goes to a doctor, who finds nothing wrong at all after
extremely careful and complete examining the patient's physical
and psychological state. Could the doctor assert that the patient
is wrong and actually doesn't pain? No. We can concede that what
causes the pain is unknown, but there is no denying that he FEELS
pain (assuming the patient is honest.) It is beliefs of subjective
feelings that need no justificatory arguments to support. Indeed,
we are fallible in finding the explanation of the pain, since we
may allege the pain is caused by something when it is not.
Nevertheless, if a person believes that he pains, it is true and
justified that he pains.
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問題不在於「他們能推理嗎？」，
也不是「他們能說話嗎？」，
而是「他們會感受到痛苦嗎？」。
－《動物解放》
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