Could China's Digital Currency Unseat the Dollar?
中國數字貨幣能否掀翻美元寶座？
原文：Foreign Affairs https://tinyurl.com/y93xsu3n
譯文：https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/a34HxTyDwdLp75oYYfd3yg
作者：Aditi Kumar 哈佛大學甘迺迪學院貝爾佛中心執行理事
Eric Rosenbach哈佛大學甘迺迪學院貝爾佛中心聯合主任，美國前助理國防部長
編譯：徐銘蔚
Imagine that it is 2022 and the United States has received intelligence from
the Mossad that Iran is procuring essential components for nuclear weapons
and missile programs. U.S. economic sanctions on Iran remain in place, but
Iran has shifted much of its international commerce to a new yuan-based system
—a Chinese digital currency that allows Tehran to avoid dollar transactions
and thus evade U.S. financial institutions. As a result, Iran’s oil sales to
China, India, and Europe are up, providing the Iranian regime with critical
revenue streams that U.S. authorities cannot monitor. And when Iran decides
to move quickly toward the development of nuclear weapons and new
medium-range missiles to deliver them, the United States can no longer turn
to sanctions as one of its primary means of responding to the threat.
讓我們先來假設一下現在是2022年，美國從摩薩德（Mossad，以色列情報機關）獲得情報
得知伊朗正在獲得制造核武器和導彈所必需的零部件，美國已經為此對伊朗施加了經濟制
裁，但是伊朗卻將其大部分國際貿易轉換為以“元”為基準的貨幣體系——一種可以讓德
黑蘭避免使用美元進行交易，並可以繞開美國各類監管機構的中國數字貨幣。由此，伊朗
對中國、印度和歐洲的石油銷量增加，為伊朗政府提供了美國當局無法監管的重要收入來
源。這樣一來，當伊朗決定要迅速推進核武器及其新型中程導彈載具的研發時，美國將無
法再把施加制裁作為應對此類威脅的主要手段之一。
This scenario may seem far-fetched given the long-standing dominance of the
dollar. But in late April, China reached a significant milestone: after more
than five years of research by its central bank, China became the first major
economy to conduct a real-world test of a national digital currency. The
pilot project, which is occurring in four large Chinese cities, is a clear
sign that China is years ahead of the United States in the development of
what is likely to become a central component of a digital world economy.
這個假設對於長期以來處於貨幣統治地位的美元來說可能有些牽強，但是在今年四月底，
中國已經取得了一個重大的里程碑：通過其中央銀行逾五年的調查，中國已經成為在現實
生活中測試使用數字貨幣的第一個主要經濟體。中國在其四大城市進行的試點項目清晰地
標志著中國在成為數字世界經濟核心的道路上已經領先美國數年。
U.S. policymakers are unprepared for the consequences. The advent of digital
currencies will degrade the efficacy of U.S. sanctions, limiting the country’
s options to respond to national security threats from Iran, North Korea,
Russia, and others. It will also hamper the ability of U.S. authorities to
track illicit financial flows. And China, meanwhile, will use the combination
of its digital yuan and strong electronic-payment platforms (such as Alipay
and WeChat) to expand its influence and reinforce its capacity for economic
coercion in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.
而美國的政策制定者們並沒有為這樣的結果做好準備，數字貨幣的出現會降低美國制裁的
效能，並且在面對來自伊朗、朝鮮、俄羅斯和其他國家的威脅時，也會限制美國可以做出
的選項，還會妨礙美國當局追查非法資金的流動。而與此同時，中國會結合利用數字貨幣
和電子支付平台（如支付寶、微信）來擴大影響力並鞏固其與非洲、中東和東南亞國家的
經濟合作。
Rather than resting on the laurels of the dollar’s decades-long dominance,
the United States must act now to protect its economic advantage in the
coming era of national digital currencies. In part, this will require
reconsidering the aggressive unilateral use of sanctions and other coercive
economic policy tools, which has spurred other nations to seek alternatives
to the U.S.-led and dollar-dominated global financial system. But it will
also require launching a “digital dollar initiative,” an effort that brings
the government together with the private sector to develop a digital national
currency. Otherwise, the failure to check the influence of China’s digital
yuan and develop a competitive American alternative could significantly
hinder the United States’ global influence in the information age.
數十年來，美元一直安於其優勢地位的現狀，而現在美國必須立刻行動起來應對即將到來
的國家數字貨幣時代，從而保護自身的經濟優勢。在某種程度上，這將需要美國重新考慮
挑釁性的單邊制裁行為以及其他脅迫性的經濟政策，因為恰恰是這些政策促使其他國家尋
求替代美國引領和美元主導的全球金融體系。同時這也需要發起“數字美元倡議”，把美
國政府同私營企業緊密聯系起來共同發展國家數字貨幣。否則，在監測中國數字貨幣影響
力和研發美國自有數字貨幣體系上的失敗，在這個信息時代將前所未有地撼動美國的國際
影響力。
NOT YOUR PARENTS’ BITCOIN
這不是你父輩的比特幣
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s hallmark economic development strategy, “
Made in China 2025,” aims to turn China into a leader in cutting-edge
technology. Accordingly, when China’s central bank determined in 2014 that a
state-backed digital currency had the potential to protect its financial
autonomy and heighten its international economic influence, the essential
ingredients—artificial intelligence, blockchain technology, and
digital-payment platforms—were already under development.
中華人民共和國主席習近平的經濟發展戰略核心——“中國制造2025”——宗旨是將中國
發展成尖端科技的領軍者。在2014年，當中國央行意識到國家支持的數字貨幣具備保護國
家財政主權、提高國際經濟影響的潛力時，其發展所需的幾項基本要素——人工智能、區
塊鏈技術以及電子支付平台——早已經處於發展進程中了。
A digital currency is any form of money that exists in electronic form, as
opposed to a tangible bill or coin. Deposits held in commercial banks today
are already digital, but they are the liability of private firms—that is,
privately owned banks are obligated to turn deposits into cash whenever a
depositor wants. China’s central bank-issued digital currency would be the
liability of the state, just as cash is. Although this change may seem
insignificant from the perspective of end users, it is fundamental, since a
central bank has much more authority and oversight over digital money that it
issues.
數字貨幣是以電子形式存在的貨幣，完全區別於有形的紙幣或硬幣。如今的商業銀行存款
早已實現了數字形式，但是這種形式是私營機構的責任——這意味著當存款者在任何時候
需要兌現，私人擁有的銀行必須將這部分存款兌換成現金。而中國央行發行的數字貨幣和
現金一樣屬於國家責任。雖然這種差別在終端使用者看來並沒有十分巨大，但這種轉變是
根本性的，因為中央銀行在數字貨幣的發行上會更權威且更易監管。
Last year, China’s efforts to master a digital currency accelerated when
Facebook unveiled Libra, a digital token administered by a consortium of
mostly technology and finance companies and backed by a basket of U.S.
dollars, British pounds, euros, and Japanese yen. “While we debate these
issues, the rest of the world isn't waiting,” Mark Zuckerberg, the Facebook
CEO, testified to Congress last October. “China is moving quickly to launch
similar ideas in the coming months.” Ironically, Zuckerberg’s push to make
Facebook the steward of a globalized monetary system catalyzed China’s
efforts to roll out its own digital currency. “If Libra is accepted by
everyone and becomes a widely used payment tool, then after some time, it is
entirely possible that it will develop into a global, super-sovereign
currency,” a top official at China’s central bank said after Libra was
announced. “We need to plan ahead to protect our monetary sovereignty.”
去年，當Facebook發布Libra時，中國也在加速發展數字貨幣的道路上取得了重大成就。
Libra是一種不追求對美元匯率穩定，而追求實際購買力相對穩定的加密數字貨幣，由美
元、英鎊、歐元和日元這四種法幣計價的一籃子低波動性資產作為抵押物。“當我們在討
論這些事務的時候，這個世界上的其他人也並沒有閑著，”Facebook執行總裁馬克‧祖克
柏去年十月向國會證實說，“在未來的幾個月里中國會很快采取和我們類似的做法。”然
而諷刺的是，恰恰是祖克柏推動Facebook成為全球化貨幣體系引領者的行為催生了中國推
行自己的數字貨幣。“如果Libra可以被所有人認可接受並且成為被廣泛使用的支付工具
，那麽假以時日，它完全有可能發展成為全球化的超主權貨幣，”中國央行一位高層在聽
聞Libra以後說道，“我們需要提前籌備以保護我們的貨幣主權。”
The digital yuan is a far cry from bitcoin, the project that first put
digital currencies on the map. Bitcoin uses peer-to-peer technology to
operate with no central administrator. Several million users maintain
independent ledgers of all transactions within a distributed system and use
consensus mechanisms to agree on which transactions are valid. Cryptographic
technology is supposed to ensure that users’ identities and transaction
records are private, secure, and immutable. But the weaknesses of this model—
wildly fluctuating values and vulnerability to cyberattacks—has kept bitcoin
and other “cryptocurrencies” from becoming more than speculative assets.
中國數字貨幣“元”與首次把數字貨幣搬上歷史舞台的比特幣有很大差異。比特幣利用點
對點技術實現無中央管理。在分散式計算機系統里的所有交易，幾百萬用戶持續擁有獨立
賬戶並且利用共識機制使交易合法有效。加密技術同時確保了用戶身份和交易記錄的隱私
、安全及不可變更。但是這個貨幣模型的缺點——價格波動巨大且容易遭受網絡攻擊——
使得比特幣同其他加密貨幣一樣都變成了投機資產。
By contrast, the digital yuan is hypercentralized. It is controlled by the
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and integrated with China’s current banking
system. It will likely follow a two-tier structure, with the PBOC issuing
digital coins to a network of state-owned banks and payments firms, such as
Alipay and WeChat, which in turn will distribute them to individuals and
businesses through mobile banking and payments apps. At the heart of the
monetary system will be a ledger overseen by the PBOC and administered by the
network that documents all transactions and instantaneously moves digital
balances among members. With this structure, the digital yuan is likely to
overcome the three major hurdles that have prevented cryptocurrencies from
achieving scale: price stability, wide acceptability through ubiquitous
payment platforms, and legitimacy in the eyes of governments and regulators.
相比之下，中國數字貨幣“元”的體系更集中化。它由中國央行直接控制並且整合了中國
現有的銀行體系。它很可能會實行雙層結構，首先由中國央行發型數字貨幣到國有銀行體
系和諸如支付寶、微信等支付平台，接著再通過手機銀行或支付應用分發給個人或企業。
這個貨幣系統的核心是受中國央行監管的總賬，並由記錄所有成員交易及其實時數字余額
的網絡集中管理。有了這個結構，中國數字貨幣元很有希望克服三個阻礙加密數字貨幣發
展的主要障礙：價格穩定、各類支付平台的廣泛接受以及政府監管部門要求的合法性。
For China, part of the appeal of a digital currency is its use in domestic
retail payments. (And indeed, other countries, especially emerging markets,
that are exploring their own digital currencies are primarily interested in
domestic payments efficiency and financial inclusion, according to a survey
by the Bank of International Settlements.) Given that 80 percent of
smartphone users in China already use mobile-payment platforms, however, the
real benefit will come with the expansion of Chinese economic and strategic
influence abroad.
對於中國來說，數字貨幣的部分啟發來源於它在國內零售支付體系上的運用。根據國際清
算銀行的調查顯示，的確，正在探索自己數字貨幣的其他國家尤其是新興市場國家更感興
趣的都在支付效率和金融包容性這兩點上。然而，即便中國現有已知80%智能手機用戶已
經在使用手機支付平台，真正的益處會伴隨著中國經濟及其海外戰略影響力的擴大而逐步
到來。
A DIGITAL BELT AND ROAD
數字化一帶一路
The backbone of the United States’ financial dominance is the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), which facilitates
messages between banks about payments orders, and a network of U.S.
correspondent banks, which serves as intermediary to execute international
payments. Most cross-border payments—nearly $5 trillion per day—are
directed through SWIFT messages, and a significant portion are routed through
U.S. correspondent banks. Information sharing with these institutions allows
U.S. authorities to identify illicit activity, such as money laundering and
terrorist financing. (For example, the U.S. Treasury’s Terrorist Finance
Tracking Program (TFTP), a post-9/11 initiative to monitor al Qaeda and other
terror networks, relies on information subpoenaed from SWIFT to investigate
suspected international terrorists and their networks.)
在美國金融中占主導地位的是全世界銀行間金融電信協會（Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunication, 縮寫SWIFT），其不僅促成銀行間就訂單支付
進行信息交流，同時也為美國各代理銀行提供國際轉賬支付的網絡媒介。每天約5萬億美
元的跨國支付當中絕大部分都是通過SWIFT的信息指引，並且其中很大一部分是通過美國
各代理銀行的路徑。這些機構間的信息共享使得美國當局可以有效識別非法行為，比如洗
錢和恐怖主義融資等等。例如，美國財政部恐怖分子資金追蹤計劃（the U.S. Treasury
’s Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, 縮寫TFTP），一項“911事件”後用來監控
基地組織及其他恐怖組織的計劃，就依靠SWIFT提交的信息來調查可疑的國際恐怖分子和
他們的網絡。
But perhaps more important, this system gives the United States enormous
leverage over other states, since sanctions that cut a country off from this
network are usually a death sentence. Over the past decades, Washington has
relied more heavily on sanctions as a core foreign policy tool, increasing
both the frequency of their use (new designations spiked in the first two
years of the Trump administration and were already on the rise before that)
and the scope of issues they are meant to address (the number of sanctions
programs increased threefold from 2009 to 2019).
但是可能更重要的是，這個系統讓美國在其他國家面前擁有了巨大的影響力，因為當一個
國家經濟被美國制裁並且從這個網絡中被完全剔除時，那就相當於被判了死刑。在過去的
幾十年里，華盛頓越來越依賴於將制裁作為其對外政策的核心工具，制裁的利用頻率不斷
增加。在川普執政前這一趨勢就已上升，而其執政後的兩年里制裁案例更是迅速激增，同
時涉足的領域也在不斷擴大，由此導致制裁數量從2009年到2019年增加了三倍。
Nations on the receiving end have in turn become increasingly resentful. But
it is not just U.S. adversaries who see the appeal of having an alternative
to dollar-based, cross-border transactions; even some U.S. allies are looking
for ways to undercut this leverage. Last year, the governor of the United
Kingdom’s central bank, Mark Carney, called for an international digital
currency that could “dampen the domineering influence of the U.S. dollar on
global trade.” Russia has developed a SWIFT alternative called the System
for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS); China has its own version called
the Cross-Border Interbank Payments System (CIPS); and five EU nations have
joined the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), which aims to
facilitate non-SWIFT and nondollar denominated transactions, primarily with
Iran.
而被施加制裁的國家紛紛開始變得更加憤恨。但是並不是只有美國的對手們意識到了尋求
美元本位制和跨國轉賬替代品的需求，甚至很多美國的盟友也在尋求可以打破現狀的方法
。去年，英國中央銀行行長馬克‧卡尼提出需要一種國際數字貨幣來“抑制美元在全球過
於專制的影響力”。俄羅斯已開發了一種可以替代SWIFT的金融信息傳遞系統（System
for Transfer of Financial Messages，縮寫SPFS），中國也有屬於自己的人民幣跨境支
付系統（Cross-Border Interbank Payments System，縮寫CIPS），還有五個歐洲國家已
經加入包括伊朗在內的INTEX（全稱Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges，直譯
為支持貿易交流的工具），旨在促進無SWIFT、無美元支配的交易。
Digital currencies further the goal of avoiding dollar transactions and U.S.
financial oversight, since they provide a scalable cross-border mechanism
that circumvents the current system. The central banks of Canada and
Singapore are already exploring the use of smart contracts to pass messages
between digital currency systems, and monetary authorities in Hong Kong and
Thailand have tested bilateral payments in their respective currencies
without intermediaries. Such initiatives demonstrate the potential to
complete cross-border transactions without SWIFT and without U.S.
correspondent banks, two critical pillars of U.S. financial dominance. The
European Central Bank has also created a working group with the central banks
of Canada, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom to explore
cross-border interoperability of national digital currency projects.
數字貨幣的出現可以促進實現非美元交易並且避開美國的金融監管，因為數字貨幣提供了
一種可以有效規避現有系統的跨境機制。加拿大央行和新加坡央行也已經在探尋使用智能
合約來跳過電子貨幣系統中的信息部分，香港和泰國的貨幣管理局也已經在嘗試不通過中
間媒介並使用各自的貨幣來實現雙邊支付。這些行為都證實了完全有可能實現不通過
SWIFT和美國代理銀行這兩個美國金融主導地位的重要支柱來進行跨境交易。歐洲中央銀
行還建立了一個包括加拿大、日本、瑞典、瑞士和英國等國央行在內的工作小組，用來探
索國家數字貨幣計劃的跨境互操作性。
The digital yuan could play an especially important role in advancing such
efforts, bolstered by China’s clear interest in facilitating international
commerce in a way that undermines U.S. influence and expands its own. In some
places, Beijing might simply share its “technology stack” or expertise to
accelerate the development of digital currencies by other governments
motivated to evade U.S. oversight.
中國數字貨幣會在推進這項成就里扮演尤為重要的角色，中國明確在促進國際商務合作，
削弱美國的影響力的同時發展自身的影響力。在一些地區，北京會簡單地分享“技術包”
或者專業技術給其他國家政府來促進發展他們的數字貨幣，從而規避美國的監管。
For example, Iran could use Chinese technology to issue a digital rial that
is fully interoperable with the Chinese system. For those countries in
Africa, the Gulf, and Southeast Asia that are already in China’s economic
orbit, Beijing could push the use of the digital yuan itself. Just as it is
funding physical infrastructure projects today through its Belt and Road
Initiative, China could invest in point-of-sale terminals, ATMs, mobile apps,
and other financial infrastructure that creates a complementary “digital
Belt and Road.” Individuals sending or receiving remittances and businesses
with large import or export ties to China, for example, could transact in the
digital yuan using Alipay. And by stipulating that importers receive payment
in the digital yuan, or requiring contractors for the real-world BRI to repay
loans using it, China could both increase demand for its national currency
and bring more users into a network that it can closely monitor.
舉個例子，伊朗可以運用中國的技術來發行伊朗數字貨幣里亞爾，完全兼容中國的系統。
還有那些已經納入中國經濟發展軌跡的非洲國家、海灣地區和東南亞國家，北京可以直接
推行使用中國數字貨幣“元”。就像現在投資“一帶一路”基礎設施建設一樣，中國還可
以投資銷售終端、ATM機、手機應用和其他金融設施來建立一條“數字化一帶一路”。比
如個人之間的收付款以及與中國相關的大額進出口交易都可以通過支付寶以數字貨幣“元
”來進行交易。通過規定進口商以中國數字貨幣“元”來接受支付，或者要求現實世界中
的“一路一帶”合約方以數字貨幣償還貸款，中國可以提高國家貨幣的需求量，同時還可
以把更多用戶帶入到這樣一個可以密切監管的網絡中來。
China has much to gain from pioneering a scalable state-backed digital
currency. Chinese finance and tech firms at the forefront of the digital Belt
and Road will capture the revenue from facilitating cross-border payments.
The PBOC will have a panopticon view of all transactions in the digital yuan
and potentially, on all transactions in systems that leverage its technology,
strengthening its information advantage. Chinese officials have described the
system as offering “controlled anonymity,” giving the government another
data set to not only identify illicit activity but also target political
dissidents and minorities. And Chinese cooperation, already important, will
become a linchpin in multilateral sanctions and other economic agreements.
推行有效的國家支持的數字貨幣，中國可以受益良多。“數字化一帶一路”中那些前沿的
中國金融公司和科技公司都將通過促進跨境交易而獲得巨大的經濟收入。中國央行會對數
字貨幣“元”的所有交易具有全景敞視，並且可以說，系統中所有交易都會無形中促進它
的技術升級、加強它的信息優勢。中國官員將該系統描述為提供“可控匿名”。這給政府
提供了另一套數據，不僅可以識別非法活動，還可以針對持不同政見者和少數群體。 而
已經扮演重要角色的中國公司將成為多邊制裁和其他經濟協定的關鍵。
Meanwhile, U.S. economic influence will be undercut, starting with less
effective sanctions. Going forward, Washington would, for example, be
hindered from unilaterally withdrawing from arrangements such the Iran
nuclear deal, as it did in 2018, since European countries could simply extend
Iran a line of credit (as they wanted to do in 2019) or trade with Iran (as
they are trying to do through INSTEX) using digital currencies that do not
rely on U.S. market infrastructure. Not only would the United States be
unable to sanction this activity, but authorities would also be limited in
their ability to track it. The U.S. intelligence community could no longer
rely on financial transaction data to see if Iran was purchasing nuclear
materials.
與此同時，美國經濟影響力會因為愈加無效的制裁而被削弱。進一步講，當歐洲國家可以
輕易地給予伊朗援手（正如他們在2019年想做的那樣）或者同伊朗通過數字貨幣進行貿易
而不需要依賴於美國的市場基礎設施（正如他們正在嘗試通過INTEX所要實現的），那麽
華盛頓在單邊退出諸如伊核協議這種多邊協議時就會有所顧慮。不僅美國將無法制裁這種
行為，包括執政當局追蹤這種交易的能力也會被限制。美國的情報機構也無法再通過金融
交易數據來發現伊朗是否購買了核武器原料。
THE DIGITAL DOLLAR
數字美元
Over the past several decades, U.S. economic power has served as the
foundation for U.S. global might. Until now, Washington could take comfort in
the fact that the U.S. financial system was truly unrivaled. Now policymakers
must decide how to protect it in an era when China—or even a private
company, such as Facebook—can challenge American banks and payments
infrastructure.
在過去的幾十年里，美國的經濟力量為美國的全球霸權提供了基礎。直到眼前，華盛頓當
局甚至都可以為美國無可匹敵的金融體系而感到安慰。但現在，在中國甚至像Facebook這
樣的私有企業都可以挑戰美國銀行和支付體系的時代里，執政者必須決定如何保住這種地
位。
A digital dollar initiative will combine the strength and stability of the
U.S. dollar with the convenience and efficiency of digital technology.
Launching the initiative will be difficult. Financial institutions and
technology companies will likely see a threat to their proprietary digital
payments solutions; U.S. policymakers and regulators will quickly need to
fill knowledge gaps in digital payments technologies; and a slew of
regulatory and policy changes will be required to, for example, protect user
privacy and ensure data and system security in a more digitized economy.
“數字美元倡議”可以將美元的強力和穩定同數字技術的方便有效結合起來。當然，啟動
這個倡議會相當困難。金融機構和科技公司可能會將其視作對他們現有數字交易方式的威
脅，美國的執政者和監管者也需要快速地填補他們在數字交易技術上的知識空缺，並且大
量的監管和政策上的改變也會隨之而來，比如更加數字化的經濟中保護用戶隱私、確保數
據和系統的安全。
So far, the U.S. Federal Reserve has been cautious but slow. In a speech last
fall, Lael Brainard, a member of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors,
outlined significant obstacles related to issuing and administering a digital
dollar, including the need to establish the Fed’s legal authority to issue
money in digital form; the need to develop operational capacity to manage a
digital currency (protecting user privacy, preventing counterfeiting,
mitigating cyber risks); and the need to understand its implications for
monetary policy and financial stability. These are real challenges that the
digital dollar initiative must address. Yet the result of inaction will be
that over time, payments flows will migrate to a digital ecosystem that is
built and administered by foreign entities. The delays and technical glitches
encountered in disbursing COVID-19-related stimulus payments to American
households and businesses have already illustrated the deep inefficiencies of
the U.S. payments network.
到現在為止，美國聯邦儲備委員會對此雖然態度謹慎但是也在慢慢做出嘗試。美國聯邦儲
備委員會理事會成員Lael Brainard在去年秋天的一場演講上簡要敘述了發行和監管數字
美元的巨大障礙，包括要確立聯邦政府發行數字貨幣的法律權威、發展管理數字貨幣的操
作能力（包括保護用戶隱私、防止偽造、降低網絡風險等），以及理解貨幣政策和財政穩
定的內在含義。這些都是建立數字貨幣一定會遇到的困難挑戰。然而隨著時間推移，對此
毫無作為的後果就是支付行為會逐漸轉移到其他已經建立並實施了數字貨幣的國家。在向
美國居民和企業支付新冠病毒援助資金時所暴露出的效率低下和技術故障已經清晰地揭露
了美國支付體系的低效。
U.S. policymakers must also reconsider the near-reflexive use of unilateral
and secondary sanctions (which prohibit dealing not only with sanctioned
entities but also with third parties who deal with them) to address national
security threats. As the former Treasury Secretary Jack Lew has pointed out,
“we must be conscious of the risk that overuse of sanctions could undermine
our leadership position within the global economy, and the effectiveness of
our sanctions themselves.” When the need for sanctions is compelling,
Washington should make sure to bring other governments, especially those of
important allies, on board. The overuse of unilateral sanctions especially
pushes other nations to look for alternatives, and China’s digital yuan
could be exactly the solution that both allies and rogue nations seek.
美國的執政者也必須反思近期幾近反射性地使用單邊和二級制裁（不僅禁止與被制裁方直
接交易，同時也禁止與同被制裁方有交易的第三方發生交易）來給國家安全帶來的威脅。
正如美國前財政部長傑克‧盧所指出的，“我們必須意識到過度使用制裁的風險會破壞我
們在全球經濟中的領導地位，並且制裁本身的效力也會隨著制裁的增加而逐漸削弱。”當
確實需要施加制裁時，華盛頓需要確保可以連同其他政府，尤其是那些重要的盟友共同發
起。過度施加單邊制裁反而會推動其他國家尋求替代品，那麽中國的數字貨幣“元”就會
成為無論是美國盟友還是那些流氓國家所共同尋求的解決方案。
Ultimately, and inevitably, monetary systems are headed toward greater
digitization and independence from U.S. intermediaries. Policymakers will
need to respond by formulating multinational data-sharing agreements,
guidelines for interoperable digital systems, and privacy regulations for
cross-border payments data. U.S. policymakers should take a leading role in
these efforts to prevent a fragmented payments system rather than letting
other nations dictate the terms.
最終，不可避免地，貨幣系統會朝著數字化方向不斷發展並且從美國的體系中獨立出來。
執政者需要致力於制定多國數據共享協議、共享數字體系指南以及跨境交易數據的隱私監
管。美國的執政者應該要肩負起領導者的角色來阻止一個碎片化的全球交易體系，而不是
由其他國家來定義這個名詞。
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論述謬誤：1 轉移議題 change of subject、2 偷換概念 concept swap、3 虛假目標
strawman argument、4 人身攻擊 ad hominem、5 感性辯護 appeal to emotion、
6 關聯替代因果 correlation as causation、7 不當類比 false analogy、8 不當引申
slippery slope、9 同義反覆 circular reasoning、10 無知辯護 argument from
ignorance、11 引用權威 appeal to authority、12 黨同伐異 appeal to faction
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