全球生育率危機
The Global Fertility Crisis
原文：National Review https://tinyurl.com/tka5snr
作者：Layman Stone
譯文：法意讀書
https://wemp.app/posts/463712a1-3e11-4cad-9a81-857568da766d
譯者：黃子晨
[法意導言]近年來，生育率下降和社會老齡化已經不再是發達國家的專屬，這一趨勢開始
蔓延到全世界。2019年，歐洲、東亞、北美很多國家的現有生育率已經降低到令人髮指的
程度，各國政府提出有針對性的解決方案迫在眉睫。
2020年1月27日，美國人口預測公司——人口情報（Demographic Intelligence）的首席
信息官萊曼·斯通在《國家評論》（National Review）發表文章《全球性生育危機——
美國也不能倖免》，從世界生育率走低的現狀出發，聚焦美國的生育危機，通過與前現代
社會的對比，揭示現代社會之下現象發生的經濟學、社會學、國際政治等角度的深層原因
，並提出相應的解決機制。
萊曼·斯通認為，生育率下降是當代社會、尤其是美國社會的一大難題，將會帶來嚴重的
經濟、政治危機。然而我們決不能片面看待這一現象、用政策綁架個人的生育意願、盲目
地依賴移民，而應認識到政策、經濟、社會文化的宏觀層面與個人生活壓力、發展抉擇、
婚姻意願之間存在極其細密複雜的聯結互動關係。政府如果想真正解決這一問題，不僅要
在宏觀層面採取舉措，也要為每一個小家蕩平道路，唯此，“千禧一代”才能對生活建立
信心，從根本上為國家賦活。
//
South Korea recently denied draft exemptions for members of the K-pop boy
band and international sensation BTS. BTS is one of South Korea’s most
dynamic economic and cultural exports, worth about $4.65 billion annually to
the South Korean economy. But despite the hundreds of millions of dollars of
lost economic output involved, the boys of BTS must serve. The South Korean
military cites many reasons for the denial of exemptions, but one reason may
simply be urgent need. Thanks to the nation’s critically low birth rate,
just 0.88 children expected per woman at 2019 levels, the army is expected to
shed over 100,000 troops in the next four years.
近日，韓國否決了對K-pop（韓國流行音樂）男子樂隊——紅遍全球的BTS（防彈少年團；
韓國男子演唱組合，由金南俊、金碩珍、閔玧其、鄭號錫、朴智旻、金泰亨、田柾國7位
成員組成。）成員的徵兵豁免草案。BTS（防彈少年團）是韓國最具活力的經濟和文化出
口商品之一，每年為韓國經濟做出的貢獻約為46.5億美元。儘管如此，韓國還是有很多更
迫切的理由去否決徵兵豁免草案。由於該國出生率極低，據2019年標準顯示，韓國1名女
性一生所產子女數僅為0.88，因此韓國軍隊的士兵數量預計在未來四年內裁減1萬多名。
Korea’s case is severe, but it may be more common in the future. Birth rates
have fallen around the world for decades. The global total fertility rate (a
simple metric of how many children a woman entering her reproductive years
would have if current age-specific birth rates remained stable over her life)
has fallen from 5.04 kids per woman in 1963 to about 2.43 today.
韓國的局勢非常嚴峻，但是未來這種情形將更加普遍。近數十年中，出生率一直在世界範
圍內下滑。全球總和生育率（這一指標用來衡量在當前分年齡出生率保持穩定的情況下，
一個進入生育年齡的女性在其一生中將會有多少孩子。其計算方法是將各個年齡段的分年
齡出生率累加，再乘以5年）從1963年到現在已經由5.04（生育子女數/每位女性）下降到
2.43。
(按 - 分年齡出生率（Age-Specific Birth Rate，簡稱ASBR）：將育齡婦女（15-49歲）
劃分為15-19歲、20-24歲、直到45-49歲的年齡段，每個年齡段覆蓋五年。統計每個年齡
段的婦女人數，以及普查之前一年內每一年齡段婦女生育子女總數，就能得到每一年齡段
的婦女女的出生率，即為分年齡出生率。)
https://tinyurl.com/w7lqnwy
圖呈現美國女性與世界女性生育率於1800-2017年的變化曲線，美國數據來自美國疾病預
防控制中心、人口普查辦公室，全球數據來自gapminder。
The change in the United States in recent years has been particularly rapid:
Fertility rates have declined from about 2.12 children per woman in 2006 to
just 1.72 today. The figure could head even lower in the near future,
especially if another recession hits. In the long run, if fertility remains
low, the result will be increasing economic stagnation, greater
intergenerational economic and political tension, and, ultimately, strategic
insecurity. There is still time to address the problem by proposing pro-natal
policies, but not much. Moreover, for pro-natal policymaking to work, it will
have to confront numerous disparate issues at the same time. Labor
conditions, family income supports, housing policy, and education finance are
all involved.
近年來美國的生育率呈加速下降趨勢，已經從2006年的2.12（生育子女數/每位女性）下
降到現在的1.72。這一數值在未來幾年會變得更低，尤其是在受到下一波經濟衰退衝擊後
。長遠來看，如果生育率始終保持低下，將使經濟停滯時間延長，導致代際間經濟性、政
治性緊張，最終形成“戰略的不安全感”。我們現在仍有時間去提出相關生育政策，但解
決問題已是迫在眉睫。此外，要落實生育政策必然將同時面臨勞工待遇、家庭收入、住房
政策以及教育財政等諸多不同的問題。
However, the much-discussed decline in global birth rates over the last half
century is overstated. Adjusting for children who died before age five,
fertility in 1963 was just 4.4 kids per woman, and today birth rates are
around 2.3 kids per woman. Human birth rates actually peaked in 1963. Global,
mortality-adjusted fertility rates probably rose from 1800 until the 1960s,
with fewer than 3.5 children born per woman surviving to age five throughout
most of the 19th century. Based on plausible population estimates of historic
human populations, it’s likely that three surviving children was the norm
for most of human history. Modern hygiene, better birth control, improved
education, and better nutrition all worked together to reduce child mortality
over time.
然而，過去半個世紀中備受爭議的全球出生率下降現象其實被誇大了。通過去除五歲前死
亡的兒童數以調整粗出生率，1963年的生育率僅為4.4（生育子女數/每位女性），而現在
的出生率在2.3（生育子女數/每位女性）左右。事實上，人類出生率在1963年達到頂峰。
從19世紀到20世紀60年代，全球經死亡率調整過的生育率一直在上升。在19世紀的絕大部
分時間中，每位婦女生育的孩子只有不到3.5個活到5歲。根據對歷史人口的合理統計，“
3個孩子倖存”可能是人類歷史上的常態。隨著時間推移，現代衛生條件及更好的節育、
教育和營養等因素共同作用，降低了兒童死亡率。
Meanwhile, the shift away from rural agriculture and towards urban wage work
changed the economics of childbearing. Pre-modern people would not understand
the idea that the cost of living is too high to have kids; they would respond
that if your costs are too high, you need more kids, since kids help with
farm labor. But today, instead of being investment capital, children are a
form of consumption.
與此同時，從農村農業勞作到城市工資工作的轉變也改變著生育經濟學。前現代的人們不
會理解因為生活成本太高而不能生孩子的想法；他們會說，如果你花費太高，那麼你需要
更多孩子，因為孩子能幫你幹農活。然而在今天，孩子不再是投資資本，而是一種消費形
式。
Contraceptive technology hastened that shift, but academic research does not
support the idea that it caused it. Economists attribute at most 40 percent
of the post-1957 fertility decline to improved contraceptive access. The
first country to undergo a fertility transition was France, in the 18th
century, long before modern contraceptives, and academic research has
pinpointed numerous cases of discrete economic or cultural shocks that
triggered fertility transition quite independently of contraceptive access.
Tellingly, the United States first reached birth rates around two children
per woman during the Roaring Twenties, not during the Great Depression or
after contraception became widely available. Today, fertility rates are
falling in countries with rapidly expanding contraceptive access, and also in
those without.
避孕技術加速了這一轉變，雖然很多學術研究並不支持這一觀點。經濟學家們認為，
1957 年後生育率下降的最主要原因就是避孕手段的改進。而最早經歷生育率轉變的國家
是18世紀的法國，遠遠早於現代避孕出現的時間。研究查明，許多獨立的經濟或文化衝擊
在沒有現代避孕手段時就已經觸發了生育率的轉變。極具說服力的是，美國是在繁榮的二
十年代第一次達到每名婦女生育兩個孩子的水平，不是在大蕭條時期，也不是在避孕措施
廣泛普及之後。而且在當下，無論避孕措施是否得到迅速普及，各國的生育率都在下降。
Besides those related to contraception, other government policies may matter
too, including intergenerational transfers such as Social Security, which
reduce fertility by creating a moral hazard. Historically, children were the
primary means of old-age support. This support is now state-provided. The
state in turn depends on families to produce enough children to finance
society-wide retirement programs. An expanding old-age safety net may be a
very good thing for many reasons, but one of its adverse consequences has
been reduced fertility.
除了與避孕相關的政策外，其它政府政策也很重要。政府政策包括社會保障等代際轉移手
段，它們產生道德風險，從而降低生育率。從歷史來看，生養孩子就是贍養老人的主要手
段；而現在，這一贍養支持是國家提供的。反過來，國家需要依靠家庭生養足夠的孩子以
資助整個社會退休計畫。從許多方面來看，擴大養老安全網絡可能是一件好事，但是其不
利後果之一就是導致生育率的下降。
(按 - 道德風險：道德風險是在信息不對稱條件下，不確定或不完全合同使得負有責任的
經濟行為主體不承擔其行動的全部後果，在最大化自身效用的同時,做出不利於他人行動
的現象。概念起源於海上保險，1963年美國數理經濟學家阿羅將此概念引入到經濟學中來
，指出道德風險是個體行為由於受到保險的保障而發生變化的傾向。)
But again, it’s important not to overstate the case here, because in
societies with stingy old-age programs, such as those in much of East Asia,
fertility rates have fallen even lower. In such societies, which have long
life expectancies and high standards of living, deficient pensions can
motivate higher savings rates. This can make the cost of having extra
children much higher, because having more kids makes it harder to save.
Children born in these societies are often pushed to be extremely competitive
so that they have good employment prospects and will be able to support their
parents.
然而同樣重要的是，不要隨便誇大這些案例的意義。因為在很多社會中——比如東亞的大
部分地區，其養老計畫都非常吝嗇，生育率甚至會下降到更低。在這些社會中，人們的預
期壽命較長，生活水平較高，養老金不足會導致儲蓄率上升。因為如果多生孩子會讓存錢
變得更加困難，所以生更多孩子的成本可能被提高了。在這些社會中出生的孩子往往被逼
成為極具競爭力的人，這樣他們才有好的就業前景，才能有能力贍養父母。
Aside from these material and policy influences, another trend is at work
around the developed world: delayed and declining marriage. The share of
reproductive-age women in a society who are married, or alternatively the age
at first marriage, is one of the best predictors of that society’s birth
rate. This holds up across countries but also across individuals, because a
woman’s lifetime fertility is well predicted by her marital history during
ages 15–50. Within the United States, married women are still two to four
times as likely to have a child in a given year than are unmarried women of
the same age.
在這些物質和政策的影響之外，還有另一種趨勢在發達國家蔓延開來：婚姻的推遲和減少
。一個社會中處於生育年齡的已婚女性比例，或者說是初婚年齡，是該社會出生率的最佳
預測指標之一。這不僅適用於國家，也適用於個人，因為一個女人一生的生育能力可以通
過她15-50歲的婚姻史進行很好地預測。在美國，已婚婦女在某一年生孩子的可能性仍然
是同齡未婚婦女的2-4倍。
The decline in marriage is driven by many factors, some of them praiseworthy.
For example, longer life expectancies change the incentive to marry young. Isn
’t it worthwhile to spend a few extra years looking for the right life
partner if life is getting much longer? Relatedly, divorce rates are falling
across the developed world as young adults become more deliberate in choosing
a spouse.
婚姻的減少是由許多因素造成的，其中有一些值得稱讚。例如，延長的預期壽命不再是人
們早早結婚的動機。如果生命越來越長，多花幾年時間尋找合適的人生伴侶難道不值得嗎
？與之相關的是，隨著年輕人擇偶時變得更加慎重，發達國家的離婚率也正在下降。
In most societies marriage is delayed until culturally sanctioned initiation
rites into adulthood have been completed, and in virtually all societies the
transition to adulthood also signifies an end to education. The initiate is
no longer primarily a learner and dependent, but now a teacher and
contributor. In pre-modern societies with little formal education, high
demands for manual labor, and short life expectancies, the ritual transition
to adulthood comes early in life. But in most modern societies, thanks to the
intense demands for knowledge and human capital in our economy, “ritual
adulthood” is achieved later and later, as years of education continue to
rise across virtually all occupational categories. That is to say, the more
years of school needed before a person is done being a student, the more
other key transitions, including marriage, are likely to be delayed. Young
Americans who anticipate “adulting” are not being frivolous; they are
correctly recognizing that society has postponed their ritual entrance into
adulthood.
在大多數社會中，婚姻被推遲到其社會文化認可的成人儀式完成之後。在幾乎所有社會中
，過渡到成年人也意味著教育的結束。這個成年社會的新人將主要扮演教育者和貢獻者的
角色，而不再是學習者和依賴者。在幾乎沒有正規教育、對體力勞動要求高、預期壽命短
的前現代社會，“成年儀式”來得很早。然而在大多數現代社會，由於經濟對知識和人力
資本的強烈需求，所有職業類別的受教育年限都不斷提高，“成年儀式”的實現時間越來
越晚。這也就意味著，當一個人完成學業所需要的學齡越長時，其它關鍵的轉變，包括婚
姻，都越有可能被推遲。那些期待“成年”的美國年輕人也並不輕率，他們正確地認識到
，社會已經推遲了他們步入成年的儀式。
Finally, some researchers have identified changed ideas about transcendence
as an even more abstract source of fertility decline. In this telling, the
economic calculus takes a back seat. People had more kids in the past not
because it was necessary, but because it was their duty: to God, to their
family, to their people, or simply to the idea of humanity. According to this
theory, best supported by research on the United States, fertility rates
represent the extent to which individuals conceive of themselves as part of,
and beholden to, a transcendent community that reaches across lifespans. To
the extent that Christendom or the American experiment or the continuation of
the species matters to you, you have kids. But as society has become
wealthier, life expectancies longer, and childbearing costlier, the “price
tag” on living out a commitment to a transcendent community has risen.
Therefore, fewer people hold such values, and in turn fewer children grow up
with them. The end result of this cycle is the low-fertility trap, a
situation in which intergenerational changes in norms make it nearly
impossible to return to replacement-rate fertility, the level needed to keep
a society’s population stable.
最後，一些研究人員發現，“超越”是導致生育率下降的更為抽象的原因。在這種情況下
，經濟角度的考慮退居次位。在過去，人們有更多的孩子並不是因為這是一種必須，而是
因為這是他們的責任：對上帝、對他們的家庭、對他們的人民，或者僅僅是對於“人性”
。這一理論得到了美國研究的有力支持，根據該理論，生育率代表了個人受“自身是跨越
壽命的超越性群體的一部分”這種想法的支配程度。如果基督教社會、美利堅模式的試驗
或者物種的延續對你來說很重要，那你就要有孩子。但隨著社會變得更加富裕，預期壽命
更長，生育成本更高，實現“超越性群體”的“價格標籤”已經上升。因此，很少有人還
在持有這種價值觀；反過來，也很少有孩子是伴隨這樣的價值觀長大的——這種循環的最
終結果是低生育率陷阱。當生育率與人口替代率相等時，能夠保持社會人口穩定。然而在
這種情況下，代際之間社會規範上的變化使得生育率不可能再回到這一水平。
(按 - 人口替代率（Replacement Rate）：人口替代率是為使一個國家或某個區域在人口
上出生與死亡達到某種相對的平衡而產生的一個比率，即每個婦女平均生小孩的個數，去
扭轉失調或保持平衡狀態。聯合國推算指出，標準的人口替代率為2.1。)
The aforementioned explanations of low fertility may do a great job
explaining why fertility fell from between three and seven children per woman
in the 1960s to one to three children per woman today, but they are just
about useless for explaining why the birth rate in every developed country
has plummeted in the last decade. It is implausible that Finland’s attitude
to transcendence or its contraceptive access or its urbanization or the
extent of its wage labor has changed enough in the last decade to account for
its nearly unprecedented decline in birth rates, from 1.9 children per woman
in 2010 to approximately 1.3 today.
上述對低生育率的探討能夠很好解釋生育率為什麼從20世紀60年代每個婦女平均生育3-7
個孩子下跌到現在每個婦女平均生育1-3個孩子，但是其無法闡明為什麼在最近十年中每
個發達國家的出生率都在暴跌。過去十年中，芬蘭對待“超越”的態度、避孕方法的普及
、城市化以及僱傭勞動程度都發生了巨大的變化，以至於出生率從2010年的1.9（生育子
女數/每位女性）下降到今天的1.3（生育子女數/每位女性），這是難以置信的。
Researchers have posited many shorter-term explanations for the recent global
baby bust. Some echo the long-term explanations, holding that long-acting
reversible contraceptives are vastly more effective than past technologies
and that their use is growing rapidly. Or that the rising generation simply
values work more and family less, and so its arrival in peak childbearing
years signals an abrupt decline in birth rates. Or that marriage ages have
been rising for a long time but have recently hit some kind of tipping point
where high-birth-propensity age groups are affected. Or that people just like
pets too much. These explanations are all delightfully provocative, and they
probably all have some measure of truth to them (except the pets one, which
is just wrong; 2018 data from the General Social Survey show that, if we
control for age, people with pets actually have more kids than people who don
’t).
研究人員對最近的全球“嬰兒荒”提出了許多短期解釋，隨即有學者提出長期解釋，指出
長效可逆避孕措施比過去的技術有效得多，而且正在被迅速推廣使用。而另一種觀點是，
正在崛起的一代只是看重工作更多、家庭更少，因此當他們的生育高峰期到來標誌著出生
率的突然下降。還有學者的觀點認為，結婚年齡在很長一段時間裡一直在上升，但最近到
達了某種臨界點，使得具有較高生育傾向的年齡群體受到影響。此外有觀點提出，生育率
降低是因為人們太喜歡寵物了。這些解釋帶有一定程度的煽動性，可能都包含部分真理（
除了“寵物說”是錯誤的——2018年的綜合社會調查數據顯示，如果我們控制年齡變量，
養寵物的人實際上比不養寵物的人有更多的孩子）。
Another explanation turns out to be even more surprising and difficult to
interpret politically: Fertility declines have been comparatively modest
among non-Hispanic white, black, and Asian Americans but extremely large
among Hispanics. Both native- and foreign-born Hispanic women have seen
dramatic declines in birth rates in recent years as illegal immigration has
slowed down, Mexico’s fertility decline has spilled over to Mexican
Americans, and immigrant families have settled down and begun to adopt
American family norms. There is not yet a consensus among researchers about
exactly what has caused Hispanic birth rates to fall at twice the rate of
other groups in America, but it is notable that the share of Hispanic women
of any age who are married has fallen about 50 percent faster than the rate
among non-Hispanic women over the last 15 years. As Hispanic marriage becomes
more delayed, Hispanic fertility is plummeting.
另一種發現則更加令人驚訝，而且從政治上也難以理解：非拉美裔白人、黑人和亞裔美國
人的生育率下降幅度相對較小，但在拉美裔美國人中下降幅度非常大。近年來，隨著非法
移民的減少，墨西哥的生育率下降開始蔓延到墨西哥裔美國人身上。移民家庭已經安頓下
來並逐漸開始遵循美國的家庭規範。在本國和外國出生的拉美裔婦女的生育率都出現了大
幅下降。調查人員對究竟什麼原因引起拉美裔出生率下降幅度為美國其他族群2倍還未達
成共識，但值得注意的是，在過去15年中任何年齡段的拉美裔女性比非拉美裔女性的已婚
比例下跌速度快50%。隨著拉美裔的結婚時間越來越推遲，其生育率也在直線下降。
But the biggest driver of short-run fertility changes is the economy. Though
not the much-examined “he-cession”; while some research suggests that the
loss of manufacturing jobs may have caused fertility declines, other research
shows that areas with bigger increases in automation did not experience
bigger fertility declines. While there is research to support the idea that
higher male wages and earnings boost fertility, male employment has been
rising for some years now, and yet fertility continues to fall. In countries
with labor markets in which male employment is much higher than female
employment, such as Japan, China, Italy, and Spain, fertility is even lower
than in the United States. Since in most developed societies both men and
women are expected to have a meaningful role at home, there is no
unambiguously positive effect of wages on fertility.
但短期生育率變化的最大驅動力是經濟。雖然並不是指被廣泛研究的“男性衰退”概念
(he-cession，指對男人的影響多於女人的經濟衰退，也叫做man-cession)，但是一些研
究表明，製造業工作崗位的減少可能導致了生育率的下降；而其它研究指出，自動化程度
更高的地區並沒有出現更大幅度的生育率下降。雖然有研究支持男性工資和收入的提高會
提高生育率的觀點，但是男性就業率在過去幾年一直在上升，而生育率卻在繼續下降。在
日本、中國、意大利和西班牙等勞動力市場男性就業率遠高於女性的國家，其生育率甚至
低於美國。由於在大多數發達社會中，無論男女都被期望在家庭中扮演重要角色，因此工
資對生育率沒有明顯的積極影響。
It turns out, parents aren’t stupid. They know that by having a baby they
will incur material and emotional costs for decades to come. They won’t
choose to do so just because they landed a job or the Christmas bonus was
bigger this year, and indeed, rising wages could discourage fertility by
encouraging parents to spend more time at work. Lifetime fertility is better
predicted by lifetime experience of things such as economic volatility (large
swings in boom-and-bust cycles) than by lifetime experience of economic
growth — greater economic uncertainty yields lower fertility.
事實證明，父母不算糊塗賬。他們知道，一旦有了孩子，他們在未來幾十年裡都將付出物
質和精神上的代價。他們不會僅僅因為找到工作或者今年聖誕獎金更豐厚就決定要孩子—
—實際上工資上漲可能會鼓勵父母花更多時間在工作上，從而抑制生育。人們一生對經濟
波動（繁榮-蕭條週期的大幅波動）的經驗比對經濟增長的經驗更能預測一生中社會的生
育率變化，因為更大的經濟不確定性會導致更低的生育率。
In fact, the key economic determiner of fertility isn’t income at all.
Rather, at both the macroeconomic and the individual level, the economic
variables most predictive of childbearing are asset value, net worth, and
homeownership. When the price of rental housing rises, fertility falls.
Reductions in mortgage payments owing to interest-rate shocks boost fertility
in indebted households. When the price to buy a new home rises, fertility
falls for younger people but rises for older ones. Birth rates have just
begun to increase in the second quarter of 2019, which is to say about two
years after the homeownership rate for Americans under 35 stopped falling and
began rising again. In 2016, according to the Federal Reserve, the net worth
of households headed by 20- to 35-year-olds had not risen from its
post-recessionary lows at all. The best economic predictor of childbearing in
a society where fertility has already fallen to around two kids per woman is
permanent income.
實際上，生育率的關鍵經濟決定因素根本不是收入。相反，在宏觀經濟和個人層面，最能
預測生育的經濟變量是資產價值、淨資產和房屋所有權。當租房價格上漲時，生育率下降
。利率震盪（Interest-Rate Shock）導致的抵押貸款支付減少，提高了負債家庭的生育
率。當購買新房的價格上升時，較年輕者的生育率下降，而較年長者的生育率上升。出生
率在2019年第二季度才剛剛開始上升，也就是說，是在35歲以下美國人的住房擁有率停止
下降並開始再次上升的兩年後。根據美聯儲的數據，2016年，20-35歲家庭的淨資產根本
沒有從衰退後的低點回升。在一個生育率已經降至每個婦女兩個孩子的社會裡，預測生育
的最佳經濟指標是永久收入。
(按 - 永久收入假說（Permanent income hypothesis）是由美國經濟學家米爾頓·弗裡
德曼（M Friedman）提出。它的基本觀點是：消費者的消費支出主要不是由他的現期收入
決定，而是由他的永久收入決定。所謂永久收入是指消費者可以預計到的長期收入。永久
收入大致可以根據觀察到的若干年收入的數值之加權平均數計得，距現在的時間越近，權
數越大；反之，則越小。根據這種理論，政府想通過增減稅收來影響總需求的政策是不能
奏效的，因為人們因減稅而增加的收入，並不會立即用來增加消費。)
In short, it’s not just what people earn and how much it costs to live
today, but what people expect to earn and spend in the future. Thus, personal
experience of economic volatility reduces birth rates by reducing the
optimism people feel about their economic futures. Lack of savings, delayed
homeownership, or excessive student debt can reduce fertility even if
debt-service costs are low, because young people correctly recognize that
their long-run disposable income will be lower. The economic problem of
childbearing is primarily a problem not of near-term liquidity but of
long-run viability. As a result, things that worsen young people’s prospects
of lifetime disposable income can be expected to reduce fertility: things
including insolvent pensions leading to expectations of higher future taxes,
strict land-use rules, occupational-licensing rules, many long years spent
accruing debt while in school, delayed promotion as Baby Boomers stay at
their desks well past normal retirement age, etc.
簡而言之，影響生育率的經濟決定因素不僅僅是人們現在的收入和生活成本，還有人們對
未來收入和支出的預期。因此，對經濟波動的個人體會減少了人們對經濟未來的樂觀情緒
，從而降低了出生率。即使償債成本很低，缺乏儲蓄、推遲擁有住房或者積累過多的學生
債務也會降低生育率。因為年輕人都能正確地認識到，他們的長期可支配收入將會更低。
生育的經濟問題主要不是短期流動性的問題，而是長期生存能力的問題。因此，那些降低
年輕人一生可支配收入預期的事情會減少生育，它們包括：破產養老金出台導致更高的未
來稅收預期、嚴格的土地使用規則、在學校時積累的多年債務、嬰兒潮一代的父母因生育
耽擱晉陞在辦公桌前鬱鬱度過退休年齡，等等。
I am 28 years old. My generation, that of the Millennials, will probably
never experience the levels of prosperity and opportunity enjoyed by previous
generations. This is not overwrought self-pity; it is a simple statement of
fact concerning changes in the American economic and policy system. Without
access to affordable housing and stable work, young Americans are forgoing
the social stability of marriage and, with it, childbearing. They are looking
at their prospects and those of potential mates, correctly judging that their
futures are extremely uncertain and that they are unlikely to be able to
afford the family life they desire, and rationally choosing to postpone
marriage and family or even forgo it altogether.
我現在28歲。我們這一代，也就是千禧一代，可能永遠也體會不到前幾代人所享有的繁榮
和機遇。這並不是過度自憐；這只是一個關於美國經濟和政策體系變化的簡單事實陳述。
因為負擔不起住房、沒有穩定工作，年輕的美國人正在放棄婚姻帶來社會穩定性以及隨之
而來的生育。他們不斷審視著自己和潛在伴侶的未來前景，正確判斷出自己的未來極其不
確定；他們不太可能負擔得起自己渴望的家庭生活，於是理性地選擇推遲婚姻和家庭、甚
至完全放棄。
Instead, they are pouring themselves into work. Stable shares of Americans
value hard work, but the share placing a high importance on family is
falling. The share of Americans who report finding meaning in their career or
in money is about as large as the share who find meaning in family generally,
and considerably greater than the share who find meaning in children or their
interaction with their spouse. Meanwhile, a growing chorus of voices across
the political spectrum has begun to decry what Derek Thompson of The Atlantic
calls “workism,” an increasingly obsessive sense that true meaning in life
comes from one’s social standing and professional success rather than from,
say, a community or family. It’s easy to mock the Millennial desire for “
meaningful work” as just so much snowflakery, but it’s actually a natural,
endogenous response to a system that is closing other avenues to a satisfying
life. And since work is increasingly a prerequisite for marriage for both men
and women, many Millennials reason that we might as well make the work itself
meaningful.
相反，他們全身心投入工作。重視努力工作的美國人比例很穩定，但重視家庭的比例正在
下降。在美國，認為自己的事業或金錢有意義的人與認為家庭有意義的人所佔比例大致相
當，並且遠遠高於認為與孩子或配偶的互動有意義的人所佔比例。與此同時，越來越多的
政界人士開始譴責《大西洋月刊》(the Atlantic)的德里克·湯普森(Derek Thompson)所
說的“工作至上主義”，即一種越來越強烈的“強迫感”。這種“強迫感”認為生活的真
正意義來自於一個人的社會地位和職業成就，而不是來自某個社區或家庭。人們習慣去嘲
笑千禧一代對“工作有意義”的渴望是多麼多愁善感（Snowflakery），但這實際上是一
種自然的、內生的反應，因為這個社會體系正在封鎖其它去往“美滿生活”的通道。當工
作越來越成為男性和女性結婚的先決條件時，許多千禧一代認為，我們不妨讓工作本身變
得有意義。
(按 - Snowflakery是千禧年後近十年來美國社會產生的帶有政治性、社會性挑釁意味的
“詞彙武器”。一開始部分人把今天的年輕人稱為“雪花一代”（Generation Snowflake
），哀嘆他們過於敏感。隨後，“Snowflake”也被視為是來自美國“硬漢精神”的嘲諷
，用來表達一種廣泛的反智主義，尤其針對校園和社區等極具文化敏感性的地方。)
Modern economies depend on numerous transfers of wealth across generations.
The most obvious are explicit transfers such as Social Security and Medicare,
whereby younger workers are taxed to pay for older retirees. But there are
many others. For example, younger workers tend to buy lots of stocks, which
they expect will appreciate over time and hope to sell as they reach
retirement. Those returns are then invested in stable, income-generating
assets to support retirement. As a result, aging societies have great demand
for so-called safe assets, which are generally government bonds or shares of
the most staid and solid corporations. As a result, governments in aging
societies can borrow money at low, or even negative, interest rates. Even in
crisis-struck Greece, savers will pay money (i.e., receive negative interest)
to lend the government their savings because the demand for safe assets is so
great. Unsurprisingly, Greece is one of the fastest-aging societies in the
world. Ultra-low-fertility South Korea is also considering a more stimulative
and inflationary permanent monetary stance to offset the negative effects of
demographic stagnation.
現代經濟依賴於幾代人之間的大量財富轉移。最明顯的是社會保障和醫療保險等明確的轉
移——從年輕勞動者處徵稅，以支付年長者的退休金。但是還有很多其它轉移。例如，年
輕的員工傾向於購買大量股票，他們預計這些股票會隨時間推移而升值，並計畫在退休時
賣出。然後，這些回報可以被用於穩定的、能產生收益的資產投資，以支持他們的退休生
活。因此，老齡化社會對所謂的安全資產有著巨大的需求，這些資產通常是政府債券或最
保守、最可靠公司的股票。於是，如果是老齡化社會的政府，也可以以低利率甚至負利率
借款。即使是在債務危機爆發的希臘，因為國民對安全資產的需求如此之大，儲戶仍然會
付錢(即收到負利息)。不出所料，希臘是世界上老齡化最快的國家之一。超低生育率的韓
國也在考慮採取更具刺激性和通脹性的永久性貨幣政策，以抵消人口停滯帶來的負面影響
。
But this system is unsustainable. The Wall Street Journal recently ran an
article about Baby Boomers trying to sell their suburban McMansions and
finding it difficult to do so. As it turns out, there aren’t enough young,
up-and-coming families in America to buy all of those houses, and those that
do want to buy are unwilling to pay the zoning-inflated prices or can’t find
sufficient credit or simply don’t want to adopt an expensive,
car-and-yard-centric suburban lifestyle. As Baby Boomers retire, they need
people to buy the assets they’ve held on to for decades: houses, stocks, you
name it. They can invest in “safe” government bonds, but the return on that
investment is becoming minuscule or even negative. The younger generation
that the system depended on to pick up the buck that Boomers are passing
simply isn’t there, and the reason is that Baby Boomers and Gen Xers simply
didn’t have those babies. They built or bought houses but never filled them
with children.
但這種體系是不可持續的。《華爾街日報》最近刊登了一篇文章，講的是嬰兒潮時期出生
的人試圖賣掉他們在郊區的豪宅，結果發現這非常困難。事實證明，並沒有足夠多年輕、
積極進取的美國家庭能買完所有這些房子，有些人確實想買卻不願支付區域內膨脹的價格
，還有人無法得到足夠的信貸，或者他們只是不想採取這種昂貴的、車子院子為中心的郊
區生活方式。隨著嬰兒潮一代淡出舞台，他們需要人們購買他們持有了幾十年的資產：房
子、股票，應有盡有。他們可以投資“安全”的政府債券，但投資的回報逐漸變得微乎其
微，甚至為負。這一系統依賴年輕一代去承擔嬰兒潮出生的一代人所承擔的責任，但他們
卻缺位了——原因是嬰兒潮時期出生的人和“失落的一代”（Generation X，指20世紀60
年代末到70年代中期出生的那撥人，意為“失落的一代”。Gen-Xers 是上述提法的簡寫
）根本沒有生出這麼多孩子。他們蓋房子、買房子，但從來沒讓孩子充滿他們的房子。
There are ways to address that. One of the reasons for the U.S. trade deficit
is simply that we have an enormous number of assets that desperately need
buyers. Whether foreigners are buying up U.S. real estate, taking stakes in
U.S. companies, or holding “safe” U.S.-government debt, they’re filling a
vacuum. There are not enough younger American savers and workers, and those
workers aren’t earning enough money, to absorb all of the assets that older
Americans have been offloading for the last decade or so and will continue to
pass off for the next few decades as gobsmacking numbers of 401(k)s are
pivoted into fixed income to support retirees in their twilight years. The
opportunity to buy from them lures U.S.-dollar-denominated investment, which
means that foreign countries need to acquire dollars (and thereby deflate
their own currencies). This creates huge demand to find a way to sell stuff
to Americans. Presto, a trade deficit. Attacking the trade deficit through
tariffs fundamentally misunderstands that the trade imbalance is a
consequence of a deeper financial and demographic imbalance.
有很多方法可以解決這個問題。其中一個導致美國貿易逆差的原因很簡單：國內有大量資
產急需買家。無論是外國人購買美國房地產、入股美國公司，還是持有“安全的”美國股
票——政府債券，他們都在填補一個真空——美國沒有足夠多的年輕本國儲蓄者和勞動者
，而且這些勞動者沒有賺足夠的錢來吸收所有的資產。“嬰兒潮一代”等老一代美國人已
經在過去十年左右的時間裡逐漸卸任，隨著他們在未來數十年中繼續淡出，401（k）養老
金計畫中的驚人數字將被轉化為固定收益，以支持這些退休者的晚年生活。向這些人購買
資產的機會吸引了大量美元計價投資，這意味著外國需要獲得美元(從而使本國貨幣貶值)
，因此其他國家隨即產生向美國人銷售商品的巨大需求。而後，很快就會出現貿易逆差。
從根本上說，通過提高關稅試圖解決貿易逆差的手段體現出國家對貿易失衡背後更深層次
的金融和人口失衡原因缺乏認識。
(按 - 401（k）計畫始於20世紀80年代初，是一種由僱員、僱主共同繳費建立起來的完全
基金式的養老保險制度。按該計畫，企業為員工設立專門的401K賬戶，員工每月從其工資
中拿出一定比例的資金存入養老金賬戶（每年上限1.8萬美元），而企業一般也按一定的
比例（不能超過員工存入的數額）往這一賬戶存入相應資金。與此同時，企業向員工提供
3到4種不同的證券組合投資計畫。員工可任選一種進行投資。員工退休時，可以選擇一次
性領取、分期領取和轉為存款等方式使用。每次取出的錢款視為當年收入，按當年稅率交
稅。)
Aside from the now widely acknowledged role of declining fertility and
population aging in reducing a society’s natural interest rate, economists
have identified other effects of lower birth rates, mostly bad ones. A
population growing proportionally older will experience faster decline in
traditional manufacturing and faster increase in demand for services —
accelerating an economic transition that is particularly challenging for
working-class males — because older people consume more services and fewer
manufactured goods. This may make working-class, male-dominated forms of
populism more politically viable.
除了生育率下降和人口老齡化有降低社會自然利率方面的作用之外，經濟學家們還發現較
低的出生率會造成其他影響，且大多為負面。當人口逐漸成比例老齡化時，傳統製造業將
更快衰退而服務業需求會更快增長——這促使經濟加速轉型，而由於老年人消費更多的服
務和更少的製成品，一切對於工人階層的男性尤其具有挑戰性。在政治上，工人階級、男
性主導的民粹主義可能將變得更為可行。
Older consumers also tend to be brand loyalists. Economists have identified
the role of demographically specific “consumer inertia” (i.e., hesitancy to
change personal-consumption patterns by trying new brands and products) in
boosting corporate profits and slowing down innovation. In the aggregate,
curmudgeonly individual consumption choices mean that established firms can
charge higher prices for the same products, new firms will face habitual
resistance by the consumers they want to serve, and, ultimately, inequality
will worsen as corporate profits rise at the expense of real wages.
年齡較大的消費者往往也更傾向成為某些品牌的忠實用戶。經濟學家已經認定了特定於人
口統計而言的“消費者慣性”(即消費者的消費慣性)在提高企業利潤和減緩創新上的作用
——美國人不願嘗試新品牌和新產品，改變個人消費模式。總的來說，執拗的個人消費選
擇意味著老牌公司可以對同樣的產品收取更高的價格，新公司將面臨想要服務的對象的習
慣性抵制。最終，隨著公司利潤的增長，新老公司之間的不平等將會惡化，而其員工的實
際工資則成為犧牲的代價。
Furthermore, lower rates of population growth among those of working age have
both direct and indirect effects on economic growth. The direct effects are
widely understood: Having fewer workers or more non-working retirees places
more of an economic burden on the workers. The indirect effects are a more
recent finding: Lower birth rates two or three decades ago resulted in less
entrepreneurship and less competitive markets today. Necessity truly is the
mother of invention, and brisk population growth means that the growing
number of workers cannot be fully absorbed by expanding employment in current
businesses unless there are implausible wage cuts. As a result, more workers
start their own businesses, especially as demand rises with rising
society-wide population, education, and capital.
此外，勞動年齡人口的增長率較低對經濟增長也會產生直接和間接的影響。其直接影響是
眾所周知的：工人減少、退休人員增多會給勞動者帶來更大的經濟負擔。而間接影響是最
近才發現的：二三十年前較低的出生率導致如今創業和競爭市場規模的縮小。需求確實是
發明之母，快速的人口增長意味著除非出現難以置信的減薪，否則不斷增長的工人數量無
法完全被當前企業擴大就業吸收。因此，越來越多的工人開始自己創業，特別是在隨著社
會人口、教育和資本的增長時，其創業需求也在增長。
Thus, even aside from worries about Social Security and Medicare, there are
problems associated with long-run low fertility. Economy-wide returns on
investment and interest rates fall dramatically — even private savings and
investment fail to produce the returns that savers expected. Where returns do
remain high, they will increasingly be a product of corporate rents and
monopoly power exercised in an economy with less and less real competition.
Indeed, thanks to the likelihood of durably low or negative interest rates,
public programs such as Social Security may be the least of our worries in
the future — the effects of demographic decline on the private sector may be
even worse.
因此，除了對社會保障和醫療保險的擔憂，還有與長期低生育率相關的種種其它問題。整
個經濟體的投資回報率和利率都在大幅下降——即便有私人儲蓄和投資，現在也無法產生
儲戶預期的回報率。的確某些領域回報率仍然很高，但是它們將日益成為企業租金和壟斷
權力的產物；在一個競爭越來越少的經濟體中，壟斷權力得以不斷鞏固和行使。事實上，
由於存在長期低利率或負利率的可能性，社會保障等公共項目可能是我們未來最不擔心的
問題——人口下降對私營部門的影響也許更糟。
The case of South Korea reveals another problem with low fertility, namely
strategic balance. Wars are not decided by the fanciest new stealth
destroyers but by society-level willingness and ability to absorb casualties.
Whether in asymmetric wars such as Vietnam, great-power conflicts such as the
Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, or some future conflict between the U.S.
and any number of potential adversaries, victory in a serious-power contest
is a function of a certain tolerance for casualties.
韓國國情揭示了低生育率的另一個問題，即戰略平衡。戰爭並不是由最先進的隱形驅逐艦
決定的，而是由社會層面的意願和吸收傷亡的能力決定的。無論是在美國對越戰爭這樣的
非對稱戰爭中，還是在納粹入侵蘇聯這樣的大國衝突中，抑或是在未來美國與任何潛在對
手之間的衝突中，如果能在一場嚴肅的力量對決中獲勝，必然是對傷亡有一定承受能力的
結果。
It is quite difficult to replace losses in many developed societies.
Militaries increasingly depend on individuals with sophisticated training to
operate complex processes and equipment, skills that are hard to find among
draftees in an emergency. Even if draftees are available, it can take many
generations to recover from a high-casualty war. Russian demographic data
today still show the scars of World War II in “missing cohorts.” In
high-fertility societies, these missing cohorts are quickly replaced, but as
the length between generations rises (as measured by median age at birth) and
the total number of children falls, it takes longer and longer to replace
casualties. The United States may be able to absorb the losses of our first
great-power conflict of the 21st century, but if we face a second, as the
United Kingdom did soon after World War I in the 20th century, we may be
stretched beyond the breaking point.
在許多發達國家，彌補損失是相當困難的。軍隊越來越依賴訓練有素的個人來操作複雜的
流程和設備，而遇到緊急情況時，在新兵中很難找到熟練掌握這些技能的人。即使有新人
不斷被徵召入伍，想從傷亡慘重的戰爭中恢復可能需要經過好幾代人。今天，俄羅斯人口
統計數據仍然顯示出二戰中那些“失蹤戰友”難以彌合的傷口。在高生育率社會，這些缺
失的群體會很快得到補充，但隨著世代間隔的增加(以出生時的年齡中位數進行衡量)和兒
童總數的下降，社會需要越來越長的時間來補充傷亡人數。美國或許能夠承受21世紀第一
次大國衝突的損失，但如果面臨第二次，就會像英國在20世紀第一次世界大戰後不久那樣
——美國將可能超出極限。
(按 - 平均世代間隔：平均世代間隔亦稱“平均世代長度”。指上一代人繁殖下一代人時
的平均年齡。由於女性在再生產過程中的特殊地位，通常只考察女性的世代間隔。為了用
這個指標與淨人口再生率一起計算人口內在自然增長率，在計算此指標時，也要借助計算
淨人口再生產率有關資料進行計算。
平均世代間隔對人口生產發展速度可以起加速或延緩的作用，它是調節人口生產發展速度
的重要手段之一，對於研究人口再生產過程具有重要意義。當人口再生率一定時，平均世
代間隔的長短與人口生產發展速度的快慢有直接關係。平均世代間隔的長短，與結婚和生
育的早晚也有直接關係。一般的情況下，晚婚晚育的國家，其平均世代間隔較長; 反之，
則較短。但是，早婚早育的國家，若生育不加節制，一直延續到育齡後期，或是生育間隔
時間很長，平均起來，也可使世代間隔拉長。)
Of course, a world where every country is facing fertility declines might
become more peaceful, as an inability to replace losses may cause countries
to become more cautious. The best thing America has going for its long-run
strategic position is not its nuclear arsenal or military spending but the
fact that the fighting-age male population of China and its allies peaked in
1995 and is now steadily falling, while the same population in the U.S. and
among our allies around the northwest Pacific is stable.
當然，當每個國家都面臨生育率下降現狀時，世界可能會變得更加和平——沒有能力彌補
損失會導致各國變得更謹慎。對於美國的長期戰略地位而言，最有利的因素並不來自其核
武庫或軍事開支，而是中國及其盟友符合參戰年齡範圍的男性人口在1995年達到頂峰後，
現在穩步下降；而美國和我們的西北太平洋盟友的相關人口人數是穩定的。
But if American fertility remains at its present low levels, that stability
could end. We could see ourselves facing a shrinking population of potential
war-fighters and holding a weakened position for the defense of democracy and
order around the globe, and especially in the Asia-Pacific region. This
problem has already become urgent in Korea and Japan; it may soon hammer the
United States as well.
但是如果美國的生育率保持在目前的低水平，最終可能喪失這種穩定。我們會看到自己面
臨著潛在作戰人員數量減少的趨勢，在保衛全球民主和秩序方面的地位被削弱，尤其是在
亞太地區。這一問題在韓國和日本已經非常緊迫，可能很快就會打擊到美國。
Here a common objection from the left must be noted: the claim that low
population growth can be rectified through fertility or immigration. Why not
just let in more immigrants? Immigrants can prop up working-age population
growth, and they also have higher fertility, so they should be able to solve
this whole problem.
這裡必須指出一個來自左翼的共同反對意見：低人口增長可以通過生育或移民來矯正。為
什麼不讓更多的移民進來呢？移民可以支撐勞動年齡人口的增長，也有更高的生育率，因
此這一觀點認為，移民能夠解決美國面臨的整個問題。
It’s a facile response and easy to rebut. First, immigrants are not immortal
— they also age. The problem of an aging society is postponed only as long
as the rate of immigration is rising. Once the immigration rate stabilizes
and the earliest immigrant cohorts reach retirement age, the same problem
rears its head, but at an even larger scale thanks to the people we’ve
added. Purely in mathematical terms, immigration delays the problem of
population aging and decline, but it does not prevent that problem.
然而，這是一個很容易反駁的回答。首先，移民不是永生的——他們也會變老。只有當移
民率上升時，老齡化社會的問題會被推遲。一旦移民率穩定下來，最早的移民群體達到退
休年齡，同樣的問題就會出現；但由於人員因移民而增加，問題的規模會更大。純粹從數
學的角度來說，移民延緩了人口老齡化和人口下降的問題，但並不能從根本上阻止這個問
題。
Second, immigrant fertility is declining. As noted above, Hispanic fertility
in the United States has plummeted in recent years. Meanwhile, as recently as
2010, the average fertility rate in countries of origin for immigrant women
was above replacement levels. But as of 2017, the typical immigrant woman is
coming from a place with fertility just near the replacement rate or even a
bit below. That is, the fertility gap between immigrants and natives is
shrinking as declining fertility spreads to more immigrant-sending countries.
其次，移民的生育率正在下降。如上所述，近年來，美國拉美裔的生育率大幅下跌。與此
同時，就在2010年，移民婦女原籍國的平均生育率還高於人口替代率。但截至2017年，典
型的移民女性通常來自一個生育率接近或略低於人口替代率的地方。也就是說，隨著生育
率下降蔓延到更多的移民輸出國，移民和本國人之間的生育率差距正在縮小。
Third, migration is a networking problem. Immigrants come from somewhere and
go to somewhere. The typical immigrant is economically motivated, and while
he may have some preference for the United States, if offered a job in Japan
or Sweden, he would go there readily enough. The typical immigrant is also
coming from a country that has high birth rates and not enough jobs, and thus
a labor surplus.
第三，遷移是一個網絡化的問題。移民從一個地方來到另一個地方，典型的移民出於經濟
上的動機，因此雖然他可能對美國有一些偏好，但如果能在日本或瑞典找到工作，他也會
毫不猶豫地去那裡。這種典型移民往往來自於一個高出生率且工作機會不足的國家，本國
出現了勞動力過剩現象。
But the number of countries with such a labor surplus is in decline as
fertility rates fall around the world and more countries achieve higher
income levels. The supply of immigrants will increasingly run dry over the
next century as more and more countries have aging populations that
desperately need workers and so retain their populations. And all of those
countries that desperately need workers will also pivot to receiving
immigrants. Western Europe, Japan, and Korea have already made this jump, and
others will follow. With fewer countries having surplus labor to send as
emigrants, and more countries having low labor-force growth and thus needing
to receive immigrants, there will be more global competition for the migrants
who do exist, and especially for the most skilled ones.
但隨著全球生育率下降，更多國家實現更高的收入水平，勞動力過剩國家的數量正在減少
。下個世紀，隨著越來越多國家出現急需勞動力的老齡化人口，移民供應將日益枯竭。所
有那些迫切需要工人的國家也將重點接收移民。西歐、日本和韓國已經邁出了這一步，其
他國家也將步其後塵。當有剩餘勞動力可以作為移民輸出的國家逐漸變少時，越來越多的
國家勞動力增長緩慢。因此各國都需要接收移民，並產生更多對意願確切的、特別是對技
術掌握最為熟練的移民的全球競爭。
In other words, immigration can’t delay population-aging forever. The
long-run effects on population will be muted thanks to falling immigrant
fertility, and the viability of an immigrant-oriented population strategy
will be time-limited as the international market for migrants becomes
increasingly competitive and zero-sum.
換句話說，移民不能永遠推遲人口老齡化。由於移民生育率下降，對人口的長期影響將會
減弱。而且由於國際移民市場的競爭日益激烈、逐漸成為零和博弈，以移民為導向的人口
戰略可行性是有限的。
As fascinating as the twin perils of economic stagnation and strategic
decline may be to policymakers, they are terribly uninspiring for families.
Telling a couple to have a baby so that their child can fight in a war
against China does not tend to be effective; nor does telling them to have a
baby to increase society-wide demand and thus make space for entrepreneurs.
對於政策制定者來說，經濟停滯和戰略衰退這兩大危險可能都極具吸引力，但對於家庭來
說，他們通常感到無動於衷。以孩子長大之後可以去打一場反對中國的戰爭為理由敦促一
對夫婦生孩子，這樣的手段幾乎毫無作用；而讓他們生下一個孩子去增加全社會的需求，
從而為企業家創造空間也是同理。
Quite frankly, given the enormous personal costs associated with
child-rearing, it’s not clear that the state has an appropriate role in
encouraging people to have kids they don’t already want to have. Trying to
nudge extremely burdensome and emotionally significant personal and family
decisions that are integral to people’s sense of their identity and meaning
in the world, in order to make the national GDP marginally higher in 30
years, is absurd and, if we’re being honest, kind of gross. New human life
is not an economic math problem or a question of national defense. It is
fundamentally a profession of faith, or even of hope, in the future. Not only
do parents not have kids simply because of a transitory income shock, their
childbearing decisions also are linked to what they find excellent, true, and
praiseworthy in life.
坦率地說，考慮到養育孩子個人所付出的巨大成本，目前我們還不清楚國家在鼓勵人們生
兒育女方面是否扮演了適當的角色。試圖讓人們相信那些自身和家庭繁重的、在情感上具
有重大意義的決定是人類世界身份認同和存在意義中不可或缺的一部分，以使國家GDP在
30年內略微提高，這是荒謬的；而且，老實說有點噁心。新生命並不是一個經濟、數學問
題，也不是一個國防問題。從根本上說，這是一種信念的表達，甚至蘊含著對未來的希望
。父母不生孩子不僅僅是因為短暫的收入衝擊，他們的生育決定還與其在生活中發現的出
色、真實和值得稱讚的東西有關。
But while the negative aggregated effects of low fertility may be poor
selling points for childbearing, there is a simpler kind of cost associated
with low birth rates: disappointment.
然而，儘管低生育率帶來的負面綜合效應可能並不是推銷生育的“賣點”，但與低生育率
相關的還有一種更簡單的代價：失望。
Numerous surveys have been conducted asking Americans about their family
desires. The nearby graph shows the number of children women in those surveys
said they desired, wanted, intended, expected, or considered ideal to have,
and it also shows the average number of children actually had by women who
would have been around 25 at the time the survey was taken.
許多調查詢問了美國人的家庭願望。下面的圖表顯示了在調查中女性表示她們渴望的、想
要的、預期的、期待的的或認為是理想的生育孩子的數量，它還顯示了進行調查時25歲左
右的女性實際生育孩子的平均數量。
https://tinyurl.com/savprrq
本圖呈現了1930-2020年生育偏好統計數據與實際25歲女性生育數據的對比。生育偏好統
計數據由世界生育偏好數據庫提供。出生兒童數據由歷史人口普查和當前人口調查生育率
補充構成。
American women reliably want two or three children and yet are having just
1.7. Women who have fewer children than they said was ideal also report being
less happy. (Women who overshoot their ideal report being less happy.) As
anyone who has suffered from infertility can attest, the aching
disappointment of not having the kids you want to have is a quite real form
of suffering. It is also a kind that is increasingly common across the
country.
美國婦女確實想要兩個或三個孩子，但她們只生了1.7個。那些所生孩子比他們理想情況
要少的女性也會感到不快樂。(超過理想值的女性會更不快樂。)任何一個不孕不育的人都
可以證明，自己想要卻不能生育孩子所帶來的痛苦和失望是非常真實的；這種不孕不育病
在全國各地也越來越普遍。
So there’s no need for policymakers to talk about draft levies and the
natural interest rate. If American women were having as many children as they
themselves say they want to have, the population would grow steadily, simply
through normal fertility. The persuasive task of pro-natalism is not to
pressure people to have more kids they don’t want but to convince corporate,
cultural, and governmental policymakers, and opinion-shapers at many levels,
to remove barriers between potential parents and the kids they do want.
因此，政策制定者根本沒有必要談論徵兵稅和自然利率。如果美國婦女想要多少孩子就有
多少孩子，那麼人口就會穩步增長，這完全是可以通過正常的生育能力實現的。鼓勵生育
主義的說服任務不是迫使人們生更多他們不想要的孩子，而是說服企業、文化和政府的決
策者，以及許多層面上的輿論塑造者，去消除潛在父母和他們想要孩子之間的障礙。
This also helps explain why immigration isn’t a viable solution on its own.
Adding more immigrants may solve the aggregate problem for the economy, but
it doesn’t solve the individual problem of disappointed aspirations for
family.
這也有助於解釋為什麼移民本身不是一個可行的解決方案。增加移民也許能解決經濟總量
的問題，但不能解決家庭期望受挫等個人問題。
Any serious effort to change demographic decline into demographic renaissance
will have to both tackle the large-scale social challenges and address the
individual aspirations.
任何將人口減少轉變為人口復興的認真努力都必須既應對大規模的社會挑戰，又滿足個人
的願望。
On the societal scale, higher levels of immigration are a necessity.
Immigration rates in the United States have been gradually declining for 30
years, driven by the twin forces of falling fertility in migrant-sending
countries and a growing number of potential destinations. Without a shot of
adrenaline, the demographic heart of the body politic will face serious
problems in the very near future. A better and more open immigration policy
can buy us valuable time. This needn’t mean throwing open the floodgates to
all comers; it’s entirely possible to have a system like Canada’s or
Australia’s, in which more immigrants are admitted and greater efforts are
made to recruit skilled immigrants.
在社會層面上，更高水平的移民是必要的。30年來，美國的移民率一直在逐步下降，這是
由移民輸出國的生育率下降和潛在移民目的地不斷增加造成的。沒有了“腎上腺素”的刺
激，在不久的將來，美國人口的“心臟”將面臨嚴重的問題。一個更好、更開放的移民政
策可以為我們贏得寶貴的時間。但這並不意味著向所有人敞開大門；美國完全有可能建立
一個像加拿大或澳大利亞那樣的移民體系，在接納更多的同時更為竭力去招募技術移民。
Having bought ourselves some demographic time by increasing immigration, we
should then adopt a range of policies to ease family formation. No one policy
will do the trick, but we’re long overdue for a broad-based push at many
levels of government to remove obstacles to parenting and offset the
intergenerational moral hazard inherent in modern economies is long overdue.
通過增加移民為我們自己贏得一些人口老齡化的緩和時間之後，我們應該採取一系列政策
來為家庭生養孩子提供便利。僅僅憑藉任何一項單獨的政策都不可能奏效，因此我們應該
早早在各級政府採取廣泛行動，消除家庭養育子女的障礙，抵消現代經濟中固有的代際道
德風險。
Such an agenda could include a huge range of different policies. For
starters, it’s vital that policymakers remove the discriminatory treatment
of working-class married couples by equalizing the treatment of married
households under the earned-income tax credit and the federal welfare and
housing programs. Beyond this, benefits for childbearing and -rearing, such
as a larger and more refundable child tax credit, paid parental-leave time,
expanded school-voucher programs and early-childhood-care allowances, and
even an explicit “baby bonus” can all help give families financial space
and choices about their lives together. A certain kind of naive
libertarianism raises an eyebrow at such generous support programs, but even
if we assume very high benefit levels, the government would still be
offsetting only about a quarter to a third of the cost of raising a child.
Given that in pre-modern societies parents could appropriate their children’
s productivity up to and beyond the entire cost of raising those children,
such programs still wouldn’t even come close to offsetting the moral hazard
associated with the economic transition to modern individually based markets.
Yes, it’s the government making an intervention — to guarantee that a
robust society continues to exist and to offset downsides to child-rearing
that the government itself created.
這樣的議程計畫可能包括大量不同的政策。首先，至關重要的是，政策制定者要消除工薪
階層已婚夫婦受到的歧視性待遇，在勞動所得稅收抵免、聯邦福利和住房項目中平等地對
待已婚家庭。除此之外，增加生育和撫養孩子的好處，如更大的、更可償還的兒童稅收抵
免、帶薪育兒假、擴大範圍的“學券制度”（School Voucher）和早期育兒津貼，甚至是
明確的“嬰兒津貼”，都可以幫助家庭獲得更多經濟空間和共同生活的選擇。某些天真的
自由主義對如此慷慨的支持計畫感到驚訝，但其實即使我們假設的福利水平非常高，政府
仍然只能抵消撫養孩子四分之一到三分之一左右的成本。與前現代社會中父母可以將孩子
的生產力提高到超過撫養他們的全部成本的水平相比，這些方案甚至還不能抵消向現代個
體市場經濟轉型所帶來的道德風險。是的，這就是需要政府的介入——以保證一個健全的
社會繼續存在，而且還要抵消政府本身造成的一些撫養孩子的負面影響。
(按 - “學券制度”：政府把原來直接投入公立學校的教育經費按照生均單位成本折算以
後，以面額固定的有價證券（即學券）的形式直接發放給家庭或學生，學生憑教育券自由
選擇政府所認可的學校（公立學校或私立學校）就讀，不再受學區的限制，學券可以沖抵
全部或部分學費。)
There are also other, less direct policy changes worth making. The housing
crunch is real and disastrous for families, with housing-related financial
stress rising rapidly in households with children. Something must be done
about zoning and land-use rules. These policies are set locally in most
cases, which limits federal action. Nonetheless, the federal government could
deny grants and aid to states where municipalities are too tightly zoned, or
deny federal fire protection to communities with high minimum lot sizes (a
policy that greatly increases the cost of federally funded firefighting).
Federal lending programs could require that zoning codes not exhibit certain
restrictive features, or simply require that permitting processes be
completed within a certain window of time.
此外，還有一些並不直接的政策值得落實。住房緊縮對家庭來說是真實且災難性的，一旦
有孩子，家庭與住房有關的財務壓力就會迅速增加。因此，必須對“分區制”土地管理及
土地使用規則進行整頓。由於這些政策在大多數情況下是由地方制定的，所以聯邦的行動
受到了限制。儘管如此，聯邦政府可以拒絕向那些地方政府分區過嚴、不合理的州提供撥
款和援助，或者拒絕向那些門檻很高的社區地塊（Lot sizes）提供聯邦消防保護(這一政
策增加了聯邦政府資助的消防成本)。聯邦貸款項目可以要求分區代碼不表現出某些限制
性特徵，或者僅僅要求許可程序可以在一定時間內完成。
(按 - “分區制（Zoning）”是包括美國在內的發達市場經濟國家地方政府進行土地管理
的基本方法。這種方法既可以確定土地的不同用途，也可以規範一個區域內土地開發和建
設的性質和範圍。由此可以看出，“分區制”土地管理制度不涉及土地的所有權性質，它
所規範的主要是土地的使用權。)
(按 - 地塊，也指地皮的尺寸（lot size）：在北美，Lot Size的單位通常用英呎（Feet
），50X120就表示從房子正面看，地皮的寬50英呎，深120英呎。)
The federal government’s antitrust power should also be deployed to protect
free labor markets from anticompetitive exploitation by government-backed
cartels. Licensing boards should be treated as monopolies unless they can
demonstrate a valid public-safety purpose. Workers should be able to pursue
class-action suits against licensing boards and receive punitive damages if
those boards are found to have formed a monopoly in restraint of trade
without a valid public-safety purpose. Beyond this, measures should be taken
to restrict the use and extent of corporate non-compete agreements and other
restrictive contracts that deny workers their God-given right to sell their
labor in a free market. The removal of licensure-related barriers to early
career advancement will accelerate the transition into economic independence
and thus into marriage and child-rearing.
聯邦政府的反壟斷力量也應該保護自由勞動力市場免受政府支持的壟斷聯盟的剝削。除非
許可證委員會能夠證明有效的公共安全目的，否則應將其視為壟斷。如果發現這些委員會
在沒有有效的公共安全目的的情況下形成了限制貿易的壟斷，工人應該能夠對許可證委員
會提起集體訴訟，並獲得懲罰性賠償。除此之外，還應採取措施限制公司競業禁止協議和
其他限制性合同的使用和範圍，這些合同剝奪了工人在自由市場上出售勞動力的上帝賦予
的權利。消除與許可證有關的障礙，使職業提早發展，將加速向經濟獨立的過渡，從而向
婚姻和育兒過渡。
There are other, even more unusual ways to make marriage and family life
easier in America. We could make Social Security more generous for people who
have more children, strip Pell-grant and subsidized-student-loan eligibility
from schools with low percentages of students working in jobs within eight
years of enrollment, increase the number of federal holidays, repeal Blaine
amendments that deny government funds to schools affiliated with religious
denominations, implement a carbon tax to address a major form of long-run
uncertainty as people think about whether to have children, transition
federal welfare programs to a simpler cash benefit to give families
flexibility, and enact other policies. Some of the policies I have mentioned
are congenial to conservatives and some are not. Addressing the decline in
fertility will depend on policymakers’ taking ideologically flexible and
politically bold actions, moving numerous different and unrelated obstacles
out of the way of families.
在美國，為了達到讓婚姻和家庭生活更輕鬆的目的，還有其它更與眾不同的方式。我們可
以給予有更多孩子的人更慷慨的社會保障；剝奪那些在入學八年內找到工作的學生比例較
低的學校的佩爾助學金和學生助學貸款資格；增加聯邦假日；廢除布萊恩修正案，否認政
府資助學校隸屬於宗教教派；收取碳排放稅，解決要孩子的一個主要擔憂，給人們吃定心
丸；將聯邦福利項目轉變為更簡單的現金福利，給予家庭靈活性，並制定其他政策。我提
到的一些政策可能令保守派滿意，而另一些則不然。解決生育率下降的問題取決於決策者
在意識形態上選擇靈活、政治上採取大膽行動，以移除眾多不同的、互不相關的障礙，為
家庭的發展蕩平道路。
(按 - 布萊恩修正案是一項失敗的美國憲法案修正案，後來在50個州中有38個州在其州憲
中採用了布萊恩條款。這些措施旨在拒絕政府對教區學校的援助，尤其是那些由天主教會
在移民人口眾多的地區開辦的學校。)
(按 - 佩爾助學金(Pell Grant)是由美國聯邦政府提供給低收入家庭子女用於完成高中後
學業的助學金。佩爾助學金獲得者可用這些錢支付學費，食宿費或其他教育花銷。佩爾獎
學金一般無需獲得者返還，也因此深受低收入家庭的學生歡迎。)
If we fail, the consequences will be imperceptible at first. More funerals
than baptisms, a bit more financial strain on the public fisc, not quite as
many new businesses, some young people who seem disappointed in where their
life has ended up. But in the long run, the story ends in deep strategic
insecurity, extraordinary dependence on immigration, lasting economic
stagnation, ever-increasing monopoly power, deep political fissures between
generations, and, eventually, perhaps even political instability. We are
already sampling the first fruits of this harvest; we must take care not to
reap the rest of it.
如果我們失敗了，一開始後果是難以察覺的。葬禮比洗禮多、公共財政的壓力更大、新生
意寥寥，一些年輕人似乎會對自己的人生結局感到失望。但從長遠來看，這個故事的結局
是嚴重的戰略不安全感、對移民的極度依賴、持續的經濟停滯、日益增長的壟斷力量、幾
代人之間深刻的政治裂痕，最終，甚至將會面對政治的不穩定。我們已經在飲鴆這次收穫
的第一批果實；我們必須提防不要再收割剩下的部分。
--
論述謬誤：1 轉移議題 change of subject、2 偷換概念 concept swap、3 虛假目標
strawman argument、4 人身攻擊 ad hominem、5 感性辯護 appeal to emotion、
6 關聯替代因果 correlation as causation、7 不當類比 false analogy、8 不當引申
slippery slope、9 同義反覆 circular reasoning、10 無知辯護 argument from
ignorance、11 引用權威 appeal to authority、12 黨同伐異 appeal to faction
--
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※ 文章網址: https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/IA/M.1582738727.A.B2C.html
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02/27 16:15,
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02/27 16:15, 1F