[編譯] 經濟學人 中國複製西藏模式鎮壓新疆
https://tinyurl.com/qmksb47
In Xinjiang, China applies repressive lessons learned in Tibet
中國複製西藏模式鎮壓新疆
In Xinjiang detained “trainees” have all “graduated”. But it is not clear
where they are
新疆再教育營的“學員們”都“畢業”了,但不知去向。
China usually marks the un’s human-rights day on December 10th with angry
rebuttals of foreign criticism rather than announcements of improvements in
its record. So it was perhaps coincidental that an official this week updated
the world on the most egregious of China’s current abuses: the incarceration
of hundreds of thousands of Uighurs and other mostly Muslim minorities in the
vast western region of Xinjiang. Shohrat Zakir, chairman of the regional
government, told a press conference in Beijing that the “trainees” in
detention had all “graduated”. Since then, he said, they “have achieved
stable employment, improved their quality of life and have been living a
happy life.”
中國造慣例地在每年12月10號國際人權日這天都會嚴斥西方世界對自己人權議題的批評,
而非宣示要改善自己的人權紀錄。碰巧的是,在本週有中國官員透露關於這可怕暴行的最
新進度;現任新疆自治區主席Shohrat Zakir在北京的一場記者會宣布:那些成千上萬被關
起來的維吾爾族和其他穆斯林少數族群「學員」都已經「畢業」了。
他說再教育營讓他們有穩定的就業、改善他們的生活、還從此過著幸福快樂的日子呢。
Mr Zakir said foreign reports that trainees numbered 1m-2m were groundless,
but did not give his own total. China describes what outsiders see as vast
prison camps (one is pictured, near the city of Hotan) as “vocational
training” centres, teaching Chinese, occupational skills and “
deradicalisation”. The camps were set up in response to sporadic outbreaks
of Islamist and anti-Chinese violence. The mass detentions amount to a
preventive internal-security operation of almost unimaginable—and
unmeasurable—proportions.
Mr Zakir表示外國報導「學員」有一兩百萬人是無根據的,但他沒說明究竟有多少人。中
國政府將外界視為大型集中營(有一座位於和田市的還被拍到)地方稱為「職業訓練所」,
用來教導中國人專職技術以及「去除極端思想」;「再教育營」是設計來對付那些不時發
生的伊斯蘭及反中國的暴動。
Divided families fear to speak about disappeared members. A Uighur activist
based in Canada says his grandfather died this year soon after being freed
from one of the camps, where his diabetes and heart condition had been
untreated. The activist is loth to contact his family. A phone call to his
bereaved grandmother prompted a warning text to her from the authorities.
家庭被拆散的維族人害怕談論那些消失的人。一名目前身在加拿大的異議維族人透漏他的
祖父今年從集中營釋放後不久就往生,因為他的糖尿病跟心臟病並無得到治療。
之前他打了一通電話給他失去至親的祖母,結果祖母後來收到當局的警告訊息,這讓他現
在都不敢聯繫他的家人。
So the fate of the detainees remains unclear. Mr Zakir did not say they had
been freed. The activist thinks a mass release “pretty unlikely”. But some
observers think that China might be moving to a more subtle form of
repression: in the community. They point to Tibet, a neighbouring region with
its own history of protest, where a resentful local population has been
subdued without mass incarceration (though plenty of malcontents remain
locked up). The Communist Party chief in Xinjiang, Chen Quanguo, served in
the same post in Tibet. His skills in containing unrest have been bolstered
by extensive deployment of surveillance technology.
Mr Zakir並沒有說明維族人是否被釋放,所以那些被關的維族人的命運仍不明朗。
該名異議人士認為大規模的釋放「不太可能的」。而一些觀察者認為中國可能改用更隱晦
的模式來壓制維族人:深入社區。觀察家們提到新疆的鄰居:西藏,西藏人沒有透過大規模
關押就“噤聲”(雖然仍有不少的異議人士被關起來)。現任的新疆黨委書記陳全國,過去
也擔任西藏黨委書記一職。他對付人民示威的手段已藉由監視科技而無所不在。
For Tibetans, December 10th did mark an important and poignant anniversary:
30 years to the day since their exiled spiritual leader, the 14th Dalai Lama,
was in Oslo to receive the Nobel peace prize. Tibetans enjoy no more freedom
than they did then. But few mass protests have been reported since an
outbreak of anti-Chinese violence in Lhasa and protests across the Tibetan
plateau in 2008.
對西藏人來說,12月10日也是一個重要且悲傷的日子,30年前,藏人的精神領袖達賴喇嘛
14世在挪威奧斯陸受頒諾貝爾和平獎。從那時起藏人的自由被打壓得更嚴重,且自2008年
在拉薩發生的抗議事件後,整個西藏都不時傳出抗議活動。
The “Tibet model” of repression relies on four tactics. The first is to
deflect any international pressure. In Tibet’s case this has meant
curtailing the influence of the Dalai Lama. At 84, he is not the tireless
globe-trotter he once was. And China is itself tireless in browbeating (and
even imposing sanctions on) any country whose leaders dare to meet him.
「西藏式」的鎮壓主要靠四種手段。
首先:抵制任何國際聲援
以西藏情形而言,就是指去削弱達賴喇嘛的國際影響力,現年已經84歲的他,已無法如年
輕時的他遊走世界各地為藏人發聲,且中國無所不用其極地恫嚇任何膽敢跟達賴見面的國
家。
Second is to limit foreign contact. Tibet remains cut off. Individual foreign
tourists—never mind journalists or human-rights investigators—are banned,
and the stream of exiles escaping to India has been cut to a trickle. Third
is to swamp the territory’s native majority by promoting economic
development that encourages migration from elsewhere in China. Thanks to
tourism and investment in infrastructure, Tibet’s economy last year grew by
9%, faster than all but one Chinese province. The growth brings both jobs and
an influx of Han Chinese, whose presence sparked the resentment that exploded
in 2008.
第二:就是去限制西藏與外界的聯繫
西藏現在可以說是被隔絕的,獨立的外國旅客,無論是記者或人權團體都被禁止進入,試
圖逃亡去印度的路線也被堵塞。
第三,中國試圖利用經濟誘因使中國其他地區的漢人進入西藏來沖淡藏人人口。
由於觀光業與政府投資,西藏去年經濟成長了9%,幾乎快過中國所有其他城市。這同時提
升了就業率以及漢民族的湧入,而這就是造成2008年藏人不滿的主因。
Last, blanket the region with security mechanisms and personnel. This
includes stationing “work teams” in villages and sensitive spots such as
monasteries, and dividing cities into “grids” in which residents have to
spy on each other.
最後,用國家機器將整個藏區圍起來,包含組成所謂的「工作小組」派駐到所有村莊和一
些例如寺廟等的敏感地帶,再將城市分成數個「安全網」讓藏民監督彼此。
Tibet shows how effective and sustainable mass repression can be. But China
still has to weather the eventual passing and reincarnation of the Dalai
Lama, a powerful and moderate restraining figure. Where the Tibet model fails
is in offering a future of reconciliation and harmony. ■
西藏經驗告訴我們中國的鎮壓行動能有多可怕,且告訴我們西藏模式是無助於族群和諧的
;當影響力巨大的溫和內斂的達賴喇嘛圓寂及轉世時,中國仍須面對潛在的西藏危機。
This article appeared in the China section of the print edition under the
headline"In Xinjiang, China applies repressive lessons learned in Tibet"
--
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※ 文章網址: https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/IA/M.1576506306.A.2FA.html
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