America Must Prepare for the Coming Chinese Empire
美國必須為即將來臨的中華帝國做好準備
The last thing American policymakers or strategists should assume is that
somehow Americans are superior to the Chinese.
美國政策制定者或戰略家不該假定，美國人在某種程度上優於中國人。
原文(The National Interest)：https://tinyurl.com/y3pm8qz3
原文PDF檔下載(免付費)：https://tinyurl.com/y2z8ej7l
部分翻譯(觀察者)：
https://www.guancha.cn/LuoBoTe-D-KaPuLan/2019_07_09_508683_s.shtml
(其餘部分由po文者翻譯)
Robert D. Kaplan
Before one can outline a grand strategy for the United States, one has to be
able to understand the world in which America operates. That may sound
simple, but a bane of Washington is the assumption of knowledge where little
actually exists. Big ideas and schemes are worthless unless one is aware of
the ground-level reality of several continents, and is able to fit them into
a pattern, based not on America’s own historical experience, but also on the
historical experience of others. Therefore, I seek to approach grand strategy
not from the viewpoint of Washington, but of the world； and not as a
political scientist or academic, but as a journalist with more than three
decades of experience as a reporter around the globe.
在為美國勾勒出一項宏大的戰略之前，我們必須先瞭解美國所身處的世界。這聽起來可能
很簡單，但華盛頓的一個禍根就是在實際瞭解得很少的情況下假定我們瞭解了全局。除非
我們能瞭解幾個大陸的基礎現狀並能夠根據其他國家的歷史經驗（而非美國自身的歷史經
驗）將它們歸納成一種模式，否則偉大的思想和計畫都是毫無價值的。因此，我希望從世
界的角度而不是從華盛頓的角度去理解大戰略，同時，不是作為一名政治科學家或者學者
，而是作為一名擁有30多年經驗的記者去研究。
After covering the Third World during the Cold War and its aftershocks which
continue to the present, I have concluded that, despite the claims of
post-colonial studies courses prevalent on university campuses, we still
inhabit (in functional terms, that is) an imperial world. Empire in some form
or another is eternal, even if European colonies of the early-modern and
modern eras are gone. Thus, the issue becomes: what are the contours of the
current imperial age that affect grand strategy for the United States? And
once those contours are delineated, what should be America’s grand strategy
in response? I will endeavor to answer both questions.
在報導了冷戰時期的第三世界國家及其持續至今的餘波後，我的結論是，儘管後殖民主義
研究課程在大學校園裡盛行，但就實際運作而言，我們仍然生活在一個帝國主義的世界。
即使早期和現代的歐洲殖民地已經不復存在，帝國卻在以某種形式永恆地存在著。因此，
問題則變成了：當前帝國時代對美國大戰略的整體影響是什麼？一旦這些影響的輪廓被勾
勒出來，美國的大戰略應該如何應對？我將盡力回答這兩個問題。
Empire, or its great power equivalent, requires the impression of permanence:
the idea, embedded in the minds of local inhabitants, that the imperial
authorities will always be there, compelling acquiescence to their rule and
influence. Wherever I traveled in Africa, the Middle East and Asia during the
Cold War, American and Soviet influence was seen as permanent； unquestioned
for all time, however arrogant and overbearing it might have been. Whatever
the facts, that was the perception. And after the Soviet Union collapsed,
American influence continued to be seen for a time as equally permanent. Make
no mistake: America, since the end of World War II, and continuing into the
second decade of the twenty-first century, was an empire in all but name.
帝國，或與之相當的強國，需要給人一種它將永遠存在的印象：這種帝國當局將永遠存在
的想法若根植於當地居民的心中，就會迫使他們默認這個帝國的統治和影響力。冷戰期間
，無論我走到非洲、中東或亞洲的哪裡，人們都認為美國和蘇聯的影響是永久性的。無論
它看起來多麼傲慢和專橫，這都是毋庸置疑的。不管事實如何，這種感覺都存在。在蘇聯
解體後，美國的影響力在一段時間內仍然被視為是永久性的。毫無疑問：美國自二戰結束
一直到21世紀的前二十年以來，除了名稱之外，實際上就是一個帝國。
That is no longer the case. European and Asian allies are now, with good
reason, questioning America’s constancy. New generations of American
leaders, to judge from university liberal arts curriculums, are no longer
being educated to take pride in their country’s past and traditions. Free
trade or some equivalent, upon which liberal maritime empires have often
rested, is being abandoned. The decline of the State Department, ongoing
since the end of the Cold War, is hollowing out a primary tool of American
power. Power is not only economic and military: it is moral. And I don’t
mean humanitarian, as necessary as humanitarianism is for the American brand.
But in this case, I mean something harder: the fidelity of our word in the
minds of allies. And that predictability is gone.
但現在情況已經不同了。歐洲和亞洲已成為盟友並有充分的理由質疑美國的穩定性。從大
學通才教育課程來看，新一代的美國領導人不再為他們國家的過去和傳統感到自豪。自由
貿易等其他自由海上帝國賴以生存的基礎正在被拋棄。自冷戰結束以來，美國國務院，這
個美國權力的重要工具，一直在走下坡路，甚至在被逐漸掏空。權力不僅是經濟和軍事上
的，也是道德上的。我不是說人道主義，因為人道主義的標籤對美國來說是必要的。在這
個問題上，我指的是更重要的東西：我們諾言的忠誠度在盟友心中開始變得不可預測。
Meanwhile, as one imperium-of-sorts declines, another takes its place.
與此同時，隨著某種帝國的衰落，另一種“帝國”將取而代之。
China is not the challenge we face: rather, the challenge is the new Chinese
empire. It is an empire that stretches from the arable cradle of the ethnic
Han core westward across Muslim China and Central Asia to Iran； and from the
South China Sea, across the Indian Ocean, up the Suez Canal, to the eastern
Mediterranean and the Adriatic Sea. It is an empire based on roads, railways,
energy pipelines and container ports whose pathways by land echo those of the
Tang and Yuan dynasties of the Middle Ages, and by sea echo the Ming dynasty
of the late Middle Ages and early-modern period. Because China is in the
process of building the greatest land-based navy in history, the heart of
this new empire will be the Indian Ocean, which is the global energy
interstate, connecting the hydrocarbon fields of the Middle East with the
middle-class conurbations of East Asia.
中國不是我們面臨的挑戰：相反，我們所面臨的挑戰是一個新的中華帝國。它從以漢族為
核心的可耕地搖籃向西延伸，橫跨中國的西部和中亞，直達伊朗；從南海，穿過印度洋，
到蘇伊士運河，再到東地中海和亞得里亞海。它是一個以公路、鐵路、能源管道和集裝箱
港口為基礎的大國。其陸路路線與中世紀唐元時期的路線相呼應，海上路線則與中世紀晚
期和近代早期的明朝相呼應。由於中國正在建設歷史上最大的陸基海軍，這個“新帝國”
的核心將是印度洋，一個連接著中東的油氣田和東亞的中產階級城市的全球能源洲際中心
。
This new Indian Ocean empire has to be seen to be believed. A decade ago, I
spent several years visiting these Chinese ports in the making, at a time
when few in the West were paying attention. I traveled to Gwadar in the bleak
desert of Baluchistan, technically part of Pakistan but close to the Persian
Gulf. There, I saw a state-of-the-art port complex rising sheer above a
traditional village. (The Chinese are now contemplating a naval base in
nearby Jawani, which would allow them to overwatch the Strait of Hormuz.) In
Hambantota, in Sri Lanka, I witnessed hundreds of Chinese laborers literally
moving the coast itself further inland, as armies of dump trucks carried soil
away. While America’s bridges and railways languish, it is a great moment in
history to be a Chinese civil engineer. China has gone from building these
ports, to having others manage them, and then finally to managing them
themselves. It has all been part of a process that recalls the early days of
the British and Dutch East India companies in the same waters.
我們必須相信這個新的印度洋大國的存在。十年前，我花了幾年時間參觀這些正在建設中
的中國港口，而當時西方很少有人注意到這一點。我去了位於俾路支省荒涼沙漠中的瓜達
爾港。在那裡，我看到一座最先進的港口綜合設施聳立在一個傳統村落之上。（中國人正
在考慮在Jawani附近建造一個海軍基地，這將使他們能夠覆蓋霍爾木茲海峽。）在斯里蘭
卡的漢班托塔，我親眼目睹了數百名中國勞工沿著海岸向內陸移動，以及震撼如軍隊般的
砂石車是如何把泥土運走的。中國已經從建設這些港口，到讓別人管理它們，最後再轉變
到自己管理它們。這一切的過程都讓人回想起英國和荷蘭東印度公司早期在同一水域的作
為。
Newspaper reports talk of some of these projects being stalled or mired in
debt. That is a traditionally capitalist way to look at it. From a mercantile
and imperialist point of view, these projects make perfect sense. In a way,
the money never really leaves China: a Chinese state bank lends the money for
a port project in a foreign country, which then employs Chinese state
workers, which utilize a Chinese logistics company, and so on.
據報導，其中一些項目已被擱置或陷入債務泥潭。這是傳統的資本主義觀點。但從商業和
帝國主義的角度來看，這些項目絕對是有意義的。在某種程度上，資金從未真正離開過中
國：一家中國國有銀行貸款給外國的一個港口項目，然後該項目僱用中國工人，這些工人
再僱傭一家中國物流公司，以此類推。
Geography is still paramount. And because the Indian Ocean is connected to
the South China Sea through the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok straits, Chinese
domination of the South China Sea is crucial to Beijing. China is not a rogue
state, and China’s naval activities in the South China Sea make perfect
sense given its geopolitical and, yes, its imperial imperatives. The South
China Sea not only further unlocks the Indian Ocean for China, but it further
softens up Taiwan and grants the Chinese navy greater access to the wider
Pacific.
地理仍然是最重要的因素。由於印度洋通過馬六甲海峽、巽他海峽和龍目海峽與南海相連
，中國對南海的控制至關重要。中國不是一個流氓國家，鑑於地緣政治以及其帝國的迫切
需要，中國在南海的海軍活動完全合情合理。南海不僅進一步為中國打開了印度洋的大門
，而且進一步軟化了台灣，使中國海軍有更多的機會進入更廣闊的太平洋。
The South China Sea represents one geographical frontier of the Greater
Indian Ocean world； the Middle East and the Horn of Africa represent the
other. The late Zbigniew Brzezinski once wisely said in conversation that
hundreds of millions of Muslims do not yearn for democracy as much as they
yearn for dignity and justice, things which are not necessarily synonymous
with elections. The Arab Spring was not about democracy: rather, it was
simply a crisis in central authority. The fact that sterile and corrupt
authoritarian systems were being rejected did not at all mean these societies
were institutionally ready for parliamentary systems: witness Libya, Yemen
and Syria. As for Iraq, it proved that beneath the carapace of tyranny lay
not the capacity for democracy but an anarchic void. The regimes of Morocco,
Jordan and Oman provide stability, legitimacy, and a measure of the justice
and dignity that Brzezinski spoke of, precisely because they are traditional
monarchies, with only the threadbare trappings of democracy. Tunisia’s
democracy is still fragile, and the further one travels away from the capital
into the western and southern reaches of the country, close to the Libyan and
Algerian borders, the more fragile it becomes.
南海代表大印度洋世界的一個地理邊界；中東和非洲之角代表另一個。已故的茲比格涅夫
·布熱津斯基曾在談話中明智地表示，數以億計的穆斯林並不像他們渴望尊嚴和正義那樣
渴望民主，這些東西不必然是選舉的同義詞。阿拉伯之春不是關於民主的：相反，它只是
中央集權的一場危機。無效和腐敗的獨裁制度被人民拒絕的事實並不意味著這些社會在制
度面上為議會制做好準備：看看利比亞，也門和敘利亞。至於伊拉克，事實證明，在暴政
的背後，不是民主的能力，而是無政府主義的空虛。摩洛哥，約旦和阿曼的政權提供了穩
定，合法性和衡量布熱津斯基所說的正義和尊嚴，正是因為它們是傳統的君主制，只是披
上民主的破舊外衣。突尼斯的民主仍然是脆弱的，而隨著越來越遠離首都進入該國的西部
和南部地區，靠近利比亞和阿爾及利亞的邊界，它變得越脆弱。
This is a world tailor-made for the Chinese, who do not deliver moral
lectures about the type of government a state should have but do provide an
engine for economic development. To wit, globalization is much about
container shipping: an economic activity that the Chinese have mastered. The
Chinese military base in Djibouti is the security hub in a wheel of ports
extending eastward to Gwadar in Pakistan, southward to Bagamoyo in Tanzania,
and northwestward to Piraeus in Greece, all of which, in turn, help anchor
Chinese trade and investments throughout the Middle East, East Africa and the
eastern Mediterranean. Djibouti is a virtual dictatorship, Pakistan is in
reality an army-run state, Tanzania is increasingly authoritarian and Greece
is a badly institutionalized democracy that is increasingly opening up to
China. In significant measure, between Europe and the Far East, this is the
world as it really exists in Afro-Eurasia. The Chinese empire, unburdened by
the missionary impulse long prevalent in American foreign policy, is well
suited for it.
這是一個為中國人量身定做的世界。中國人不會就一個國家應該擁有什麼樣的政府發表道
德說教，而是為其經濟發展提供助力。也就是說，全球化在很大程度上與集裝箱運輸有關
：這是一項中國人已經掌握的經濟活動。位於吉布提的中國軍事基地是通往巴基斯坦瓜達
爾東部的港口安全中心，向東延伸至坦桑尼亞的巴加莫約，向西北延伸至希臘的比雷埃夫
斯，所有這些都有助於中國的貿易和投資。中東，東非和地中海東部。吉布提是一個虛擬
的獨裁政權，巴基斯坦實際上是一個由軍隊管理的國家，坦桑尼亞越來越專制，希臘是一
個制度化程度很低的民主國家，越來越多地向中國開放。在很大程度上，這是一個在歐洲
和遠東之間，真實存在於非洲 - 歐亞大陸的世界。中華帝國的外交政策不像美國政策那
樣帶有傳教性質，也因此使其擺脫了沉重的負擔。
More to the point, when it comes to China, we are dealing with a unique and
very formidable cultural organism. The American foreign policy elite does not
like to talk about culture since culture cannot be quantified, and in this
age of extreme personal sensitivity, what cannot be quantified or
substantiated by a footnote is potentially radioactive. But without a
discussion of culture and geography, there is simply no hope of understanding
foreign affairs. Indeed, culture is nothing less than the sum total of a
large group of people’s experience inhabiting the same geographical
landscape for hundreds or thousands of years.
更重要的是，當談到中國時，我們面對的是一個獨特而強大的文化有機體。美國的外交政
策精英不喜歡談論文化，因為文化無法量化，在這個極端個人感知的時代，無法用一段註
解來量化或證實的東西只能具有潛在的放射性(無實際作用)。然而，若沒有對文化和地理
的討論，我們就無法真正理解外交事務。事實上，文化只不過是居住在同一地域數百年或
數千年的一大群人的經驗總和。
Anyone who travels in China, or even observes it closely, realizes something
that the business community intuitively grasps better than the policy
community: the reason there is little or no separation between the public and
private domains in China is not only because the country is a dictatorship,
but because there is a greater cohesion of values and goals among Chinese
compared to those among Americans. In China, you are inside a traditional
mental value system. In that system, all areas of national activity—
commercial, cyber, military, political, technological, educational—work
fluently toward the same ends, so that computer hacking, espionage, port
building and expansion, the movement of navy and fishing fleets, and so on
all appear coordinated. And within that system, Confucianism still lends a
respect for hierarchy and authority among individual Chinese, whereas
American culture is increasingly about the dismantling of authority in favor
of devotion to the individual. Confucian societies worship old people；
Western societies worship young people. One should never forget these lines
from Solzhenitsyn: “Idolized children despise their parents, and when they
get a bit older they bully their countrymen. Tribes with an ancestor cult
have endured for centuries. No tribe would survive long with a youth cult.”
任何在中國旅行或者密切觀察過中國的人都能意識到：商界比政策界更能直觀地把握一些
事情。中國公共領域和私人領域之間很少或根本沒有分離的原因不僅僅是因為這個國家是
獨裁，而是中國人在價值觀和目標上比美國人更有凝聚力。在中國，你處於傳統的心理價
值體系中。在該系統中，國家活動的所有領域——商業、網絡、軍事、政治、技術、教育
——都能順利地朝著同一目的，因此計算機黑客攻擊，間諜活動，港口建設和擴展，海軍
和捕魚船隊的運動等等，看起來都很協調。在這個體系中，儒家思想仍然尊重中國個人的
等級制度和權威，而美國文化則越來越傾向於廢除權威，致力於個人。儒家社會尊重老年
人；西方社會尊重年輕人。人們永遠不應該忘記索忍尼辛的這段話：“偶像化的孩子鄙視
他們的父母，當他們變老時，他們欺負他們的同胞。擁有祖先崇拜的部落已經存活了數世
紀。沒有一個部落會因為青年崇拜而長期生存。
Chinese are educated in national pride； increasingly the opposite of what
goes on in our own schools and universities. And Chinese are extraordinarily
efficient, with a manic attention to detail. Individuals are certainly more
concrete than the mass. But that does not mean national traits simply do not
exist. I have flown around China on domestic airlines with greater ease and
comfort than I could ever imagine flying around America at its airports. And
that is to say nothing about China’s bullet trains.
中國人受的是民族自豪感的教育；這與我們自己的學校和大學的傾向越來越相反。中國人
非常有效率，狂熱地注重細節。個人肯定比群眾更具體。但這並不意味著國家特徵根本就
不存在。我乘坐”國內航空”飛越中國，比起在美國機場間飛來飛去更容易和更舒適---
我說的是中國的子彈列車。
Of course, there are all sorts of political and social tensions inside China.
And the unrest among the middle classes we see today in Brazil and the rest
of Latin America could well be a forerunner to what we will see in China in
the 2020s, undermining Belt and Road and the whole Chinese imperial system
altogether. China’s over-leveraged economy may well be headed for a hard,
rather than a soft, landing, with all the attendant domestic upheaval which
that entails. I have real doubts about the sustainability of the Chinese
political and economic model. But the last thing American policymakers or
strategists should assume is that somehow we are superior to the Chinese, or
worse: that somehow we have a destiny that they do not.
當然，中國內部存在各種政治和社會緊張局勢。我們今天在巴西和拉丁美洲其他地區看到
的中產階級的騷亂很可能成為我們將在10 年後的中國看到的東西，它們將破壞“一帶一
路”和整個中國的帝國體制。中國過度槓桿化的經濟很可能會走向艱難而不是軟著陸，伴
隨著隨之而來的國內動盪。我對中國政治和經濟模式的可持續性表示懷疑。但美國政策制
定者或策略師最不應該假設的就是我們在某種程度上優於中國，又或者更糟：我們在某種
程度上擁有他們沒有的天命。
We have entered a protracted struggle with China, which hopefully will not be
violent at certain junctures. And it may become more dangerous precisely
because China could weaken internally due to economic upheavals, causing its
leaders to dial up nationalism as a default option. It will be a struggle (or
war) of integration rather than of separation. Throughout the human past,
wars have seen an army from one place and an army from another place meet
somewhere in the middle to give battle. However, in the cyber age, we are all
operating inside the same operating environment, so that computer networks
can attack each other without armies ever meeting or even blood being shed.
The Russian attempt to influence our politics is an example of war by
integration, which could not have existed even two decades ago. The
information age has added to the possibilities for warfare rather than
subtracted from it. The enemy is only a click away, rather than hundreds of
miles away. And because weapons systems require guidance from satellites,
outer space is now a domain for warfare, just as the seas became once the
Portuguese and Spanish had begun the Age of Exploration. Every age of warfare
has its own characteristics. Increasingly, warfare has become less physical
and more mental: the more obsessively driven the culture, the better suited
it will be for mid-twenty-first-century cyber warfare. If that seems
offensive to the reader, remember that the future lies inside the silences—
inside the things we are most uncomfortable talking about.
我們已經進入了長期鬥爭，只能希望這個鬥爭在某些關鍵時刻不會轉化為暴力衝突。而它
也可能變得更加危險，因為中國可能因經濟動盪而內部削弱，導致其領導人將民族主義作
為預設選項。這將是一場融合而非分裂的鬥爭（或戰爭）。在整個人類過去，戰爭是一個
地方的軍隊和另一個地方的軍隊在中間的某個地方遇到戰鬥。然而，在網絡時代，我們都
在相同的操作環境中運行，因此計算機網絡可以在沒有軍隊會面或甚至流血的情況下相互
攻擊。俄羅斯試圖影響我們的政治，這是整合戰爭的一個例子，即使在二十年前也不可能
存在。信息時代增加而不是減少了戰爭的可能性。敵人只需點擊一下，而不是遠征數百英
里之外。而且由於武器系統需要衛星的指導，外太空現在已成為戰爭的領域，正如海洋為
葡萄牙人和西班牙人開啟探索時代一樣。每個戰爭時代都有自己的特點。越來越多的戰爭
變得較少物理面而更多精神面：文化越是癡迷，就越適合二十一世紀中期的網絡戰。如果
這對讀者來說似乎是冒犯的，請記住，未來存在於無聲中 - 在我們最不想談論的事情內
部。
In functional and historical terms, this will be an imperial struggle, though
our elites both inside and outside government will forbid use of the term.
The Chinese will have an advantage in this type of competition as they have a
greater tradition in empire building than we do, and they are not ashamed of
it as we have become. They openly hark back to their former dynasties and
empires to justify what they are doing； whereas our elites can hark back
less and less to our own past. Westward expansion, rather than the heroic
saga portrayed by mid-twentieth-century American historians, is now often
taught as a tale of genocide against the indigenous population and nothing
more—even though without conquering the West, we never would have had the
geopolitical and economic capacity to win World War I, World War II and the
Cold War.
儘管我們政府內外的精英都將禁止使用這個詞，但從功能性和歷史的角度來看，這將是一
場“帝國”的鬥爭。中國人將在這類競爭中佔據優勢，因為他們在國家建設方面有著比我
們更偉大的傳統。他們並不像我們的那樣臉皮薄。他們公開追溯他們以前的朝代和帝國，
為他們正在做的事情提供正當性；而我們的精英們卻越來越少地追溯過去。西進運動已不
是二十世紀中葉美國歷史學家描繪的英雄傳奇，它現在經常被教導成為對土著居民進行種
族滅絕的故事。而若沒有西進，我們也不會有地緣政治和贏得第一次世界大戰，第二次世
界大戰和冷戰的經濟能力。
Moreover, the Chinese have demonstrated an ability to quickly adapt, which is
the key to Darwinian evolution: the continual changes that they are making to
their Belt and Road model are an example of this.
此外，中國已經證明了其快速適應的能力，而這是達爾文進化論的關鍵：他們對“一帶一
路”模式的持續變革就是一個例子。
The Chinese also have more capable leadership than we do.
中國人的領導能力也比我們強。
Undeniably, our post-Cold War presidents have been dramatically inferior to
our Cold War presidents in terms of thinking strategically about foreign
affairs. Bill Clinton was not altogether serious about foreign policy,
especially at the beginning of his presidency； George W. Bush was in
significant measure a failure at it； Barack Obama too often seemed to
apologize for American power； and Donald Trump is frankly unsuited for high
office in the first place. Compare them to Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy,
Nixon, Reagan and the elder Bush. Compare, too, our post-Cold War presidents
to Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Xi is disciplined, strategically minded,
unashamed of projecting power, an engineer by training, with living
experience in the provinces, and perhaps, most importantly, someone with a
deep sense of the tragic, as his family was a victim of Mao Zedong’s Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This is a man of virtu, in the classical
Machiavellian sense. One could go further and say that there is not only a
crisis in American leadership but in Western leadership in general. The truly
formidable, dynamic leaders, whatever their moral values, are more likely to
be found outside the United States and Europe. Witness, in addition to Xi,
Japan’s Shinzo Abe, India’s Narendra Modi, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and
Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu. They have all grasped the art of power； they
are constantly willing to take risks, and they are in office not only out of
personal ambition but because they actually want to get certain things done.
不可否認，我們冷戰後的總統在外交事務的戰略思考方面明顯不如冷戰時期的總統。比爾
·柯林頓對外交政策並不是十分認真，尤其是在他擔任總統之初；喬治·布希在很大程度
上是失敗的；巴拉克·歐巴馬似乎經常為美國的實力道歉；坦率地說，唐納德·川普從一
開始就不適合擔任要職。將他們與杜魯門、艾森豪威爾、甘迺迪、尼克森、雷根和老布希
相比，高下立見。同樣，把我們冷戰後的總統和中國領導人習近平進行比較也是如此。習
近平紀律嚴明，有戰略頭腦，不恥於投射權力，是訓練有素的工程師，且在各省生活過，
也許最重要的是，他是有著深刻的悲劇意識的人，因為他的家人是毛澤東無產階級文化大
革命的受害者。在經典的馬基雅維利（Machiavellian）意義上，這是一個有德行之人。
更進一步說，不僅是美國的領導出現了危機，整個西方的領導都出現了危機。真正令人敬
畏、充滿活力的領導人，無論他們的道德價值觀如何，都更有可能在美國和歐洲之外找到
。看看日本的首相安倍晉三，印度的納蘭德拉·莫迪，俄羅斯的弗拉基米爾·普京和以色
列的內塔尼亞胡。他們都掌握了權力的藝術；他們總是願意冒險，他們執政也不僅是出於
個人野心，而是因為他們確實想把某些事情做好。
Thus, the competition between the United States and China will coincide with
a political-cultural crisis of the West against a resurgent East.
因此，美國和中國之間的競爭將與西方對抗東方復興的政治文化危機同時發生。
We have truly entered an American-Chinese bipolar struggle. But it is a
bipolar struggle with an asterisk: the asterisk being Russia, which can
always inflict consequential damage on the United States. Yet, whereas the
Russians appear to our media as classic bad guys, the Chinese are more opaque
and business-like, so the gravity of our competition with Beijing is still
insufficiently appreciated by our media.
我們已經真正進入了一場中美兩極的鬥爭。但這是一場帶有星號的兩極鬥爭：這個星號就
是俄羅斯。它總是能給美國造成相應的損害。然而，當我們的媒體把俄羅斯人描繪成典型
的壞人時，我們與北京競爭的緊迫性仍然沒有得到我們媒體的足夠重視。
Truly, the sense of invulnerability the United States felt at the end of the
Cold War and the onset of globalization is gone. Initially, post-Cold War
globalization meant a Westernization of the world to go along with the
adoption of Western-style management practices and America’s so-called
unipolar moment. Now that this moment has passed, and with middle classes
enlarging throughout the developing world—while different shades of
authoritarianism compete with democracy—globalization is becoming more
multicultural, with the East assuming an equal position, helped also by
demographic trends. In this competition, the United States is wrong to
promote democracy per se. Instead, it should promote civil society whether
democratic or of the enlightened authoritarian mode. (Witness the
liberalizing yet authoritarian monarchies of Morocco, Jordan and Oman. And I
could give examples beyond the Middle East.) Hybrid regimes of an enlightened
authoritarian mode have been more of a norm throughout history than democracy
has been. Moreover, it has been my clear experience that people in Africa and
the Middle East care first about basic order and physical and economic
protection before they care about political freedoms. As the late liberal
philosopher Isaiah Berlin writes: “Men who live in conditions where there is
not sufficient food, warmth, shelter, and the minimum degree of security can
scarcely be expected to concern themselves with freedom of contract or of the
press.”
的確，美國在冷戰結束和全球化開始時所擁有的堅不可摧的感覺已經消失了。最初，冷戰
後的全球化意味著世界的西方化，隨之而來的是西方管理方式的採用和美國所謂的單極時
代。現在這個時刻已經過去了。隨著整個發展中國家中產階級的擴大——不同程度的威權
主義與民主競爭——全球化正變得更加多元化，而東方在人口趨勢的幫助下也佔據了平等
的地位。在這次競爭中，美國輸出民主本身就是錯誤。相反，它應該促進市民社會，無論
是民主社會還是開明的專制模式。 （見證摩洛哥，約旦和阿曼的自由化但獨裁的君主制
。我可以舉出中東以外的例子。）開明的專制模式的混合體制在整個歷史中比民主更為常
態。我的明確經驗是，非洲和中東人民首先關心的是基本秩序，物質以及經濟保護，然後
才是政治自由。正如已故自由主義哲學家以賽亞·伯林所寫：“生活在沒有足夠食物、溫
暖、住所和最低程度安全的環境中的人，幾乎不能指望自己關心契約自由或新聞自由。”
Obviously there exists a hierarchy of needs, and meaningful improvement in
people’s lives as a first priority should demand flexibility on our part—or
else it will be harder to compete with the Chinese. The expansion of middle
classes worldwide will by itself lead to greater calls for democracy: for as
people’s material lives improve they will increasingly demand more political
freedoms anyway. We do not need to force the process. If we do, it will be we
who are the ones being ideological； not the Chinese, who have the
civilizational confidence and serenity to accept political systems as they
already are.
很明顯，我們的需求是有層次的，改善人民生活作為第一要務，要求我們面對問題時具有
靈活性，否則我們將更難與中國人競爭。世界範圍內中產階級的擴大本身將導致對民主的
更大呼聲： 因為隨著人們物質生活的改善，他們無論如何都將日益要求更多的政治自由
。我們不需要強迫這個過程。如果我們這樣做，我們就是那些意識形態的人；而中國人不
是，他們有文明的信心和冷靜接受既存的政治制度。
Yet, even at our worst, our political system is open and capable of change in
the way that China, and that other great autocratic power, Russia, are not. A
world in which the United States is the dominant power will be a more humane
world of more personal freedoms than a world led by China.
然而，即使在最糟糕的情況下，我們的政治制度也是開放的，能夠以中國和其他專制政權
如俄羅斯所不能的方式改變。美國為主導力量的世界將是一個比中國領導的世界更加個人
自由與人道的世界。
I concentrate on China in this essay because China constitutes a much
stronger economy, a much more institutionalized political system, and a more
formidable twenty-first-century cultural genius than Russia. Therefore, China
should be the yardstick or pacing power by which our diplomatic, security and
defense establishments measures themselves: merely by competing with China we
will make our own institutions stronger. Such competition is all that might
be left to jolt our bureaucracies out of their ongoing decrepitude and
decline. Indeed, the profusion of travel orders, security clearance
paperwork, unnecessary receipts, and so forth, even as the hacking of our
systems continues, are all ways in which we deliberately deceive and defeat
ourselves. Paperwork arises out of the lack of trust. The more paperwork, the
less trust that exists within a bureaucracy. The Pentagon is a prime example
of this. We should always remember that there is no regulation or procedure
to instill basic common sense.
我在這篇文章中關注中國，是因為中國構成了一個比俄羅斯強大得多的經濟體、一個更加
制度化的政治體系，以及一個比俄羅斯更強大的21世紀文化才能。因此，中國應該成為衡
量我們的外交、安全和防務機構自身的尺度：通過與中國競爭，我們將使我們自己的機制
更強大。這種競爭可能會讓我們的官僚機構擺脫持續的衰退和衰落。事實上，即便在我們
的系統被黑客攻擊的情況下，大量的旅行禁令，安全許可文件，不必要的收據等等，都只
是我們故意欺騙和打倒自己的方式。文件源於缺乏信任。文件工作越多，官僚機構中存在
的信任就越少。五角大樓就是一個很好的例子。我們應該永遠記住，沒有任何規則或程序
可以灌輸基本的常識。
September 11, 2001 might have provided the jolt that we desperately needed.
But the younger Bush administration misused it. And even if it had not, 9/11,
as significant as it was, was a one-time security event that cannot compete
with a decades-long competition with China.
2001年9月11日可能提供了我們迫切需要的震撼。但年輕的布希政府濫用了它。即使沒有
濫用，9/11如此重要的事件，也只是一次的安全事件，無法比擬和中國長達數十年的競爭
。
Competition with China can teach us about priorities, which are the mainstays
of grand strategy.
與中國的競爭可以教會我們分辨優先的事項，而這是大戰略的支柱。
One priority should be to effectively get out of the Middle East. Every extra
day that the United States is diverted and bogged down in the Middle East
with significant numbers of ground troops helps China in the Indo-Pacific and
Europe even, where China is working to establish powerful commercial shipping
footholds in places like Trieste on Italy’s Adriatic shore and Duisburg in
riverine Germany； to say nothing about promoting its 5G digital network. I
don’t mean to say that we should pull all our forces out of the Middle East
tomorrow. I mean that our goal should be to reduce our military footprint as
quickly as practically possible, whenever and wherever possible.
當務之急應該是有效地撤出中東。美國及其陸軍被中東這片泥潭分散注意或者困住每多一
天，都有助於中國在印度-太平洋地區和歐洲的計畫。中國正致力於在意大利利亞斯特的
亞得里亞海岸邊及德國杜伊斯堡的河邊建立強大的商業航運立足點，更不用說推廣其5G數
字網絡了。我並不是說我們應該明天就從中東撤軍。我的意思是，我們的目標應該是盡快
地在所有可行的地方減少我們的軍事行動。
For example, the United States has had combat troops in Afghanistan for
almost two decades with no demonstrable result. The future of Afghanistan
will be decided by competing ethnic alliances within that country, and
Indians and Iranians squaring off against Chinese and Pakistanis. The Indians
and Iranians will build an energy and transport corridor from Chah Bahar in
southeastern Iran north through western Afghanistan into former Soviet
Central Asia. The Chinese and Pakistanis will try to build another such
corridor from Gwadar in southwestern Pakistan north, parallel with the Afghan
border, to Kashgar in western China. In particular, Pakistan, which will
always require Afghanistan as a rear base against India, must, therefore,
struggle against India in Afghanistan. India, whose own imperial past
encompasses the eastern half of Afghanistan, will do everything possible to
thwart Pakistan there. Russia, which lies just to the north of Afghanistan,
will also play a role because of its interest in smothering radical Islam. A
great game is about to ensue in Afghanistan in which the United States will
play absolutely no part, regardless of how much blood it has shed there,
because it lacks a geographical basis for it, and therefore has little or no
national interest at stake.
例如，美國在阿富汗部署作戰部隊近20年，沒有明顯的結果。阿富汗的未來將由該國內的
各民族團體競爭決定，印度人和伊朗人將對抗中國人和巴基斯坦人。印度人和伊朗人將建
立一條能源和運輸走廊，從伊朗東南部的Chah Bahar通過阿富汗西部進入前蘇聯中亞。中
國和巴基斯坦人將試圖從巴基斯坦西北部的瓜達爾建造另一條走廊，與阿富汗邊境平行，
直達中國西部喀什地區。特別是巴基斯坦，它總是要求阿富汗作為對抗印度的後方基地，
因此必須在阿富汗與印度作鬥爭。印度本身的帝國過去包括阿富汗東半部，它將盡一切可
能阻撓那裡的巴基斯坦。位於阿富汗北部的俄羅斯也將發揮作用，因為它有興趣扼殺激進
的伊斯蘭教。在阿富汗即將發生一場偉大的比賽，在這場比賽中美國將完全沒有參與，無
論它在那裡流了多少血，因為它缺乏地理基礎，因此很少或根本沒有國家利益。
All we can do is help stabilize Afghanistan so that the Chinese and others
can more safely continue to establish mining and other operations in the
country. In any case, building a strong central government in Afghanistan may
prove chimerical since none has ever existed in Kabul. The city has
traditionally functioned as a central point of arbitration for the various
warlords and tribal leaders that have exercised effective control in southern
Central Asia. Covering the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the
1980s, I saw vividly how the Soviets lost because the mujahidin enemy, a
diverse collection of tribal-based groups which viciously distrusted each
other, provided the Soviets with no useful point of attack. Afghanistan’s
very disorganization defeated the Soviets, just as it has been defeating us.
我們所能做的就是幫助穩定阿富汗，使中國人和其他人能夠更安全地繼續在該國建立採礦
和其他業務。無論如何，在阿富汗建立一個強大的中央政府可能不切實際，因為歷史上在
喀布爾從未有過。對於在中亞南部實施有效控制的各種軍閥和部落領導人來說，這座城市
傳統上一直是仲裁的中心點。從20世紀80年代在阿富汗對抗蘇維埃的戰爭裡，我清楚地看
到了蘇聯人是如何失敗的，因為聖戰者的敵人，各種各樣的部落群體彼此惡毒地互相攻擊
，使蘇聯人無可用的攻擊點。阿富汗的極度混亂打敗了蘇聯，就像它擊敗了我們一樣。
Iran, of course, so populous and well-educated, and fronting not one but two
hydrocarbon-rich zones (the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea), is the
demographic, economic and cultural organizing principle of both the Middle
East and Central Asia. But what happens inside Iran will be internally
driven. Iranians have a civilizational sense of themselves equal to that of
the Indians, Chinese and Japanese. Even dramatic American diplomatic actions,
like signing a nuclear deal with it, and later abrogating that same deal, can
have only a marginal effect on Iran’s confoundedly-complex domestic politics
in a country of over eighty million people. Despite periodic street
demonstrations which will continue, the very institutionalized strength of
the Revolutionary Guard Corps and other regime organizations make Iran
perhaps the most stable big state in the Muslim Middle East.
當然，伊朗人口眾多，受過良好教育，而且只有兩個富含碳氫化合物的區域（波斯灣和里
海），正是中東和中亞的人口，經濟和文化組織起來的原理。但伊朗境內發生的事情將由
內部驅動。伊朗人的文明感與印度人，中國人和日本人的感覺相同。即使是戲劇性的美國
外交行動，如簽署核協議，以及隨後廢除同樣的協議，也只能對伊朗在一個擁有八千多萬
人口的國家中混亂複雜的國內政治產生微不足道的影響。儘管定期的街頭示威將繼續下去
，但革命衛隊和其他政權組織的制度化力量，使伊朗成為穆斯林中東地區最穩定的大國。
As for Iraq, the inching forward of political stability there, however messy
and fragile, has had relatively little to do with what the United States has
done； or has not done. In fact, improvement in the Iraqi political situation
has, for the most part, occurred despite American actions； not because of
them. One American president destabilized Iraq by toppling its totalitarian
ruler. The next American president further destabilized it by suddenly
withdrawing American troops. Thus, from the anarchy of Iraq after Saddam
Hussein came for a time the tyranny of the Islamic State. It was the
experience of living under the Islamic State that convinced many Sunnis that
they were better off allying with Shiites than with radicals of their own
sect. It is this fact that has given Iraq some measure of hope and stability.
True, American special operations forces helped a moderate Shiite leader
defeat the Islamic State. But this moderate Shiite leader was subsequently
defeated at the polls. In short, Iraq will determine its own destiny,
influenced by Iran, the great power next door. American influence will remain
marginal, whether or not we have any troops there. I say this as someone who
initially supported the invasion of Iraq, which I have come to bitterly
regret.
至於伊拉克，那裡政治穩定的微妙進展著，無論多麼脆弱，都與美國所做的或者還沒有完
成的事情關係不大。事實上，儘管美國採取了行動，但伊拉克政治局勢的改善大部分是自
發的，不是因為美國。一位美國總統通過推翻其極權主義統治者來破壞伊拉克的穩定。下
一任美國總統突然撤軍，進一步破壞了美國軍隊的穩定。因此，在薩達姆侯賽因之後，伊
拉克的無政府狀態一度迎來伊斯蘭國暴政。生活在伊斯蘭國之下的經歷使許多遜尼派相信
他們最好與什葉派結盟，而不是與他們自己教派的激進分子結盟。正是這一事實給了伊拉
克一些希望和穩定的程度。的確，美國特種作戰部隊幫助一名溫和的什葉派領導人擊敗了
伊斯蘭國。但這位溫和的什葉派領導人隨後在民意調查中被擊敗。簡而言之，伊拉克將決
定自己的命運，受到隔壁大國伊朗的影響。無論我們是否在那裡有任何部隊，美國的影響
力仍將是微不足道的。我以一個最初支持入侵伊拉克的人說這些事，我對此深感遺憾。
As for Syria, Bashar al-Assad has reconsolidated power in the only part of
Syria that ultimately counts: its main population centers. Israel, buttressed
by massive American military and economic aid, will be able to deal with the
Iranian presence in Syria on its own. If the Russians want to get bogged down
in Syria for the sake of their decadeslong investment in the Assad family
regime, good luck to them. And by the way, Israel, unlike the United States,
has a workmanlike, albeit problematic, relationship with Russia which it can
employ as a go-between with Iran. The United States benefits very little by
diverting time and resources to Syria.
至於敘利亞，巴沙爾·阿薩德已經重新鞏固了敘利亞唯一最重要的部分：其主要人口中心
。在美國大規模軍事和經濟援助的支持下，以色列將能夠獨自應對伊朗在敘利亞的存在。
如果俄羅斯人為了在阿薩德家族政權上投入數十年而在敘利亞陷入困境，祝他們好運。順
便說一句，與美國不同，以色列與俄羅斯有板有眼的關係雖然存在問題，以色列可以利用
俄羅斯作為與伊朗的中間人。美國將時間和資源分到敘利亞上利益很小。
The United States needs to end its adventures in the Middle East begun
immediately after 9/11. Of course, the Chinese hope we never leave the Middle
East. For if we deliberately defeat ourselves by remaining militarily engaged
in the Middle East, it will only ease China’s path to global supremacy.
Indeed, China would like nothing better than a war between the United States
and Iran. China is already Iran’s largest trading partner and is pouring
tens of billions of dollars into port, canal, and other development projects
in Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, proving how America’s military
involvements in the region have gotten it virtually nowhere.
美國需要在9/11之後立即結束其在中東的活動。當然，中國人希望我們永遠不會離開中東
。因為如果我們通過在軍事上繼續留在中東而故意打敗自己，那只能使中國走向全球霸權
的道路更輕鬆。實際上，沒有什麼比美國和伊朗之間的戰爭是中國更想要的了。中國已經
是伊朗最大的貿易夥伴，正在向埃及和阿拉伯半島的港口，運河和其他發展項目投入數百
億美元，證明美國在該地區的軍事參與幾乎無處可去。
No place in the Muslim Middle East can serve as a litmus test of how we are
doing vis-à-vis China the way that India and Taiwan can. They are the pivots
that will go a long way to determining the strength of the American position
in the Indo-Pacific: the first-among-equals when it comes to global strategic
geography.
穆斯林中東地區的任何地方都比不用我們利用印度和台灣對付中國。它們是確定美國在印
度太平洋地區地位的力量的關鍵所在：在全球戰略地理方面，它是平等的首要因素。
India is not a formal American ally and should not become one. India is too
proud and too geographically close to China for that to be in its interest.
But India, merely on account of its growing demographic, economic and
military heft, along with its location dominating the Indian Ocean, acts as a
natural balancer to China. Therefore, we should do everything we can to
enable the growth of Indian power, without ever even mentioning a formal
alliance with it. An increasingly strong India that gets along with China
while never moving into China’s orbit—and is informally aligned with the
United States—will be a sign that China is contained.
印度不是美國的正式盟友，也不應該成為美國的盟友。印度太驕傲了，地理位置又太靠近
中國，這不符合它的利益。但印度，出於其人口、經濟和軍事實力的不斷增長，以及其在
印度洋的主導地位，對中國來說就像一個天然的平衡器。因此，我們應該在不提及與印度
正式聯盟的同時盡我們所能促進印度實力的增長。一個日益強大的，與中國和睦相處卻未
進入中國軌道，同時又與美國非正式結盟的印度將是一個表明中國受到了遏制的跡象。
Taiwan has been a model ally, a stable and vibrant democracy, and one of the
world’s most prosperous, efficient economies. It is a successful poster
child for the liberal world order that the United States has built and
guaranteed in Asia and Europe since World War II. Richard Nixon and Henry
Kissinger opened relations with China, but did so without endangering Taiwan.
Therefore, if it ever became clear that the United States was both unable and
unwilling to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese military attack on the
island—or that an authoritarian China had consolidated its grip on Taiwan
without the need of such an attack—then it would signal the end of American
strategic dominance in East Asia. Countries from Japan in the north to
Australia in the south would have no choice but to seek compromising security
assurances from China in the event of such an eclipse of American power. This
would be an insidious process often outside the strictures of the news
headlines, but one day we would all wake up and realize that Asia has been
partly Finlandized and the world had changed. Chinese domination of Taiwan
would also, by the way, virtually confirm China’s effective domination of
the South China Sea, which, together, with its port building activities to
the east and west of India, would help give the Chinese navy unimpeded access
to two oceans.
台灣是一個模範盟友，一個穩定和充滿活力的民主國家，也是世界上最繁榮，最有效率的
經濟體之一。它是自第二次世界大戰以來美國在亞洲和歐洲建立和保障的自由世界秩序的
成功典範。理查德尼克森和亨利基辛格與中國建立了關係，但這樣做並沒有危及台灣。因
此，如果美國在中國對該島進行軍事攻擊的情況下既不能也不願意為台灣辯護，或者專制
中國在不需要軍事攻擊的情況下鞏固其對台灣的控制權 - 那麼這將標誌著美國在東亞戰
略統治地位的終結。從北方的日本到南方的澳大利亞的國家別無選擇，只能在美國實力如
此黯淡的情況下妥協，尋求中國的安全保證。這將是一個不常出現在新聞頭條的隱伏的過
程，但總有一天我們都會醒悟並意識到亞洲已部分芬蘭化，世界已發生變化。順便說一句
，中國對台灣的控制也將實際上證實中國對南海的控制是有效的，再加上中國在印度東部
和西部的港口建設活動，將有助於中國海軍暢通無阻地進入兩個大洋。
Grand strategy is about recognizing what is important and what is not
important. I am arguing that, given our goals, India and Taiwan are
ultimately more significant than places like Syria and Afghanistan.
(Regarding Russia, because it is not almost at war with China as it was when
the Nixon administration played the two communist regimes off against each
other, moving closer to Russia now achieves little, though stabilizing our
bilateral relationship is in our interest.)
大戰略就是要認識到什麼是重要的，而什麼是不重要的。我認為，考慮到我們的目標，印
度和台灣最終比敘利亞和阿富汗等地更重要。（關於俄羅斯，它幾乎沒有與中國發生戰爭
，即便尼克森政府曾將兩個共產主義政權導向相互對立。如今和俄羅斯走近幾乎沒有成果
，儘管穩定我們的雙邊關係符合我們的利益。）
Whereas India and Taiwan are greatly affected by American sea power, the
desert immensities of the Middle East are much less so. This is not an
accident, but indicates something crucial. In a century when we will try to
stay out of debilitating land conflicts that require large armies, we are
better off relying on our navy which can project power without dragging us
into bloody wars nearly as much. It is the U.S. Navy that will counter
Chinese power along the semi-circle of the navigable Eurasian rimland, from
the eastern Mediterranean to the Sea of Japan. And with less of a chance of
drifting into costly military conflicts, we will have a better possibility of
healing and invigorating our democracy at home. This is what grand strategy
is fundamentally about.
雖然印度和台灣深受美國海上力量的影響，但中東廣袤無垠的沙漠卻遠非如此。這不是一
個意外，且表明了一些至關重要的事情。在一個我們試圖置身於需要大量軍隊且帶有削弱
性的土地衝突之外的世紀裡，依靠我們的海軍是我們最好的選擇，因為它可以在不把我們
拖入和土地衝突一樣血腥的戰爭的情況下部署力量。美國海軍將在可航行的歐亞邊緣地區
的半圓上成為反擊中國的力量，從地中海東部到日本海。隨著陷入代價高昂的軍事衝突的
機率減少，我們將有更好的機會在國內治癒和振興我們的民主。這就是大戰略的本質。
Grand strategy is not about what we should do abroad. It is about what we
should do abroad consistent with our economic and social condition at home.
大戰略不是關於我們應該在國外做什麼，而是我們應該在國外採取什麼符合我們國內的經
濟和社會條件的戰略。
Now, keep in mind my own, three-year rule. No matter how necessary and
inspiring a military conflict, the American public will only give
policymakers three years to settle it. America’s involvement in World War I
lasted little more than eighteen months. In World War II, United States
troops did not arrive in the Eastern Hemisphere until 1942, and by the Battle
of Okinawa in 1945 there was public clamoring to end the Pacific war (as the
war in Europe had already ended). The Korean War began in 1950 and by 1952
was unpopular, with Eisenhower forced to end it in 1953. American troops
landed in large numbers in Vietnam in 1965 and the public turned against that
war in 1968. The Iraq War was launched in 2003 and the public turned against
it in 2006. We should aim never to test this three-year rule again. (In
Afghanistan, we were able to break the rule only because we brought
casualties down dramatically.) That means keeping a prolonged rivalry with
China nonviolent in terms of blood-cost. We should engage on a number of
fronts: cyber, economic, naval, diplomatic and so on, without open warfare.
This can be achieved by not making a fetish out of the South China Sea. The
U.S.-China relationship is too wide-ranging and organic to be reduced to a
military dispute about one region. Military, trade and other areas of
contention should not be kept in silos, since they can indeed interact.
現在，請記住我的三年規則。無論多麼必要和激勵軍事衝突，美國公眾只會給政策制定者
三年時間來解決它。美國參與第一次世界大戰只持續了18個月。在第二次世界大戰中，美
國軍隊直到1942年才到達東半球，1945年沖繩島戰役迫使公眾吵著要結束太平洋戰爭（因
為歐洲戰爭已經結束）。朝鮮戰爭始於1950年，到1952年不受歡迎，艾森豪威爾於1953年
被迫結束。1965年，美國軍隊大量登陸越南，1968年公眾反對這場戰爭。伊拉克戰爭於
2003年啟動。公眾在2006年反對它。我們應該永遠不要再次測試這個三年規則。 （在阿
富汗，我們能夠打破這一規則只是因為我們大大減少了人員傷亡。）這意味著在流血成本
的計較方面要與中國保持長期的非暴力競爭。我們應該參與多個方面：網絡，經濟，海軍
，外交等，沒有公開戰爭。這可以通過不從南中國海製造迷信來實現。美中關係範圍太廣
，有機，無法解決一個地區的軍事糾紛。軍事，貿易和其他爭論領域不應該保持孤立，因
為它們確實可以相互作用。
To repeat, grand strategy for the United States in the twenty-first century
is, in the end, about restraining from violence in order to concentrate on
the home front, and yet compete with China at the same time: which, in turn,
means recognizing certain geographical imperatives. (Of course, there is also
the realm of ideas: so that it is tragic that President Trump abrogated the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, which as a free-trading alliance would have given
us a big idea to compete with Belt and Road.)
再重複一遍，美國21世紀的大戰略，說到底，是關乎通過遏制暴力來更好地在國內集中精
力，同時與中國競爭。這反過來意味著認識到某些地理要求。 （當然，還有思想領域：
川普總統廢除跨太平洋夥伴關係是悲慘的，因為自由貿易聯盟會給我們一個與“一帶一路
”競爭的好主意。）
For some states and empires, which are victims of geography rather than
blessed by it—Byzantium, Habsburg Austria—grand strategy is a necessity for
survival. Contrarily, America’s geographical blessings have meant it can
incur one disaster after another without paying a commensurate price. But as
technology shrinks distance, enmeshing our continental half-island deeper
into an unstable world, the United States finally becomes truly vulnerable:
meaning it can no longer afford heroic delusions.
對於一些國家和帝國而言，它們是地理學的受害者，而不是受到它的祝福 – 如拜占庭，
奧地利哈布斯堡，大戰略是生存的必需品。相反，美國的地理恩賜意味著它可以在不付出
相應價格的情況下招致一場又一場災難。但隨著技術縮小距離，將我們的大陸半島深深地
融入一個不穩定的世界，美國終於變得真正脆弱：意味著它再也無法承受英雄的妄想。
Consider: during the Cold War we didn’t need to worry about grand strategy
because we already had one. It was called containment. George Kennan eschewed
the hot-headed approach of those in the late-1940s and early-1950s who
believed that it was possible to defeat the Soviet Union by subversion,
special operations forces and other such desperate measures. Kennan
understood that since Soviet Communism was fundamentally flawed as a system
of governance, it would eventually falter and all we had to do was outlast it
(just as we are likely to outlast Communist China if only we are patient).
Thus, blessed by geography for so long, and blessed by a wise and temperate
grand strategy for over four decades, we lost the art of thinking critically
about ourselves, which, once again, is also what grand strategy is ultimately
about.
考慮一下：在冷戰期間，我們不需要擔心大戰略，因為我們已經有了一個：它被稱為遏制
。喬治凱南避開了20世紀40年代末50年代初那些頭腦發熱的方法：即認為有可能通過顛覆
，特種作戰部隊和其他如此絕望的措施來擊敗蘇聯。凱南明白，既然蘇聯共產主義作為一
種治理體系存在根本上的缺陷，它最終會動搖，而我們所要做的就是超越它（正如我們可
能比共產主義中國更耐心，只要我們有耐心）。因此，受地理位置保佑這麼長時間，並且
受到四十年來明智和溫和的大戰略的祝福，我們失去了批判性地思考自己的藝術，這再一
次也是大戰略的最終目的。
Unable to look ourselves in the mirror and see our flaws and limitations, we
concentrated too much on our military, and invaded or intervened in one
Muslim country after another in the 2000s and achieved nothing as a result.
Intervening in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s was successful in stopping
a war, but the creation of ethnic cantons that followed did not lay a
groundwork for the future, and even if it had done so, that would not have
risen to the level of grand strategy given Yugoslavia’s secondary
importance. So we are starting from scratch.
由於我們沒能照照鏡子看到自己的缺點和侷限，導致我們把太多精力集中在了我們的軍隊
上，入侵或干預了一個又一個的穆斯林國家，結果卻一無所獲。在1990年代，我們對前南
斯拉夫的干預成功阻止了戰爭，但隨後創建民族州時卻沒有為未來奠定一個好的基礎。而
即使它這麼做，出於南斯拉夫的次要地位，它也不會上升到大戰略的層面。所以我們要從
零開始。
Starting from scratch means realizing that however inspiring the dreams of
our elite are, those dreams will be stillborn if not grounded in both
granular, local realities around the world and widespread public support at
home that spans party lines—and that must be sustained over the long-term.
We must be respectful of local realities, whether in Wyoming or Afghanistan.
從零開始就意味著要意識到，無論我們精英階層的夢想有多麼的鼓舞人心，若這些夢想沒
有建基於世界各地的實際情況以及美國人民跨越黨派界限，廣泛且長期的公眾支持，那這
些夢想必將胎死腹中。無論是在懷俄明州還是在阿富汗，我們都必須尊重當地的實際情況
。
--
※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc), 來自: 129.110.242.26 (美國)
※ 文章網址: https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/IA/M.1563057764.A.E48.html
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