[資訊] 美國非它自認為的強大

看板IA作者kwei (光影)時間5年前 (2019/05/17 21:20)推噓5(5推 0噓 8→)

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America Isn’t as Powerful as It Thinks It Is 美國非它自認為的強大原文：Foreign policy https://tinyurl.com/y2z5s45b 譯文：觀察者網 https://www.guancha.cn/StephenMWalt/2019_05_17_501954.shtml STEPHEN M. WALT 斯蒂芬‧沃爾特哈佛國際關係學教授 Just how powerful is the United States? Is it still the unipolar power, able to impose its will on adversaries, allies, and neutrals, and force them— however reluctantly—to go along with policies they think are foolish, dangerous, or simply contrary to their interests? Or are there clear and significant limits to U.S. power, suggesting that it should be more selective and strategic in setting goals and pursuing them? 美國到底有多強大？它是否仍然是一個有能力將其意志強加給對手、盟友和中立國，並迫使他們無論多麼不情願都必須去執行那些儘管他們認為是愚蠢、危險或與他們自身的利益完全相悖的政策的單極力量？還是說，美國的實力其實已經受到了明確而嚴重的限制，以至於美國在設定和實現自己的目標時將變得更具選擇性和戰略性呢？ The Trump administration has embraced the first position, especially since John Bolton became White House national security advisor and Mike Pompeo took over as secretary of state. Whatever President Donald Trump’s initial instincts may have been, their arrival marked a return to the unilateralist, take-no-prisoners approach to foreign policy that characterized George W. Bush ’s first term as president, when Vice President Dick Cheney and the neoconservatives held sway. A key feature of that earlier period was the assumption that the United States was so powerful that it could go it alone on many issues and that other states could be cowed into submission by demonstrations of U.S. power and resolve. As a senior advisor to Bush (reportedly Karl Rove) told the journalist Ron Suskind: “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.” Compromises and coalition-building were for wimps and appeasers; as Cheney himself reportedly said in 2003: “We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it.” 川普政府接受了前一種說法，尤其是在約翰‧博爾頓（John Bolton）成為白宮國家安全事務助理以及邁克‧蓬佩奧（Mike Pompeo）接任國務卿之後。無論川普總統最初的本意是什麼，他們的到來都標誌著美國外交政策向喬治‧w‧布希第一個總統任期時的單邊主義、不妥協的外交政策回歸，當時掌權的是副總統迪克‧錢尼（Dick Cheney）和新保守主義者。那個時期的一個重要特徵是，人們認為美國非常強大，美國可以在許多問題上按照自己的意願去行事，而其他國家都會被美國所展示的力量和決心所壓倒。布希的高級顧問（據報導是卡爾‧羅夫）就曾告訴一位名叫羅恩‧蘇斯金德的記者：“我們是一個帝國，當我們行動時，我們創造了我們自己的現實”。妥協和聯盟建設是懦弱者和綏靖者的事，正如錢尼2003年在報導中所說的那樣：“我們不會與邪惡的一方談判，我們將擊敗他們 ”。 The Bush-Cheney approach produced a string of failures, but the same unilateral arrogance lives on in the Trump administration. It is evident in Trump’s decision to threaten (or in some cases, to actually begin) trade wars not just with China but with many of America’s economic partners. It was part and parcel of the impulsive decisions to abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership and leave the Paris climate accord. It is the basis of the administration’s “take it or leave it” approach to diplomacy with North Korea and Iran, wherein Washington announces unrealistic demands and then ratchets up sanctions in the hope that the targets will capitulate and give the United States everything it wants, even though this approach to both countries has repeatedly failed in the past. It is even more obvious in the recent decision to impose secondary sanctions on states that are still buying Iranian oil, a move that threatens to drive up oil prices and damage U.S. relations with China, India, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and others. It is almost certainly true of the so-called peace plan that nepotist-in-chief Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and senior advisor, keeps promising to reveal, a proposal likely to make Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Republican donor Sheldon Adelson, and other fans of the concept of Greater Israel happy but won’t advance the cause of peace in the slightest. A similar faith in America’s vast ability to control outcomes can also be seen in the premature recognition of Juan Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela and the strident U.S. demands that “Maduro must go.” However desirable that outcome would be, it would be nice if we had some idea how to bring it about. 布希和錢尼的做法導致美國遭遇了一系列失敗，然而川普政府仍然延續著同樣的單邊傲慢心態。這種傲慢明顯地體現在川普對中國以及中國以外的許多美國經濟夥伴做出的貿易戰威脅的決定中。放棄跨太平洋夥伴關係協定（TPP）並退出巴黎氣候協定都是這種衝動決定的結果。這種單邊傲慢心理是美國政府對朝鮮和伊朗實施“要麼接受要麼挨揍”外交政策的基礎。在這種外交政策下，華盛頓對這兩個國家提出一些不切實際的要求，然後加大制裁力度，希望這兩個國家能夠投降，給美國一切想要的東西。然而這種對待這兩個國家的做法在過去屢遭失敗。這種單邊傲慢心態在美國最近的一項對仍在購買伊朗石油的國家實施制裁的決定中體現得更加明顯，這一舉動可能導致油價上漲，並損害美國與中國、印度、土耳其、日本和韓國等國家之間的關係。幾乎可以肯定的是，川普的女婿兼高級顧問賈裡德‧庫什納一直承諾要披露的所謂和平計畫提議，也許會讓以色列總理內塔尼亞胡、共和黨捐款人謝爾頓‧阿德爾森和其他“大以色列”概念的支持者們感到高興，但是卻不會對推動和平事業的發展有絲毫用處。從美國政府對胡安‧瓜伊多（Juan Guaid）作為委內瑞拉臨時總統的過早承認以及“馬杜羅必須下台”的咄咄逼人的強硬要求中，我們也可以看到美國對自己具有控制結果的強大力量充滿了信心。 The underlying assumption behind all of these policies is that U.S. pressure— you know, what Pompeo likes to call “swagger”—will eventually force acknowledged adversaries to do whatever it is the United States demands of them, and that other states won’t find ways to evade, obstruct, divert, dilute, hedge, hinder, or otherwise negate what Washington is trying to do. It assumes we are still dwelling in the unipolar moment and that all that matters is the will to use the power at America’s disposal. 所有這些政策背後的基本假設都是：在美國的壓力下，其對手將被迫去做美國要求它做的任何事情，而且其他國家將無法找到任何辦法逃避、阻撓、妨礙、轉移、稀釋、對沖或以其他方式否定華盛頓正在做的事情。它假定我們仍然生活在單極時代，按照美國的意願來使用權力是這個世界上唯一重要的事情。 Perhaps most important, this approach denies that there are any real trade-offs between any of these objectives. If the United States is really all-powerful, then sanctioning China over oil purchases from Iran won’t have any impact on the trade talks that are now underway with Beijing, and Turkey won’t respond to the same pressure by moving closer to Russia. It further assumes that America’s NATO allies are so desperate to keep the U.S. military in Europe that they will accept repeated humiliations and follow the U.S. lead against China, despite the growing evidence that this is not the case. It sees no downsides to going all-in with Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf, and it sees little risk should relations with Iran or others escalate to war. 也許最重要的一點在於，美國的這種心態否認有任何真正意義上的交易存在。如果美國果真是全能的，那麼在伊朗購買石油問題上制裁中國將不會對目前正在與北京進行的貿易談判產生任何影響，而且土耳其也不會採用與俄羅斯走得更近的方式來回應美國在同樣問題上的壓力。持有上述心態的美國人還認為，美國的北約盟友是如此迫切地希望美國軍隊留在歐洲，以至於他們願意接受美國再三的羞辱，並跟隨美國的腳步去對抗中國（儘管越來越多的證據表明，實際情況並非如此）。他們不認為把寶壓在埃及、以色列、沙特阿拉伯和海灣地區身上會有什麼壞處，也不認為與伊朗或其他國家的關係升級為戰爭會帶來什麼風險。 To be fair, it is not hard to understand why hawks think they can get away with this approach to foreign policy, at least in the short term. Despite many recent missteps, the United States is still very powerful. Its active assistance is still something that some other states want, and its “focused enmity” is something no state can completely ignore. The United States is still a vast and valuable market, the dollar remains the world’s main reserve currency, and the ability to cut other states or financial institutions off from the infrastructure of global finance gives Washington unusual leverage. Many U.S. allies are accustomed to deferring to Washington and are understandably reluctant to do anything that might encourage the United States to withdraw support. Trump and company can also count on the support of authoritarian soul mates in the European right (including the present rulers in Poland and Hungary), as well as America’s morally compromised allies in the Middle East. Plus, most Americans don’t care all that much about foreign policy and are usually willing to go along with whatever the executive branch is doing, provided that it doesn’t prove too costly or embarrassing. 說實話，其實也不難理解為什麼美國鷹派人士會認為他們可以用這種方式來處理外交政策。因為儘管美國最近有許多失誤，但美國仍然是非常強大的。它的積極援助仍然是其他一些國家所需要的，它的“敵意”也是任何國家都不能完全忽視的。美國仍然是一個巨大而有價值的市場，美元仍然是世界上主要的儲備貨幣，美國切斷其他國家或金融機構與全球金融基礎設施之間的聯繫的能力，賦予了美國非同尋常的影響力。許多美國盟友習慣於順從華盛頓，不願做任何可能導致美國不再對其給予支持的事情，這些都是可以理解的。川普和他的同路人還可以依靠歐洲右翼威權主義靈魂伴侶（包括波蘭和匈牙利的現任統治者）以及美國在中東的盟友的支持。大多數美國人對外交政策並不那麼在意，他們通常願意接受行政部門正在做的任何事情，只要能證明這樣做的代價不會太高或者不會顯得太愚蠢。 Nonetheless, there are even more potent reasons why this bullying approach has produced no major foreign-policy successes so far and is unlikely to yield significant success in the future. First of all, even much weaker states are loath to succumb to blackmail, for one very good reason: Once you’ ve shown you can be coerced, there may be no end to subsequent demands. Moreover, when the United States insists on complete capitulation (i.e., by calling for total North Korean disarmament or regime change in Iran), it gives the target state zero incentive to comply. And given Trump’s amply demonstrated dishonesty and fickle approach to diplomacy, why would any foreign leader believe any assurances he (or Pompeo) might give? Put all this together, and you have a perfect recipe for “no deal.” 儘管如此，還有更為有力的理由能夠解釋為何這種具有威脅意味的外交手段迄今為止並沒有取得重大成功，而且也不太可能在未來取得成功。首先，即使是實力非常弱小的國家，也不願在威脅面前屈服。原因在於，一旦你表現出願意在威脅下屈服的跡象，接下來的要求可能就沒有止境了。此外，當美國堅持一個國家應該徹底投降時，比如美國呼籲朝鮮全面解除武裝或者要求伊朗政權更迭時，這些國家實際上完全沒有任何服從的動力。此外，鑑於川普在外交上的不誠信和反覆無常，外國領導人為何還要相信他（或蓬佩奧）可能給出的任何保證呢？ Second, bullying nearly everyone makes it much harder construct powerful coalitions whose support can enhance America’s diplomatic leverage. This problem is perhaps most apparent in the administration’s haphazard approach to economic diplomacy with China. By leaving the Trans-Pacific Partnership and picking trade fights with other key partners, the administration missed an opportunity to organize a broad coalition of industrial powers united by a desire to get China to reform its own economic practices. Trump’s trade team may still get some sort of deal with Beijing, but it won’t be as good as what they could have achieved with a more sophisticated and cooperative effort. 其次，美國對幾乎所有國家都進行威脅，這使美國建立強大的聯盟變得更加困難，而來自這些聯盟的支持能夠增強美國的外交影響力。這一問題在美國政府對華經濟外交的隨意性中可能體現得最為明顯。由於退出《跨太平洋夥伴關係協定》，並針對其他主要夥伴挑起貿易爭端，美國政府錯過了建立一個由工業大國組成的廣泛聯盟以迫使中國對自身經濟進行改革的機會。 Much the same lesson applies to Iran. The Trump administration deliberately set out to kill the Iran nuclear deal, and it did it in plain sight. It is so focused on this goal that it is even willing to punish the other signatories in a vain attempt to get Iran to say uncle. Tehran has continued to abide by the terms of the agreement despite Washington’s reneging on the deal, but its patience is probably not infinite, especially when the administration has made it clear that regime change is its real objective. Should Iran eventually restart its nuclear weapons program—which has been in abeyance for more than a decade—the rest of the world is not going to suddenly line up behind the United States and support more forceful action. Why? Because everyone knows that it was the United States—not Iran—that killed the deal, and there won’t be a ton of sympathy for America when it starts bleating about Iran’s response. America’s Middle East clients will no doubt be happy if Washington decides to fight another war on their behalf, but don’t count on a lot of help from them or from anyone else. 同樣的教訓也來自伊朗。川普政府有意扼殺伊朗核協議，這是顯而易見的。它如此專注於這一目標，以至於它甚至願意懲罰其他簽署國，徒勞地試圖讓伊朗屈服。儘管華盛頓背棄了協議，但德黑蘭仍在繼續遵守協議的條款，但它的耐心不是無限的，尤其是當美國政府明確表示政權更迭才是美國的真正目的的時候。如果伊朗最終重新啟動這個已經擱置了十多年的核武器計畫，世界上其他國家將不會突然站到美國一邊並支持其採取更有力的行動。原因何在呢？因為每個國家都知道是美國而不是伊朗扼殺了這項協議，所以當美國開始指責伊朗的反應時，也不會有很多國家對美國表示同情。對於美國的中東客戶而言，如果華盛頓決定代表他們再打一場戰爭，他們無疑會感到非常高興，但不要指望他們或其他任何國家會為此提供太多幫助。 Third, other states don’t like being beholden to the whims of others, and especially when others behave selfishly, erratically, and with ill-disguised contempt for others’ interests. Not surprisingly, therefore, other states are starting to develop workarounds designed to limit U.S. leverage, most notably by designing financial arrangements outside the network of institutions that Washington has been using to coerce allies and adversaries into compliance. As Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman recently wrote in FP, “ instead of leading states and businesses to minimize contact with the targets of U.S. sanctions,” the Trump administration’s strong-arm tactics “may lead states and businesses to minimize their contact with the U.S.-led global financial system and to start to construct their own workarounds. Over time, those workarounds might even begin to accumulate into an effective alternative system.” 第三，所有的國家都不願意接受他國的擺佈，尤其是當這個試圖擺佈別國的國家表現得自私、反覆無常，並且毫不掩飾地蔑視他國利益的時候。因此，其他國家開始制定旨在限制美國影響力的變通方案也就不足為奇了，他們會在華盛頓一直用來迫使盟國和對手們屈服的金融機構網絡之外設計全新的金融安排。正如亨利‧法雷爾（Henry Farrell）和亞伯拉罕‧紐曼（Abraham Newman）最近在《外交政策》雜誌中所提到的：“川普政府的強硬策略可能並不會導致各個國家和企業與美國製裁目標國家接觸的減少，反而可能導致各個國家和企業儘量減少與美國領導的全球金融體系的接觸，並逐漸推出他們自己的解決方案。隨著時間的推移，這些變通方法甚至可能開始形成一個有效的替代體系”。 Lastly, being a bully encourages adversaries to join forces out of their own self-interest, while giving potential allies more reason to keep their distance. It is no accident that Russia and China continue to move closer together—even though they are not natural allies, and a smarter U.S. approach could give Moscow reasons to distance itself from Beijing—and America’s same bullying impulses are going to push states like Iran even closer to them. Bolton and those of his ilk will probably come up with some trite new moniker for this group—“Axis of Evil” and “Troika of Tyranny” are taken, so perhaps “Triad of Troublemakers” or “Coalition of Chaos”— ignoring the fact that their own policies have helped push these powers together. 最後，恃強凌弱的手段只會刺激對手出於自身利益的考量而聯合起來，同時也給潛在盟友更多的理由與其保持距離。俄羅斯和中國持續走近絕非偶然。中俄兩國本來並非天然的盟友，如果美國採取更明智的做法，也許會讓莫斯科有理由與北京保持距離。但如果美國採取同樣的具有威脅性的衝動做法，它將會把像伊朗這樣的國家也推向中俄兩國。博爾頓和他的同僚們可能會給這個前述組織起一些比如“邪惡軸心”和“暴政三駕馬車”之類的老套的綽號，因此，或許“麻煩製造者三人組”或“混亂聯盟”忽略了一個事實，是他們自己的政策幫助推動了這些力量的結合。 What we are witnessing, therefore, is a real-world test of two competing visions of contemporary geopolitics. One version sees U.S. power as essentially undiminished and believes that a combination of material capabilities, favorable geography, and entrenched institutional capabilities will allow it to pursue an ambitious and revisionist foreign policy at little cost and with a high probability of success. The second version—to which I subscribe—sees the United States as very powerful and in a privileged position (for various reasons) but also believes there are limits to U.S. power and that it is necessary to set priorities, minimize trade-offs when possible, and collaborate with others on many issues. It also assumes that others cannot be browbeaten into abject capitulation and that effective and durable international agreements require a degree of mutual compromise, even with adversaries. 因此，我們正在目睹的是對當代地緣政治下兩種相互競爭的觀點的現實考驗。其中一種觀點認為，美國的實力基本上沒有減弱，並相信美國的物質能力、有利的地理位置和牢固的制度能力的結合，將使它能夠以很小的代價和很高的成功幾率推行其野心勃勃的修正主義外交政策。第二種（同時也是我贊同的）觀點認為，美國是非常強大的，出於多種原因，美國處於特權地位；但該觀點也認為，美國的權力是有限的，美國必須設定待解決事項的優先次序，並在許多問題上與其他國家合作。這種觀點還強調，其他國家不可能因受到脅迫就卑躬屈膝，有效和持久的國際協議需要一定程度的相互妥協，即便與敵對國家之間也是如此。 The United States tested Version #1 from 2001 to 2004, and the results were a near-total failure. I realize that trying to replicate past results is important to scientific progress, but does America really need to repeat this particular experiment again? 美國從2001年到2004年測試了第一種觀點，結果幾乎是完全失敗。我知道，努力複製過去的結果對於科學進步來說十分重要，但美國真地需要再次重複這個特別的實驗嗎？ -- ※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc), 來自: 223.136.24.235 ※ 文章網址: https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/IA/M.1558099213.A.FE3.html

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