[編譯] 內戰迷霧(Foreign Policy)
The Fog of Civil War
foreignpolicy.com
Stephen Starr
July 23rd, 2012
In Jdaydieh Artouz, a town 11 miles southwest of Damascus that is home to a
mix of Sunnis, Christians, and Alawites, protests have been taking place
almost daily for well over a year. Yet the security forces, centered at a
police station a few hundred yards up the street from where the protesters
regularly gather, have largely ignored them. One wet, cold January night
while out to pick up some sharwama sandwiches, I watched cars with Bashar
al-Assad's face emblazoned across the rear window pass within inches of the
indomitable demonstrators. Neither side appeared perturbed. With the
exception of isolated incidents in which several protesters were killed, the
town remained peaceful throughout the uprising -- that is until Thursday,
July 19, when rebel fightersfired RPGs at the police station, killing five
officers.
這一年來,在Jdaydieh Artouz這個位於大馬士革西南方11公里,住著遜尼派、阿勒維派
教徒與基督徒等居民的小鎮,示威活動幾乎天天登場。然而主要駐紮在距示威地點數百碼
警察局的政府軍,這段時間以來對此往往是視而不見。在那又冷又濕的一月某天晚上,我
親眼看到一台車,把正燒著的阿塞德肖像架在後窗,呼嘯駛過那群立場堅定的示威群眾們
。然而衝突雙方都不為所動。除了少數示威者在特定事件中遭到殺害,大體上這個小鎮在
這場目前局勢影響下還算相安無事--直到七月十九日星期四那天,叛軍用火箭推進榴彈(
Rocket Propelled Grenades, RPGs)把警察局轟了,還殺了五名安全武力官員。
Living in this town for the first 11 months of the uprising, I tried, and
failed, to get articles published questioning why the regime tolerated
protests or allowed free assembly in some areas, but not others. These
incidents didn't fit the narrative that all protests were being violently
quashed. The majority, of course, were -- and often brutally -- but the full
picture was unnervingly complex.
在敘利亞動亂起初十一個月,我曾試著發表我的文章,懷疑當局在特定區域大肆鎮壓,但
為何在特定區域容許示威行動或集會發生(譯註:如頭段所述小鎮)--當然後來我失敗了
。這些事件並不符合一般大家所熟知得:「所有示威都遭到強力鎮壓」論述,當然敘利亞
大部分地區都有血腥鎮壓情事發生,但這場動亂的完整圖像恐怕是更為複雜。
Yet because anti-regime activists succeeded where I did not, the story of
Jdaydieh Artouz has been distorted, almost beyond recognition. Hundreds of
videos uploaded to YouTube present the outside world with the idea that the
town was in open rebellion, that it was united in its opposition to the
Syrian government.
不過反對派人士成功完成我作不到的:他們把Jdaydieh Artouz小鎮的故事「加工」後並
公開,扭曲的程度超乎我的理解。數以百計得影片上傳到Youtube,呈現出這個小鎮曾處
於公然叛亂狀態,而已經被反叛軍所成功統一這樣的景象。
But ask the Christian, Shiite, and Druze families whom I lived among in
Jdaydieh if they support the revolution, and the vast majority will answer,
in private, that they do not. Today, Christians fear that their churches will
be tightly controlled by what would likely be a conservative Sunni
government, should the rebellion succeed. They wonder if women will be told
how to dress.
但問問我那些過去一起住在那小鎮的基督教、什葉派與德魯茲(Druze)派家庭,「你們支
持革命嗎?」,大部分都會偷偷都說,「不」。現在,如果叛軍一舉成功,基督徒害怕他
們的教堂被未來可能執政的保守遜尼派政府牢牢控制,包括女性穿著也是如此。
In Jdaydieh, as in many other towns and villages around Syria, beer, vodka,
and spirits can be bought on street-corner kiosks day or night; Christians
can openly mark their religious feasts by marching up and down central city
streets. They value the liberties associated with -- and, in their words,
"allowed by" -- Assad's rule. Broadly, they are not part of this revolt.
在Jdaydieh小鎮,如同其他敘利亞的小鎮與村落,你隨時可以在路旁報亭買到啤酒、伏特
加與雪碧;基督徒在這能夠在公開遊行,慶祝他們的宗教慶典,他們把這樣的自由,歸功
於阿塞德政權(他們稱為「允許」)。大體上,這些少數派並不屬於這場動亂任何一方。
But it is not only minorities who fear change. The new middle class of
Syrians who hold banking jobs, drive $15,000 cars, and are raising young
families feels threatened by the revolt. Many in this group of nouveau riche
clearly fear losing the privileges they have gained and enjoyed during
Assad's reign. Peace and prosperity, for them, is a Syria before March 2011.
而他們並不是唯一害怕革命的少數分子。敘利亞內部一群新中產階級感受到革命的威脅--
他們在銀行工作,開著價值15000美金的車子,撫養他們剛成立的家庭。許多這類「暴發
戶」害怕失去他們現在在阿塞德政權底下所享有的特權。對他們來說,在2011年3月前的
敘利亞(譯註:敘利亞革命開端),是和平與繁榮的。
The difficulties of reporting in Syria -- particularly in the areas outside
Damascus -- are obvious. Many noted reporters paid the ultimate price.
(Following an assignment last February to an area in eastern Damascus that
had seen clashes between rebels and the Syrian army, I chose to leave the
country. I had reported the shocking scenes I witnessed there and was growing
paranoid that I might suffer the consequences of my trip.)
在敘利亞進行報導(特別在大馬士革)的難處相當顯而易見,許多知名記者也為此付出代
價。(在去年二月被派往東大馬士革,我得以觀察雙方衝突,但最後我選擇離開這個國家
。當時我報導我所目睹的那些令人震驚的畫面,另外這段旅程的副作用--逐漸加重的偏執
症狀--也讓我深深為此所苦)
While living in Syria, I never risked traveling to Homs or Daraa, two of the
cities hit hardest by Assad's forces, for fear of being deported -- the fate
of many other journalists covering the conflict. As a result, much of Syria
remained a black hole for me. I could hear the sound of shells landing in the
farmlands around my apartment, but their dull thud carried with them little
information about what was happening outside the city.
當住在敘利亞時,我從不覺得往荷姆斯與德拉(譯註:敘利亞動亂兩座政府軍鎮壓最力的
城市)是件大不了的事,更不用說會因此被驅逐出境了(但這卻是許多其他記者的命運)
。現在,許多敘利亞地區的狀況隊我來說就像是黑洞一樣:我能聽得到我公寓附近,轟炸
農田的聲音,但對那些在發生城外隱隱約約的砲擊聲,卻是一無所知。
Even in the microcosm of Damascus, it was not easy to get a bead on what was
going on: People's perspectives inevitably warped their understanding of
events. I regularly entered towns around the capital, guarded by government
checkpoints, where Sunnis protested and minority groups cowered in fear. My
contacts in these towns, all from minority groups, spoke of quietly taking
whiskey and food to the security forces manning the regime's checkpoints;
they passed on intelligence information; they fully supported the government.
即使在大馬士革,想知道一丁點當前局勢資訊都是困難重重:人們不可避免地在他們看法
中加入個人對事件的扭曲理解。我一如往常進入首都附近城鎮,接受政府檢查站保護,而
外頭遜尼派示威者抗議著,裡頭少數團體為此所懼。我在這些城鎮的線民全都來自於少數
團體,談到他們悄悄把酒與食物遞給那些駐紮在檢查站的政府軍;還傳送情報資訊,他們
完全支持阿塞德政府。
The truth gets muddled when media outlets are forced to resort to YouTube
videos to tell the world what's happening inside Syria. Though often
authentic, such video clips are extremely difficult to verify. Most
damningly, though, they lack the nuance afforded by context -- something that
can only be achieved by reporters on the ground. Yet it is activists' videos
appearing on television stations around the world that have shaped our
thinking and opinions on Syria. The conflict becomes black and white when
viewed through such a lens: Assad's regime is wrong and the rebels are right.
The truth, of course, is more complicated than that.
當媒體必須透過Youtube,來告知世界這裡發生了什麼事,真相也愈來愈一塌糊塗。雖然
這些影片通常都是真的,但要辨別這些剪輯後片段是相當困難的。更糟的是,這些剪輯後
的片段,往往讓人無法判別與各自影片脈絡上的微妙差異,而這些工作正是記者要去辨認
的。這些片段被叛軍在全世界各大電視臺上不斷播放,並且形成我們對敘利亞局勢的看法
。在這些有色眼鏡觀察下,這場衝突變得黑白分明:阿塞德錯了,叛軍才是對的。當然,
真相絕對遠遠地複雜的多。
Another significant challenge faced by reporters in Syria is that either they
must take the official route -- seeking a visa from the Syrian government and
resigning themselves to a choreographed charade that makes the regime out to
be a victim of bloodthirsty terrorists -- or they must cross illegally from
Turkey or Lebanon with the aid of rebel forces.
其他想前往敘利亞的記者們更面臨一項挑戰,要不接受官方限制(取得敘利亞簽證,迫使
他們必須把敘利亞政府描繪成恐怖主義下的受害者)要不在叛軍協助下透過土耳其與黎巴
嫩邊境進入敘利亞。
Contrary to reports, the Syrian government is allowing foreign journalists to
enter the country. Teams from Fox News and Britain's ITV television were
recently granted 10-day visas to cover Syria from the capital. Many of these
journalists are reporting from the bedsides of wounded regime soldiers and
have remarked that Syria is, in fact, a divided country and that significant
support does exist for the regime. But the limitations on official reporting
are manifold. Government minders place restrictions on travel and contact
with locals, making it difficult to report anything that does not fit the
regime's narrative.
和以往報導不同地,敘利亞政府允許外國記者進入境內。來自福斯新聞網與英國ITV的新
聞團隊最近獲得十天簽證得以在首都進行採訪,報導內容包括政府軍傷患,並描述敘利亞
在事實上成了一個分裂國家,而支持政府的力量依然堅定。但是記者們仍面臨來自當局的
重重關卡,政府陪同採訪的官員讓他們與當地人的接觸受到限制,任何報導內容都難以逃
脫政府論述範疇。
Embedding with the rebels, who are equally eager to present themselves as
victims rather than aggressors, invites similar hurdles in accessing the
truth. But the rebels are a complicated bunch. Elizabeth Palmer, a journalist
with CBS, recently managed to escape her government minders and go in search
of fighters in the Free Syrian Army. When she found them, however, she was
promptly told that she would be executed for having Syrian government stamps
in her passport. Others covering events in the countryside have reported
insurgents to have been a menace.
對於叛軍而言,他們也希望自己在外界能表現出受害者而非加害者的形象,同樣面臨外界
如何理解真相的難題。但叛軍這群人組成更加複雜,CBS記者Elizabeth Palmer最近成功
逃離政府監視以尋找敘利亞自由軍,但當她找到他們,這位記者被告知因為她的護照上有
敘利亞政府的戳記必須處死,其他鄉間採訪也指出叛亂份子所帶來的威脅與恐嚇。
Because of obstacles to reporting on Syria from the inside, we hear little of
what Aleppo's large Armenian community thinks. We don't fully understand why
Syria's Ismailis are the only minority to actively support the revolt.
Latakia, on the northwest coast, is home to the highest Alawite population of
any city in Syria -- but we don't know where they see themselves in a future
Syria. Few journalists have attempted to speak to civilians in remote parts
of the country. And articles that explore small-town idiosyncrasies are all
too rare.
由於當局對新聞報導所設立的阻礙,我們幾乎聽不到在阿勒波市裡最大亞美尼亞族裔在想
什麼,我們也完全不瞭解為什麼敘利亞裡的伊斯瑪儀派會是唯一支持叛軍的少數族裔。
Latakia這座位於西北岸的城市,擁有敘利亞最多的阿勒維教派人口,但我們不知道未來
敘利亞哪兒有他們的容身之處?幾乎沒有記者試著與遙遠的平民對話,而探討那些小鎮故
事的文章又少之又少。
Today, the regime is openly espousing sectarianism (for example, it has
supplied weapons to Alawites living in the Mezzah 86 area of Damascus), but
so too are Sunni civilians who back the revolt. Alawite civilians in Syria
are being murdered for no other reason than their religion. In one case, a
female Alawite schoolteacher was singled out on a social media website and
later killed. (Her death was celebrated on Facebook hate pages that were
later taken down.) One Syrian working in the international press told me that
Sunnis and Alawites can no longer live together, that some Alawites should be
pushed back to the mountains of western Syria.
今日,當局已經公開擁抱宗派思維(例如他們提供武器給住在大馬士革Mezzah86區的阿勒
維教派),但那些立即往叛軍靠攏的遜尼派人民也是如此。敘利亞的阿勒維平民被謀殺的
原因無他,就是教派之爭。其中一位女性阿勒維教派學校教師被社群媒體網站挑出,隨後
即遭到殺害(他的死亡在臉書某個頁面上立即被公開慶祝,但隨即被取下)。一位在國際
通訊社工作的敘利亞人表示,遜尼派與阿勒維派再也無法共處一室了,而後者應該後退到
敘利亞西方的山上。
In the midst of recent fighting in Damascus, activists asked for God to
elevate the city to the status given to Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. I
wonder what Syria's Druzes and Christians think of this. I also wonder what
Sunnis think of the Christians who quietly root for the regime to wipe out
the protesters.
在最近大馬士革衝突中,示威者向神請求將大馬士革提高為如同麥加、麥地那與耶路撒冷
一般地位。我很想知道在敘利亞的德魯茲教徒與基督徒對此作何感想,以及遜尼派如何看
待那群悄悄支持當局鎮壓行動的基督徒。
But there is an even deeper division opening up in Syria that has been
overlooked because of the difficulties of reporting the conflict. It is the
division between the activists and rebels who are hammering away at the Assad
regime and those who simply want a quiet life -- regardless of who is in
government. The complexity of the situation was perhaps best summed up by a
28-year-old dentist I spoke to in Damascus last January: "We hate the regime,
but we want peace," he said more than once. "The regime is better than civil
war."
但敘利亞內部面臨更深刻的分裂,且因為衝突局勢中報導困難而遭到忽略:也就是示威者
或叛軍,以及那些不論誰當權只想平靜生活的人,之間的裂痕。 當前局勢的複雜性,有
一位28歲的牙醫描述得好,「我們痛恨這個政府,但我們要的是和平」他不斷重複:「維
持當前政權比陷入內戰還好。」
The complicated nature of the Syrian conflict, coupled with the obstacles
faced by reporters, has favored a simplistic portrayal of events. But the
reality is that many Syrians back neither the regime nor the revolt. They are
Syria's silent majority, and they will likely pay a heavy price for the
uprising that has been billed as a showdown between good and evil. The Assad
regime instigated this revolt -- it chose guns over dialogue -- but its
legacy of divisiveness has since taken on a life of its own. Too often now,
it is Syrians killing Syrians, but reading the news you might never know.
敘利亞衝突的複雜性,以其記者採訪所面對阻礙,成就現在對局勢過度簡化的圖像。但真
實情況是,許多敘利亞人--敘利亞的沉默多數--兩邊都不想支持,但他們將為這場即將攤
牌的「正邪之戰」付出代價。雖然阿塞德當局挑起叛亂(他們選擇鎮壓而不是對話),但
分裂的命運卻因此加諸在敘利亞人身上。現在,敘利亞人正自相殘殺著,但讀著新聞的我
們卻可能一點都不瞭解。
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/23/the_fog_of_civil_war
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