Re: Default password hash

Damian Weber <dweber@htw-saarland.de> writes:
> *collision* attacks are relatively easy these days, but against 1 MD5,=20
> not against 1000 times MD5

I'm not talking about collision attacks, I'm talking about brute-forcing
hashes.

> there is a NIST hash competition running, the winner will soon be announc=
ed
> (and it won't be SHA256 or SHA512 ;-)
> http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/timeline.html
> so my suggestion would be to use all of the finalists - especially
> the winner - for password hashing
>     * BLAKE
>     * Gr=C3=B8stl=20
>     * JH
>     * Keccak
>     * Skein
> see, for example, http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/sha3_010511.cfm

There's a world of difference between switching the default to an
algorithm we already support and which is widely used by other operating
systems, and switching to a completely knew and untested algorithm.

DES
--=20
Dag-Erling Sm=C3=B8rgrav - des@des.no
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