[演講]6/17認知神經科學跨領域整合之進展研討會

看板Cognitive作者 (沒暱稱)時間13年前 (2012/06/12 16:11), 編輯推噓0(000)
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大家好: 這個禮拜日(6/17)會有幾場演講。是一個整天的活動, 有關於整合型認知神經科學的進展,地點在陽明大學活動中心第三會議室, 議程請見下列網址。不需事先報名,歡迎參加。 http://www.tacp.url.tw/download/other/1010604.JPG
另外,星期日研討會的其中一位講者 Joe Kable, 於本週四(6/14)在 台灣大學社科院第28教室有一場和neuroeconomics有關的演講,演講內容詳見如下。 --- In the upcoming neuroeconomics colloquium series, we invite Professor Joseph Kable from the University of Pennsylvania. The series will include two talks. The first talk will be held at the Department of Economics, National Taiwan University (6/14, Thurs, 1:30pm). The second talk, which is co-organized with the Symposium on Integrative Cognitive Neuroscience, will be held at National Yang-Ming University (6/17, Sun, 2:45pm). Please see more detailed information below. About Joe Kable: Dr. Kable studies how people make decisions, and the psychological and neural mechanisms of choice. His approach was highly interdisciplinary and combines methods and ideas from social and cognitive neuroscience, experimental economics, and personality psychology. His postdoctoral work with Paul Glimcher on the neural computations of subjective value was highly influential (Kable & Glimcher, 2007, Nature Neuroscience) and was the first study that systematically and quantitatively characterized the mapping between individual preferences and patterns of neural activity in decision-related neural systems. More recently, Dr. Kable’s research has expanded to studying changes in people’s preferences and associated neural mechanisms, a fascinating new topic. For example, he is interested in distinguishing the kinds of decision making that are more stable and more trait-like, from the decision making that are more subject to changes in decision contexts, and the psychological, genetic, and neural sources of those differences. Dr. Kable received his Ph.D. in Neuroscience from the University of Pennsylvania in 2004, and did his postdoctoral work with Paul Glimcher at New York University before returning to Penn in 2008 as an Assistant Professor in Psychology. 演講一 時間:6月14日 (星期四) 下午1:30-3:30 地點:台灣大學社科院第28教室 Title: Sustaining Delay of Gratification: Potential Cognitive and Neural Mechanisms Abstract: Persistence in the pursuit of long-run outcomes is an important dimension of self-control. Decision-makers often fail to persist: they initially choose a larger, later outcome, wait a period of time, and then abandon this initial choice in favor of a smaller, immediate reward that had always been available. Explanations for this kind of dynamic reversal usually assume that the timing of outcomes is known with certainty, but this is rarely the case in the real world. When outcome timing is uncertain, a rational decision-maker should continually update their estimate of the remaining delay. The value of continued persistence therefore hinges critically on the decision-maker's prior expectations regarding the temporal uncertainty. We first show that, with respect to several self-control dilemmas, decision-makers hold temporal expectations that would rationalize persistence failure at some point. In a series of behavioral experiments, we then demonstrate that people adapt their degree of persistence depending on the statistics of the environment, waiting longer for delayed rewards when persistence is profitable, and exhibiting a reduced willingness to wait when reversals are merited. Finally, we show that when individuals wait for delayed rewards, BOLD activity in medial prefrontal regions reflects a continually updated estimate of the delayed reward's value. This activity varies depending on the timing statistics of the environment, and predicts whether an individual will abandon the delayed outcome or continue to persist. These results demonstrate the critical role of temporal expectations in persistence, and suggest that shaping these expectations could encourage persistence when this is desired. 演講二 時間:6月17日 (星期日) 下午2:45-3:45 地點:陽明大學活動中心第三會議室 Title: When you keep changing your mind: Psychological and neural mechanisms of preference reversals Abstract: Systematic inconsistencies in people's decisions provide a central challenge to rational choice theories. A classic example is the "preference reversal phenomenon": for two gambles matched in expected value, people systematically choose the higher-probability option but provide a higher bid for the option that offers the greater amount to win. Here we use eye-tracking and functional brain imaging to help better understand the mechanism underlying such reversals. We find that the preference reversal phenomenon is accompanied by a shift in visual attention to different attributes, with people fixating probabilities more during choices and payoffs more during bids. We also find a corresponding change in the influence that different attributes have on neural signals linked to the computation and comparison of subjective values. These findings support a "contingent weighting" explanation of preference reversals, which locates the source of the reversal in a task-dependent change in the weight given different attributes in the valuation process. -- ※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 120.126.40.174 ※ 編輯: sanmogreen 來自: 120.126.40.174 (06/12 16:12)
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