Fw: [外電] How Paying Established Closers Saves T
※ [本文轉錄自 MLB 看板 #1J0cXso4 ]
作者: EEERRIICC (魯蛇觀止) 看板: MLB
標題: [外電] How Paying Established Closers Saves T
時間: Tue Feb 18 03:52:16 2014
How Paying Established Closers Saves Teams Money
簽下正職終結者如何能節省球隊開銷
http://www.hardballtimes.com/how-paying-established-closers-saves-teams-money/
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Teams that pay steep price tags for “proven closers” often get ridiculed by
statistically-inclined baseball writers and readers, often for good reason.
This tends to be especially true when these teams already have a viable
replacement in their bullpen who is cheaper and maybe even a superior pitcher.
那些花一大把銀子簽下所謂“proven closers”的球隊,常常是被那些數據派的作家
所嘲弄,在球隊本身就有許多更便宜、甚至更優秀的替代人選之下更顯得如此。
However, as Jeff Sullivan wrote on FanGraphs, when those teams include the
Athletics and Rays, we tend to step back and reevaluate our positions since
these teams typically know what they’re doing. When the A’s traded for Jim
Johnson in early December it was a bit of a head-scratcher, as the team had
two young relievers perfectly capable of handling the ninth inning in Ryan
Cook and Sean Doolittle. While Sullivan pointed out at the time that the A’s
roster was deep and it would be difficult for them to upgrade elsewhere,
there was another reason that didn’t receive as much attention: signing a
veteran reliever could keep the young relievers out of the closer role, thus
reducing their cost.
就像Sullivan所寫的一樣,這些球隊包含了運動家還有光芒。
當豆爺簽下Jim Johnson時,大家的第一個反應就是搔搔頭,因為A's本身就有兩隻年輕
牛棚可以擔下終結者的重任(Cook & Doolittle)。
然而Sullivan卻聽出了弦外之音:簽下一名有經驗的終結者可以讓年輕小牛遠離終結者
這個位置,進而節省使用他們的代價。
(P.S.) Jeff Sullivan在FanGraph寫的文章:http://ppt.cc/POoJ
The Athletics were the most prominent team to make a move like this, but
plenty of other situations where teams with excellent young relievers and
departing closers opted to sign a veteran to take over the ninth inning. The
Rays acquired Heath Bell (and later signed Grant Balfour) instead of giving
strikeout machine Jake McGee a chance to close, and the Indians followed suit
by signing John Axford (coming off a -0.5 WAR season) to handle the ninth
inning despite Cody Allen’s strong 2013 campaign. Most recently, the
Mariners committed $14 million so that Fernando Rodney could close out games
while Danny Farquhar, with his 34.7 percent strikeout rate and 1.86 FIP in
2013, got bumped to a setup role. Earlier in the offseason, the Rockies
signed journeyman LaTroy Hawkins to close despite the presence of Rex
Brothers as well.
當然不只運動家這麼作,不少隊伍在擁有優秀牛棚以及終結者從缺的狀況下,GM們都傾向
簽下一名有經驗的終結者。光芒簽下了Bell跟Balfour,無視三振機器McGee的表現;
印地安人簽下了Axford處理第九局的任務,儘管Cody Allen上季是如此強悍;水手簽下了
Rodney,去年34.7%三振率以及1.86FIP的Farquhar只能為他Set-up;更早之前,落磯簽下
了浪人Hawkins擔任終結者,而非Brothers亦是這種情況。
So what’s really happening here? In three of these cases, the veteran closer
had actually performed significantly worse than the young set-up man in 2013,
yet the teams went out and committed significant money to these free agents.
While these moves may be frustrating for baseball fans, a deeper analysis
reveals that these deals might make quite a bit of economic sense for these
teams. The idea of saving money on young relievers is occasionally thrown
around, but how much money can teams really save?
所以到底花生省魔術?
上述案例中某些CP去年甚至表現的比原本隊上的年輕小牛還要差,球隊卻還是選擇把他們
簽下來當終結者,這令球迷心碎挫折,但在更深層的分析之下,這些交易卻有那麼一點
省錢的意味。
究竟省了多少呢?
Let’s try to keep things relatively simple by focusing on the Athletics,
given the fact that their in-house closer candidates have amassed multiple
excellent seasons but have yet to reach arbitration. You can make a case that
the other teams might not have been comfortable with their in-house options,
but that argument simply doesn’t hold water for the A’s.
Simple點,拿豆爺的魔球隊伍出來看就好。
For the purpose of this research, we’ll assume that had the A’s kept their
bullpen intact after Balfour’s departure, Ryan Cook would have handled the
ninth inning. Cook has a 2.55 ERA over 148 innings in two seasons with the A’
s and 7.2 innings with Diamondbacks and has earned 16 saves in that time. So
far, Cook looks like an elite set-up man, pitching mostly in the seventh and
eighth innings and earning 44 holds with the A’s. Luckily for us, the cost
for an elite set-up man in his first year of arbitration is pretty well
defined as you can see from the pre-arbitration stats and first-year
arbitration salaries in the table below.
讓我們先假設運動家原封不動的把少了Balfour的牛棚搬到2014年,Cook理所當然會接下
9局的任務(約莫148局 2.55ERA 外帶16SV)。
目前為止,Cook就是一位精英布局投手,在7、8兩局上場並奪下了44個中繼點。
幸運的是,在薪資仲裁的第一年,使用一位優秀的布局投手的代價幾乎已經落入了窠臼,
如同下表所顯示的仲裁前數據以及仲裁第一年的薪水。
ELITE SET-UP MEN, FIRST TIME THROUGH ARBITRATION
Player IP ERA WAR SV Hold Arb 1 ($M)
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David Robertson 172 2.62 4.0 3 53 1.6
Jonny Venters 171 1.89 2.9 6 59 1.6
Luke Gregerson 209 3.10 3.2 3 83 1.6
Tyler Clippard 239 2.52 3.0 1 64 1.6
Bobby Parnell 163 2.98 2.0 13 38 1.6
Sergio Romo 144 2.38 4.3 3 54 1.6
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Average 183 2.58 3.23 5 59 1.6
If we assume Cook maintains his current level of excellence in 2014, he’d
project to beat most of this group in innings pitched (222), WAR (4.5) and
holds (68). However, even players with lots of innings (Clippard) or holds
(Gregerson) received the same $1.6 million figure. Cook also already has more
saves than anyone in the group at 16, but once again we see that Parnell’s
13 saves didn’t help him out-earn the others.
假設Cook在2014能維持高檔狀態,他的預測數據將會打敗上表在座的各位。
即使有球員吃了非常多局數(Clippard)或是拿了一堆中繼點(Gregerson),他們仲裁
第一年還是一樣乖乖下去領1.6M。你說Cook有16次救援成功,海放表上的諸位,
可惜同樣有著雙位數救援的Parnell也沒辦法領的比其他人更多。
I think it’s safe to assume that if Cook remains an elite set-up man in
2014, he should project to earn $1.6 million in arbitration. Now, how much
might Cook earn in his first year of arbitration if he were to succeed as the
A’s closer in 2014? Luckily, there are a pair of decent comps from this past
season for relievers who didn’t become full-time closers until their final
pre-arb year.
現在來看看,若是Cook在2014年趕赴上任終結者,他會領多少錢。
剛好有兩隻牛在他們仲裁前一年當上了全職終結者,比比看。
ONE-YEAR CLOSERS, FIRST TIME THROUGH ARBITRATION
Player IP ERA WAR SV Hold Arb 1 ($M)
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Steve Cishek 188 2.54 3.2 52 16 3.8
Ernesto Frieri 198 2.96 1.8 60 13 3.8
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Average 193 2.75 2.50 56 15 3.8
You can make a strong case that many of the relievers in the first group had
actually pitched better than Cishek and Frieri. No matter, the 50+ saves from
each of them pushed their earnings to $3.8 million. You could argue that Cook
is better than these guys, but since we’re being conservative let’s just
pencil in Ryan Cook the hypothetical closer for the same $3.8 million.
很明顯的,上一個表中的球員,有幾個其實投的比Cishek或Frieri都好,但是50+的救援
次數卻能有效的在仲裁中把他們的薪資推到3.8M。
或許你會覺得Cook比他們幾位都還強,但我們就保守估計吧,假設他在2014年就接下終結
者的狀況下會領到3.8M。
Looks like Billy Beane has already saved $2.2 million from his 2015 payroll,
not too shabby. But since we know that arbitration raises are built off of
the previous year, saving $2.2 million in year one will also lead to savings
in years two and three. This is where the numbers get a bit more difficult.
Let’s go back to the first group and look at what a few of the relievers
earned in the rest of arbitration.
看起來豆爺只為球團在2015薪資表中省了2.2M。(3.8 - 1.6 = 2.2)
但我們知道,仲裁是會依年資累積的,明年省了2.2M也會間接省到後面幾年的開銷。
讓我們回到第一個表,看看其中幾位在接下來幾次仲裁中領了多少。
ELITE SET-UP MEN, ALL TIMES THROUGH ARBITRATION
Player Arb1 Arb2-SV Arb2 Arb3-SV Arb3 Arb Total
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David Robertson 1.6 5 3.1 8 5.2 9.9
Tyler Clippard 1.6 33 4.0 33 5.9 11.5
Bobby Parnell 1.6 35 3.7 (2015) (2015) ?
(P.S.)此表中的SV,是各個仲裁的年度所累積的生涯救援數字
Robertson appears to be the best comp for an elite set-up man who never gets
a chance to close, earning just under $10 million over the course of his
contract. Clippard and Parnell fit what we might expect if Cook gets a shot
to close in 2015 after Johnson’s contract expires, although Clippard went
back to being a set-up man in his penultimate year and we won’t know Parnell
’s final arbitration contract for another year.
Robertson是最好的例子,幾乎沒有救援機會的他在這些日子裡領了不到10M。
而另外兩位剛好符合了Cook在2015時Johnson離開球隊後的狀況。
Since Clippard’s ERA (3.72) and Parnell’s low innings total (50 IP) leading
into their second arbitration year may have cost them, let’s assume Cook can
beat the pair and earn $4.2 million in 2015 in his first year as a full-time
closer. To fill in the rest of the blanks, let’s take a look at a few recent
relievers who followed similar paths to see how their arbitration costs
escalated.
Clippard的ERA跟Parnell的局數降低了使用他們的代價,我們假設優秀的Cook可以在
2015接下終結者後拿到4.2M,為了預測未來幾年的薪資成長,讓我們來看看其他幾隻
狀況類似的牛,薪資是如何成長的。
RECENT CLOSERS, ALL TIMES THROUGH ARBITRATION
Player Super2 Arb Arb1 Arb2 Arb3
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Chris Perez 2.2 4.5 7.3 Non-Tender
Jim Johnson 1.0 2.6 6.5 10.0
Joel Hanrahan N/A 1.4 4.1 7.0
Matt Capps N/A 2.4 3.5 7.2
It’s not easy to find pitchers who didn’t start closing until their third
or fourth year of team control, so unfortunately, three of the four recent
comps were super-twos, two weren’t all that great, two were non-tendered,
and one is Johnson himself. Perez got a $2.8 million raise after a season
with 39 saves and a 3.59 ERA, while Hanrahan and Capps both earned $3.7
million raises after eclipsing the 40-save mark with ERAs under 2.5. The key
takeaway here is that an effective pitcher who is earning saves as a
full-time closer will see raises of $2-4 million in arbitration. While a
reliever like Cook is certainly capable of putting up a monster season and
earning a $3.5-4 million raise, let’s keep things simple and use $3 million.
Perez在拿到了39SV之後,薪資漲了2.8M;Capps跟Hanrahan在40+救援的加持下,漲幅
也達到了3.7M。關鍵在於,一個球員開始接下終結者工作後,仲裁會給他2-4M的薪資
漲幅。
當然Cook是絕對有能力製造一個怪物球季並拿到3.5-4M的薪資漲幅,我們姑且就用3M
來算算看。
(P.S.) Super 2的規則: http://www.fangraphs.com/library/business/super-two/
Using this knowledge, we can put together a table estimating Ryan Cook’s
expected arbitration cost if he had become a full-time closer in 2014 versus
waiting until 2015 to close out games.
有了這些數據可以推斷,我們作出Cook在2014趕赴上任或等到2015才接下終結者後,
未來薪資的比較表。
RYAN COOK, POTENTIAL VS. PROBABLE EARNINGS
Player Arb 1 Arb 2 Arb 3 Arb Total
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Ryan Cook w/ Johnson 1.6 4.2 7.2 13.0
Ryan Cook, closer 3.8 6.8 9.8 20.4
There you have it. By keeping Cook out of the ninth inning for just one year,
the A’s appear to be saving around $7.4 million in arbitration costs. This
makes the net cost of having Jim Johnson close for the A’s in 2014 around
$3M. You could argue that these numbers are a bit generous, but assuming that
Cook continues to be an effective reliever, the A’s appear to be saving at
least $5 million with this move. A $10 million Jim Johnson doesn’t look too
great, but at $3-5 million he has to be considered a steal.
恭喜大家得到它了。
原來讓Cook少投一年的第九局,可以在未來替球隊省下約7.4M的開銷,這讓簽下Johnson的
淨花費變成了不到3M。
你說這太理想了,好吧那假設這個動作只為球隊省至少5M好了,那只花3-5M就簽到Johnson
,也能在豆爺的神偷事蹟中加上一筆了。
This analysis also shows us the importance of the first year of arbitration.
Since the salaries build on one another, an inflated figure in the first year
will have a big impact on the subsequent years. Therefore, the difference in
cost between a pitcher who starts closing during his first year of
arbitration and one who starts closing during his final pre-arbitration year
is much greater than the difference between the former pitcher and one who
doesn’t close at all.
這分析顯示了第一年薪資仲裁的重要性,畢竟仲裁是會讓薪資水漲船高的。
總之仲裁前一年不讓好牛被推上火線關門是很重要的。
We also see the degree to which saves trump skill in the arbitration process.
A pitcher like Chris Perez (0.8 career WAR in 333 innings) pitching in the
ninth will end up being significantly more expensive than David Robertson
(7.6 career WAR in 329 innings).
從Robertson跟Perez的比較中,也可以看到這種策略是如何替球隊省下開銷。
So where does this leave us? Teams that have effective young relievers in
their pre-arbitration years when a vacancy in the ninth inning opens up are
put in a tough position. If they hand over the keys to the ninth, they’re
almost certain to pay the price in arbitration.
如果操之過急,讓仲裁前一年的好牛上去關門,那個球隊有可能就要準備多付一筆。
However, if teams sign a veteran closer to keep their young guy from racking
up saves until after his first arbitration hearing, they stand to save a lot
of money, possibly as much as $7-8 million. At the start of 2011, the Atlanta
Braves chose to hand the keys to rookie flamethrower Craig Kimbrel. Now, he’
s about to earn more than any other first-time arbitration-eligible reliever
and may become so expensive that the Braves have to consider trading him.
然而球隊如果簽下了老牌終結者,不讓年輕人有機會累積救援數據,那麼就可以省下約
7-8M的錢。
2011年,勇士隊讓Kimbrel接下九局重任。比起其他第一次仲裁的牛棚投手,Kimbrel
現在身價不同凡響,甚至讓勇士要考慮交易掉他。
(P.S.)勇士已於2/16與Kimbrel達成4年延長合約,4年42M
Given the amount of money on the line, it’s not surprising that nearly every
team that lost its closer to free agency and had a pre-arbitration reliever
posed to take over opened up its wallet and signed a veteran. Effectively,
these teams have a coupon that gives them a huge rebate on a free-agent
closer, but they have to use it this offseason. For a team with deep pockets,
it might make sense to simply let the best reliever close. However,
smaller-market teams that need to squeeze more value of their cost-controlled
players might be more likely to take advantage of this discount. In this
context, these types of acquisitions become not only defensible, but actually
quite brilliant.
所以說在前述情況下,打開錢包簽下一個有經驗的終結者可說是稀鬆平常。
口袋深一點的球隊或許就直接讓年輕小牛接下九局,但小市場球隊必須利用這種策略,
製造出更多的價值。
Earlier in the offseason, Eno Sarris explored some of the complexities of the
arbitration process on the FanGraphs website and podcast, noting how savvy
teams could manipulate the system to save money. Nowhere is there a greater
gap between the arbitration process and the open market than in the premium
placed on saves.
As front offices get wiser and it becomes more difficult to find values on
the free-agent market, teams (especially those with tighter budgets) are
always searching for new market inefficiencies to get an edge. Judging by
some of these transactions, it appears that teams are realizing the economic
advantage that they can get by exploiting the arbitration process to suppress
the costs of their own players.
FEBRUARY 12, 2014 BY MATTHEW MURPHY
http://www.hardballtimes.com/how-paying-established-closers-saves-teams-money/
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簡單說,簽下Johnson是讓Cook或Doolittle沒有機會累積救援數據,使得他們在仲裁
第一年時沒辦法拉高薪資,進而在接下來幾年為球隊省錢。
簡評:化消了我對豆爺簽Johnson的疑惑
非逐字翻譯,請見諒,有錯麻煩不吝指正。
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是的,本文是理想狀態的策略,
我在猜如果簽到一個爛CP,要把小牛推上火線,
那麼與日俱增的committee形式是否就是這種策略之下的因應之道?
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Jim Johnson不是BS天王,怎麼會覺得豆爺無視九局守成呢?
簽Johnson --> 牛棚強化 未來簽自家小牛便宜
未來小牛維持水準,運動家投資得宜,省了一筆錢去補其他位置
未來小牛失去水準,運動家也不用花更多錢當冤大頭
進可攻 退可守的策略 其實不錯
很值得深思的一篇文
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已修正 謝謝:)
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謝謝
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※ 編輯: EEERRIICC 來自: 219.71.226.108 (02/18 12:27)
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※ 轉錄者: condition0 (180.176.29.216), 04/11/2014 03:08:50
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